

AUG 5 1927

90TH YEAR

No. 362

THE
DUBLIN REVIEW

A QUARTERLY AND CRITICAL JOURNAL

JULY, 1927

1. THE LIME STREET CHAPEL (PART II.). By Gregory Macdonald.
2. DR. WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. By Professor A. E. Taylor.
3. A FORGOTTEN FRANCISCAN MYSTIC, BERNARDINO DE LAREDO. By Professor E. Allison Peers.
4. THE CHURCH AND THE HOUR OF FASCISM. By M. Mansfield.
5. THE PERSECUTION IN MEXICO. By His Grace the Archbishop of Michoacan.
6. AFRICA, THE ARABS, AND FRANCE. By M. G. Chadwick.
7. A FURTHER NOTE ON EBION. By Hilaire Belloc.
8. THE COMING OF AGE OF THE IRISH DRAMA. By Andrew E. Malone.
9. SOME RECENT BOOKS ON MYSTICISM.

BOOKS REVIEWED.

DECISIONS OF ROMAN CONGREGATIONS.

LONDON

BURNS OATES & WASHBOURNE LTD.

Price 7s. 6d. Net. Yearly Subscription, 25s. Post Free.

Registered at the Post Office, Chicago, as Second-Class Matter.

IMPORTANT BOOKS

THE LIFE, CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF DESIDERIUS ERASMUS OF ROTTERDAM.

Derived from a Study of his Works and Correspondence. By
JOHN JOSEPH MANGAN, A.M., M.D. Demy 8vo. Two
volumes. With eleven full-page illustrations. 25s.

This book will take its place by the side of Dr. P. S. Allen's edition of the
"Letters of Erasmus" as the standard work on the great reformer.

NEWMAN AS A MAN OF LETTERS.

By JOSEPH J. REILLY, Ph.D. Crown 8vo. xii + 330 pp.
7s. 6d.

Dr. Reilly discusses Newman as man, as preacher, as novelist, as poet,
historian and controversialist, takes up in detail the "Idea of a University,"
and the "Apologia," and concludes with a chapter on "The Significance of
Newman."

THE CALVERT SERIES

General Editor, HILAIRE BELLOC.

Each volume, crown 8vo. Cloth. 4s.

The Catholic Church and Conversion.

By G. K. CHESTERTON.

The Catholic Church and the Appeal to Reason.

By LEO WARD.

The Catholic Church and History.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

The Catholic Church and Philosophy.

By VINCENT McNABB, O.P.

The Catholic Church and its Reactions with Science.

By SIR BERTRAM WINDLE, F.R.S.

BURNS OATES & WASHBOURNE LIMITED

PUBLISHERS TO THE HOLY SEE

28 ORCHARD STREET, W. 1 8-10 PATERNOSTER ROW, E.C. 4

129 VICTORIA STREET, S.W. 1 33 ASHLEY PLACE, S.W. 1

AND AT MANCHESTER, BIRMINGHAM AND GLASGOW

THE DUBLIN REVIEW

July to December, 1927

Half-Yearly Vol. 181.

Nos. 362 & 363

47

LONDON

BURNS OATES &
WASHBOURNE Ltd.

70

General
Faxon

CONTENTS

JULY, AUGUST, SEPTEMBER, 1927

	PAGE
Art. 1. The Lime Street Chapel (Part II.). By Gregory Macdonald	I
Art. 2. Dr. Whitehead's Philosophy of Religion. By Professor A. E. Taylor	17
Art. 3. A Forgotten Franciscan Mystic, Bernardino de Laredo. By Professor E. Allison Peers	42
Art. 4. The Church and the Hour of Fascism. By M. Mansfield	51
Art. 5. The Persecution in Mexico. By His Grace the Archbishop of Michoacan	67
Art. 6. Africa, the Arabs, and France. By M. G. Chadwick	71
Art. 7. A Further Note on Ebion. By Hilaire Belloc	93
Art. 8. The Coming of Age of the Irish Drama By Andrew E. Malone	101
Art. 9. Some Recent Books on Mysticism - -	115
Books Reviewed - - - - -	137
Decisions of Roman Congregations - -	160

BOOKS REVIEWED

G. T. Rivoira's *Roman Architecture and its Principles of Construction under the Empire*; E. H. Goddard and P. A. Gibbons' *Civilization or Civilizations: An Essay in the Spenglerian Philosophy of History*; A. L. Maycock's *The Inquisition*; Christopher Hollis' *Glastonbury and England*; Paul Dhorme's *Le Livre de Job*; William Holden Hutton's *John Wesley*; Raoul Plus' *Facing Life*; C. C. Martindale's *Christ is King*; C. V. Trent's *The Mind of the Saints*; Grace Guiney's *Letters of Louis Imogen Guiney*; Marjorie and C. H. B. Quennell's *Everyday Life in Anglo-Saxon, Viking, and Norman Times*.

CONTENTS

OCTOBER, NOVEMBER, DECEMBER

1927

	PAGE
Art. 1. The Claims of Commonsense. By Fr. M. C. D'Arcy.	161
Art. 2. The Greek Witness to the Immortality of the Soul. By Dom David Knowles, O.S.B.	179
Art. 3. The Criterion in Art. By Dom Raphael Williams, O.S.B.	201
Art. 4. Preaching and History. By W. H. Kent, O.S.C.	210
Art. 5. La Vie Religieuse en Russie Soviétique. By Hélène Iswolsky.	230
Art. 6. Cardinal Pacca and Napoleon. By J. J. Dwyer.	247
Art. 7. The Crisis of the West. By Christopher Dawson.	261
Art. 8. The Economic Life of Fascist Italy (Part I). By Aline Lion.	278
Art. 9. Some Recent Anglican Apologetics.	296
Poem - - - - -	308
Books Reviewed - - - - -	309
Books Received - - - - -	317
Decisions of Roman Congregations - - - - -	320

BOOKS REVIEWED

R. Waterville Muncey's *The Passion of S. Perpetua*; "Spanish Art," *Burlington Magazine*; H.E. President Tommaso Tittoni's *International Economic and Political Problems of the Day and Some Aspects of Fascism Discussed*, 1919-26.

Three Plays by William Archer

has an Introduction by

BERNARD SHAW

which, according to the *Times Literary Supplement*, is "one of the most gracious and pleasing things Mr. Shaw has written : and makes a valuable preface to any study of Archer's work."

10s. net

also

THE INQUISITION : From its Establishment to the Great Schism.
By A. L. MAYCOCK M.A. With an Introduction by FATHER RONALD KNOX, and 8 colotype plates. 12s. 6d. net.

THE FRANCISCANS IN ENGLAND (1224-1539)
By EDWARD HUTTON. 7s. 6d. net.

WESTERN MYSTICISM : With "Afterthoughts."
By DOM CUTHBERT BUTLER. New Edition. 12s. net.

AN OPEN-AIR PULPIT.
By FATHER RONALD KNOX. 6s. net.

CONSTABLE ORANGE ST LONDON WC 2

The "Thoughts of the Saints" Series

Each volume, cloth, 2s. 6d. ; leather, 5s.

1. **THOUGHTS OF SAINT TERESA FOR EVERY DAY.**
Selected and arranged by KATHLEEN MARY BALFE.
2. **THOUGHTS OF SAINT JOHN OF THE CROSS FOR EVERY DAY.** Selected and arranged by KATHLEEN MARY BALFE.
3. **SAYINGS OF ST CATHERINE OF SIENA.** Arranged by a Gleaner 'mid God's Saints.
4. **THOUGHTS FROM ST FRANCIS OF ASSISI FOR EVERY DAY.** Selected and arranged by FLORA LUCY FREEMAN.
5. **THOUGHTS OF BLESSED RAMON LULL FOR EVERY DAY.** Selected and arranged by E. ALLISON PEERS.
6. **THOUGHTS OF ST AUGUSTINE FOR EVERY DAY.**
Selected and arranged by KATHLEEN MARY BALFE.
7. **THOUGHTS OF ST FRANCIS DE SALES FOR EVERY DAY.** Selected and arranged by ALAN G. McDUGALL.

BURNS OATES & WASHBOURNE LTD.

MORE NEW BOOKS

THE COMPLETE POEMS OF G. K. CHESTERTON.
Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d.

THE LIFE OF MOTHER MAGDALEN TAYLOR.
Foundress of the Poor Servants of the Mother of God
(1832-1900).

By FATHER DEVAS, S.J. With a Preface by CARDINAL BOURNE,
and 22 illustrations. Demy 8vo. xii + 385 pp. 15s.

"To all the name and story of Mother Magdalen Taylor should be a source of high inspiration, of new endeavour, and of confident trust in God."—CARDINAL BOURNE.
"I have read with great interest and much edification the excellent life . . . it is full of incidents which keep up the interest of the narrative to the end."—CARDINAL GASQUET.

SAINT TERESA OF LISIEUX: A Spiritual Renaissance.

By PÈRE PETITOT, O.P. Translated from the French by the
Benedictines of Stanbrook. Crown 8vo. About 340 pp. 6s.

THE STORY OF BRUGES, GHENT AND YPRES.
Retold from the Chronicles of Sir JOHN FROISSART, with 22 wood-
cut illustrations by DOROTHY A. H. MILLS. Quarto, 7s. 6d.

ANNE MARIE: A Friend of the Maid.

A new story by SOPHIE MAUDE, dealing with France and England
in the days of Saint Joan. The Maid herself is one of the principal
characters. 3s. 6d.

THE MIND OF THE SAINTS.

By C. V. TRENT. Cloth, 6s.

Some main characteristics of the Saints' lives illustrated by many examples. The book
consists in part of essays which have already appeared in *The Sower*, and discusses the
rôle the Saints have performed in the world's life and their special contribution to human
progress, as manifested in their relation with our Lord, their motives, asceticism,
detachment, mysticism and martyrdom.

CONTEMPLATIVE PRAYER.

By PÈRE DE LA TAILLE, S.J. Translated by a Tertiary of the
Order of Mount Carmel. Wrapper, 1s.

**LIGHT ON MOUNT CARMEL: A Guide to the
Works of St. John of the Cross.**

By LUDOVIC DE BESSE, O.S.F.C. Translated from "Eclaircisse-
ments sur les oeuvres de S. Jean de la Croix" by a Monk of
Parkminster. Boards, 2s. 6d.

THE SPIRITUAL ARMOUR.

By ST CATHERINE OF BOLOGNA. Together with "The Way of
the Cross," by Blessed ANGELA OF FOLIGNO. Translated from
the Italian by ALAN G. McDUGALL. Wrapper, 1s.

BURNS OATES & WASHBOURNE LTD.

PUBLISHERS TO THE HOLY SEE

28 ORCHARD ST., W. 1 8-10 PATERNOSTER ROW, E.C. 4
129 VICTORIA STREET, S.W. 1 33 ASHLEY PLACE, S.W. 1

AND AT MANCHESTER, BIRMINGHAM AND GLASGOW

CHURCH CHAIRS of Superior Quality

Cheap Chairs for Halls, Convents, Schools, etc. Also Hymn Boards, Prie-Dieu Desks, and Credence Tables in Oak. Seasoned Timber. Best Workmanship. Satisfaction Guaranteed. Numerous recommendations from Catholic clergy, convents, etc. *Catalogues free.*

Established 100 years.



MEALING BROTHERS, LTD., *Avenue Chair Works*
WEST END ROAD, HIGH WYCOMBE

The Novels of Father Robert Hugh Benson

The first ten volumes of the new collected edition are now ready. The text is in every case absolutely unabridged; the books remain as in the original editions published in the author's lifetime. Each volume, bound in blue cloth, with picture wrapper, 2/6.

THE CONVENTIONALISTS
THE SENTIMENTALISTS
THE NECROMANCERS
THE LIGHT INVISIBLE
THE HISTORY OF RICHARD RAYNAL
THE KING'S ACHIEVEMENT
THE QUEEN'S TRAGEDY
BY WHAT AUTHORITY?
COME RACK! COME ROPE!
ODDSFISH!

BURNS OATES & WASHBOURNE LTD.

PUBLISHERS TO THE HOLY APOSTOLIC SEE

28 ORCHARD ST., W.1

8-10 PATERNOSTER ROW, E.C. 4

129 VICTORIA STREET, S.W. 1

33 ASHLEY PLACE, S.W. 1

AND AT MANCHESTER, BIRMINGHAM AND GLASGOW

RECENT BOOKS

DEVOTIONAL AND ASCETIC PRACTICES IN THE MIDDLE AGES

By DOM LOUIS GOUGAUD, Benedictine of St Michael's Abbey, Farnborough. English Edition prepared by G. C. BATEMAN. 5s.

Essays on : Attitudes of Prayer—Eastward Position in Prayer—Altar Devotion—Why was Saturday dedicated to Our Lady?—The Beginnings of the Devotion to the Sacred Heart—Death-Bed Clothing with the Religious Habit—Fasting in Ireland—Ascetic Immersions—The Discipline as an Instrument of Penance—The Desire for Martyrdom.

EDEN'S FOURFOLD RIVER

An Instruction on Contemplative Life, written for the Monks of Witham Charterhouse, Somerset, circa 1200 A.D. Edited with an Introduction by a Monk of Parkminster. Being No. 4 of the Orchard Books, Extra Series. Cloth, 2s. 6d. ; leather, 5s.

THE AMENDING OF LIFE

By RICHARD ROLLE, of Hampole, Hermit. Being a Translation into English of his treatise, *De Emendacione Vitae*, made in the year 1434 by RICHARD MISYN, Carmelite. Edited and slightly modernized by A. P. With an Introduction by the same. Being No. 5 of the Orchard Books, Extra Series. Cloth, 2s. 6d. ; leather, 5s.

A MANUAL FOR INTERIOR SOULS

By Père JEAN GROU, S.J. Authorized English Translation. New Impression. Crown 8vo. 5s.

THE LIFE OF UNION WITH GOD

And the Means of attaining it, according to the great Masters of Spirituality. By the Very Rev. CANON AUGUSTE SAUDREAU. Translated from *La Vie d'Union a Dieu* by E. J. STRICKLAND. Demy 8vo. Cloth. 10s. 6d.

THE SCALE OF PERFECTION

By WALTER HILTON, Augustinian Canon of Thurgarton Priory, Nottinghamshire. Modernized from the first printed edition of Wynkyn de Worde by an Oblate of Solesmes. With an Introduction from the French of Dom M. Noetinger, Monk of Solesmes. Being No. 13 of the Orchard Books. Cloth, 5s. ; leather, 7s. 6d.

THE ORDINARY WAYS OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE

A Treatise on Ascetic Theology for the use of Seminaries, the Clergy and Layfolk. By Mgr. ALBERT FARGES, Ph.D., S.T.D. English Translation. Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d.
A companion volume to the same author's *Mystical Phenomena*.

BURNS OATES & WASHBOURNE LTD.

PUBLISHERS TO THE HOLY SEE

28 Orchard Street, W. 1 8-10 Paternoster Row, E.C. 4
129 Victoria Street, S.W. 1 33 Ashley Place, S.W. 1
AND . AT . MANCHESTER . BIRMINGHAM . AND . GLASGOW

THE DUBLIN REVIEW

July, August, September, 1927

LONDON

BURNS OATES &
WASHBOURNE Ltd.

COMMUNICATIONS in regard to articles should be addressed to Mr. Algar Thorold, Editor of THE DUBLIN REVIEW, The Gravel Pit, Chalfont St. Peter, Bucks.

Communications respecting the Publishing Department should be addressed to BURNS OATES & WASHBOURNE Ltd., 28 Orchard Street, London, W. 1. Advertisements should reach the Publishers not later than the 10th of the last month of each Quarter.

PRINTED IN ENGLAND

CONTENTS

JULY, AUGUST, SEPTEMBER, 1927

	PAGE
Art. 1. The Lime Street Chapel (Part II.). By Gregory Macdonald	1
Art. 2. Dr. Whitehead's Philosophy of Religion. By Professor A. E. Taylor	17
Art. 3. A Forgotten Franciscan Mystic, Bernardino de Laredo. By Professor E. Allison Peers	42
Art. 4. The Church and the Hour of Fascism. By M. Mansfield	51
Art. 5. The Persecution in Mexico. By His Grace the Archbishop of Michoacan	67
Art. 6. Africa, the Arabs, and France. By M. G. Chadwick	71
Art. 7. A Further Note on Ebion. By Hilaire Belloc	93
Art. 8. The Coming of Age of the Irish Drama By Andrew E. Malone	101
Art. 9. Some Recent Books on Mysticism - -	115
Books Reviewed - - - - -	137
Decisions of Roman Congregations - - -	160

BOOKS REVIEWED

G. T. Rivoira's *Roman Architecture and its Principles of Construction under the Empire*; E. H. Goddard and P. A. Gibbons' *Civilization or Civilizations; An Essay in the Spenglerian Philosophy of History*; A. L. Maycock's *The Inquisition*; Christopher Hollis' *Glastonbury and England*; Paul Dhorme's *Le Livre de Job*; William Holden Hutton's *John Wesley*; Raoul Plus' *Facing Life*; C. C. Martindale's *Christ is King*; C. V. Trent's *The Mind of the Saints*; Grace Guiney's *Letters of Louis Imogen Guiney*; Marjorie and C. H. B. Quennell's *Everyday Life in Anglo-Saxon, Viking, and Norman Times*.

THE CALVERT SERIES

General Editor: Hilaire Belloc.

Each volume, crown 8vo., bound in blue cloth, 4s.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND CONVERSION

By G. K. Chesterton.

"One of the most stimulating and convincing books he has ever written, and we cannot praise it too highly."

Catholic Times.

"It has been a real joy to read."—*Catholic Gazette.*

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE APPEAL TO REASON

By Leo Ward.

"An able defence of the Church's unceasing insistence on the appeal to Reason as the only secure basis for religion, both natural and revealed."

Westminster Cathedral Chronicle.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND HISTORY

By Hilaire Belloc.

"A rebutting of evidence drawn from history which is presumed to demolish the claim of the Catholic Church to be God's divinely-commissioned authority upon earth."

Catholic Gazette.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND PHILOSOPHY

By Vincent McNabb, O.P.

"An excellent treatise on general Catholic philosophy."

Irish Weekly.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND ITS REACTIONS WITH SCIENCE

By Sir Bertram Windle, F.R.S.

BURNS OATES & WASHBOURNE LTD.

PUBLISHERS TO THE HOLY SEE

28 ORCHARD ST., W. 1 8-10 PATERNOSTER ROW, E.C. 4

129 VICTORIA ST., S.W. 1 33 ASHLEY PLACE, S.W. 1

AND :: AT :: MANCHESTER :: BIRMINGHAM :: AND :: GLASGOW

The Dublin Review

JULY, 1927

No. 362

ART. I.—THE LIME STREET CHAPEL

PART II

THE opposition which James clearly expected began to make itself felt so soon as the workmen were installed to prepare the chapel; its origin was universally ascribed to the Bishop of London* and the Dean of St. Paul's. The instrument they used was the Lord Mayor himself, which was all the more surprising, as Sir Thomas Jeffries was a relative of Lord Chancellor Jeffries, and had been until that time considered a staunch friend of the Court. Accompanied by his sheriffs and others, the Lord Mayor entered the house forcibly and drove the workmen from the premises, "severall of his Lordship's attendants affronting and giving ill language to the sayd Resident's servants."† He even presumed to lock up the place and carry off the keys.‡ But Stanford complained at once to the King; and "his Ma^{ty} having taken the sayd matter into Consideration and thinking himself obliged to take the sayd Resident into his particular protection against all the like insults contrary to y^e Law of Nations"§ summoned

* Compton, Bishop of London, had already been dismissed the Council for refusing to check controversial sermons. This gave him a greater influence as a martyr for Protestantism. But James felt that if the Established Church broke a religious peace he was free to associate himself with the advance of Catholicism. The King told Barillon "que la Chapelle sera bastie et frequentée comme celle(s) des autres Ministres publics: et que l'on trouvera mesme des moyens d'en bastir d'autres: que le Maire avoit esté suscité par l'Evesque de Londres à s'opposer à l'establisement de cette Chapelle, et que, puisque la Cabale des factieux avoit levé le masque et pretendoit empêcher une chose juste et raisonnable, il s'en serviroit pour avancer l'exécution de la résolution où il est d'establir la religion Catholique autant qu'il luy sera possible."

† Privy Council Registers, P.R.O., Vol. LXXI, March 26, 1686.

‡ *Ellis Correspondence*, Letter XXXIII.

§ Privy Council Registers, P.R.O., Vol. LXXI, March 26, 1686.

Sir Thomas to his presence. The Lord Mayor, who was formally rebuked by the King and by the Chancellor, declared that when he closed the place a riot was imminent, that Stanford's action was in any case illegal, and that in setting up a Catholic chapel he was the more to be blamed, being an Englishman by birth.* The force of these and other arguments was nullified by the King's arid thanks for a zeal assuredly not according to knowledge. Ignoring the head and front of Stamford's offence against the ultra-Protestant City of London, James laid down the obvious principle that, in case of riots against the Palatine Resident, the rioters were to be prosecuted, not the Resident. The Resident was free to do what he would in his own house, and he was responsible for his actions to the King alone. The Lord Mayor, however unwilling, was forced to give an undertaking that he would protect the chapel. Possibly he would still have turned a blind eye to future riots, but when he heard of James' offer to Stamford to garrison the City on his behalf he became the most zealous of protectors. Owing to the precautions which had been taken, no one could do more than guess how far James was concerned with Stamford; but as the connection between them was by now easily to be assumed,† the enemies of the chapel saw fit after this to leave active assaults upon it in the very capable hands of the London apprentices. "It looks with an odd face, and provoking to the *mobile*," wrote one Londoner,‡ "and ours have as weak a pretence to prudence upon such occasions as any *mobile* in the world."

More important perhaps, but less effective than the Anglican and civic opposition to the chapel, were the protests made to James by Philip William immediately the project of his representative was communicated to him. Here, and in Barillon's despatches, we see the importance of the chapel in the game of international diplomacy. During April the Elector wrote a stern letter to Stamford dissociating himself from all connection with the business

* Van Citters, March 30, 1868.

† Stanford wrote two weeks after in boasting of his own influence with the King: "On remarque qu'il est bien long temps et fort sovant seul avec sa Majesté dans son Cabinet et il prend audience quand il veut et sans cérémonies."

‡ *Ellis Correspondence*, Letter XXXIII.

and hinting that the expenses already incurred should be borne by the zealous Catholics and others who were benefited.* Philip William considered it an unprecedented imposition to expect him to finance a chapel "in the city of so powerful a monarch, when we find ourselves in our Palatinate, of which the people are heretics, hardly able to afford the hire of rooms in the cities and towns for the gradual restoration of the exercise of the Catholic religion." He refused to believe that James had, in fact, suggested the project, "for we are persuaded that he would not have thrown himself into such a public affair, which may draw down upon us the hatred of so many Protestant princes and even cause unrest or rebellion in our territories, without awaiting our verdict; for our Chapel in the middle of the City of London will convert as few of the people as all the great and beautiful churches and all the Clergy of France have converted of the Huguenots who have left that kingdom!" So he forbade Stamford to carry on the work in his name, and he refused to sanction the smallest expense; with the added assurance that Stamford was not alone in not having a chapel, for the representative of the Elector of Cologne, an Elector who was in fact an ecclesiastic, was also without one. Stamford's answer was the complacent remark that "the chapel is already famous; all Christendom speaks of it." He mentioned a letter which the Earl of Sunderland had written to Heidelberg in the hope that it would soon be answered; and he added, with an indifference to punctuation which must have been peculiarly exasperating to the Elector: "It is entirely in the power of your Highness to oblige his Majesty to the highest degree since all the other Princes only seek the occasion to please him however the £500 I borrowed for the work is spent and the work only half done."

At the end of April the Elector wrote to James himself. His attitude now was to pretend that the chapel was founded by the ambitious Stamford without the encourage-

* "Vous ne dites pas mal de ne vous avoir jamais trouvé plus embarrassé d'à présent puisque sans nostre ordre vous vous avez voulu vous charger des nouvelles depes superflues en prennant à interest l'argent que vous y allez employer contre nostre gré, si ce n'est que vous veniez assisté par le zèle des Catholiques, ou d'autres qui y contribuent à ces frays comme nous croyons."

ment of the King. He remarked that even during the lifetime of Charles II Stamford made many and frequent representations for the maintenance of a chapel. Now that he had founded a chapel on his own responsibility "under pretext of an order and encouragement received from your Majesty," the Elector had no doubt that his action arose "out of an obstinate ambition fostered for many years"; or—was it possible?—"he solicited your Majesty so long that you finally gave your consent."

If this were so, the Elector openly expressed his sorrow for it. James knew very well, he said, that it was his policy "to assist and help all Protestants within and without the Roman Empire for their own best interests, thus to preserve in them the greatest affection and their hitherto assured support for the Electoral house."

This chapel might be used as a pretext by Protestants to cut themselves off from him, and in any case he had no desire to mix in the religious affairs of another kingdom. If this were Stamford's doing the Elector felt that Stamford had dishonoured his mission, and he had heard regretfully that opposition had already been forthcoming from the Lord Mayor. But "if it happened with your Majesty's approval and consent I have but to advise my Resident, whom up to the present I have left unanswered* in this matter, of my approbation and to call him over here to me for this and also for other matters, in order to send either him or another back with my approval."

This letter was considered by James of such a nature that he must answer it himself. Luckily we know from the despatches of his confidant Barillon his attitude towards

* The letter to Stamford already quoted is dated Heidelberg, April, 1686. The exact date is illegible or not recorded. The letter to James is dated Fredericksburg, den 5 May, 1686. So he had not left Stamford unanswered. This letter to James is in German, the only one in the series. A second letter, dated Fredericksburg, ce 10^{me} May, 1686, is almost the same, word for word, but in French. One difference is his pretence that James, to oblige (as he thought) the Elector through Stamford, had assisted in the foundation of the chapel against his own policy: "Et j'aurois d'autant plus de douleur, si l'intention que V.M. auroit eue dans ce rencontre à l'instance de mon Résident, de me faire une grace, causoit du chagrin à Elle même, en donnant par là, à ses propres sujets occasion de s'irriter contre Elle et d'en témoigner du mécontentement selon que j'ay appris avec de plaisir, que le Lord Mayor a même déjà fait quelques oppositions au sujet de cette Chapelle." The German copy was probably the Elector's first draught, worked over and translated by the Secretariat.

the Elector in the matter, although the actual letter or letters written by James were possibly destroyed during the French invasions of the Palatinate. It would be interesting to know definitely how Louis XIV and his ambassador regarded the foundation of the chapel, for it was Louis' policy with James to keep him occupied in home affairs, so that he would not throw himself into the political balance of Europe.* But here he was engaged in a matter which might have international results. On the other hand, the understanding between James and Louis made the former quite indifferent to the legitimate expostulation of the Elector. In June Barillon wrote that James had received a letter from Philip William. "The King of England made fun of the letter, as unworthy of a Catholic Prince. He is resolved that the Chapel remain where it is." And at the end of the same month Barillon again described James' relations with the Elector, who must have suggested that the chapel should be removed from the City to some place less likely to offend the eyes of Londoners.† "The King of England derided the letter sent him by the Elector Palatine to transfer his Resident's chapel. He thinks that the counsel emanates from London, and that the Ministers of the House of Austria are very anxious that a Prince entirely attached to the Empire should not give an occasion of real offence to the people of London. He is decided not to vacate the part of a King of England and he is satisfied with the course he has taken in paying no regard to the Elector's letter. The extreme Protestants have already been boasting that they have obtained a victory, thinking that this chapel may be removed from

* Barillon, April 11, told Louis that he had impressed James with the idea "que V^e M^{te} a pour principal but de maintenir le repos de l'Europe et que les differends qui restent à terminer avec l'Espagne ou avec l'Electeur Palatin se peuvent aisement accommoder si le Conseil de Madrid et celui de Vienne prennent des résolutions conformes à la prudence et à la bonne politique. Il me paroist que le Roy d'Angleterre voit tout cela fort clairement et ne se laisse point du tout alarmer de ce que les partisans de la Maison d'Autriche et du Prince d'Orange peuvent dire. Il est appliqué aux affaires de dedans de son Estat et il connoist bien que s'il laissoit passer la conjuncture présente sans en profiter il trouveroit de plus grands obstacles à ses desseins à l'avenir."

† It may be, though we have no record of it, that Philip William ordered Stamford to retire from the City. But Barillon himself saw no connection between the Elector's orders and Stamford's decision. Le fond est que ce Résident de M. l'electeur Palatin a voulu se mettre en "sécurité."

London. They cannot conceive that a King of England should wish to oppose the design of an Elector Palatine!"

Philip William must have seen that he had no redress and no power to stop the headlong career of his Resident. His strong opposition soon collapsed as completely as the opposition of the Lord Mayor. Probably James exerted some political pressure upon him in one of his private letters. At all events, the Elector wrote from Heidelberg on June 18 a letter of complete resignation. "And since your Majesty," he wrote, "has deigned to inform me that what my Resident has done in the matter of the Chapel has been only to fall in with the intention and desire of your Majesty, I am greatly relieved; so that I humbly beg you to believe that I shall consider it always a pleasure and a particular boon to be able to contribute on all occasions to the advancement of the Catholic religion and also to the service of your Majesty."

Stamford soon enough discovered that the spiritual and political consolations of maintaining a chapel in London were not unmixed with material disadvantages. He moved into the premises on April 2,* and the chapel was probably blessed privately by Bishop Leybourne on Sunday, the 4th.† The first mass‡ was said on Saturday, the 17th, and the chapel was publicly opened on the 18th. Immediately the rioting, which had been intermittent for some time, assumed serious proportions.

Although the Lord Mayor was now zealous enough to preserve the peace by means of the City militia, he could not count upon the equal enthusiasm of that body. On one occasion, when the militia were informed that the crowd

* Stamford, April 5, old style: "Je suis depuis troy jours dans ma maison."

† Van Citters, April 9, old style: "I am informed that last Sunday the chapel of Lord Stamford was consecrated by Father Leybourne, Vicar-General of England, and that afterwards it was proclaimed on the door that service will be performed there every Sunday. The citizens apprehend some commotion from the rabble about this, and should it take place the King will doubtless seize the opportunity to place soldiers in the City."

‡ Stamford, April 19, old style: "Avant hier estant samedy, je fais dire la premier messe, a hier estant dimanche, il y avoit tres grand concours du monde." d'Adda, May 3, new style: "Domenica passata li 28 di April fu aperta la Capella in Londra dal Ministro Palatino."

Luttrell, p. 375, Vol. I.: "On Sunday the 18th was a tumult made in Cheap-side occasioned by the meeting at the popish chappel in Limestreet, some of the rabble having followed the preists thither."

was pulling down popery, they replied that if such were the case they could not in conscience hinder. An apprentice who behaved unseemingly in the chapel was ordered to leave, but he threatened "to break their crosses and juggling boxes down; whereupon a riot seemed to form." A militia officer who arrested him allowed him to slip away, yet not so far but he watched the outcoming of either a priest, or an appendix, of the Chapel, and beat and dragged him through the kennel."*

No wonder, then, that on the day of the public opening the mob actually broke in and did damage to the chapel, tearing down the crucifix from the altar (they set it up by the pump outside and paid it mock veneration!) and smashing the organ. Stamford sent about fifty of them to be tried by the Lord Mayor, and his servants were attacked as they returned to the chapel. Owing to the apathy of the militia the Mayor had to assert his authority in person, and although Stamford expressed himself well satisfied with his efforts, he was again reprimanded by James, who ordered the arrest of the militia officer and renewed his threat to garrison the City.

Such were the risks and dangers of which Fr. Andrew Giffard made no mention in his account of the chapel. Each Sunday and holiday the riots were expected, and as a rule endured, until the end of May. Special precautions were taken by the authorities on such occasions as the Feast of St. George and May Day, for it was becoming a civic pastime for the London hot-heads to "banter Mr. Sandford's chapel." However, by dint of royal and mayoral proclamation that servants and apprentices were to be kept within doors or rigidly accounted for by their masters, the trouble was allayed within six weeks. At least once the Londoners were offered the strange spectacle of a Lord Mayor attending in state a Catholic chapel—though not to bow down in the House of Rimmon, but to preserve the peace. The Lime Street Chapel, with the cessation of riots, became one of the sights of London, to which the curious came for the novelty of Mass and popish

* *Ellis Correspondence*, Letter XLI. The Verney papers contain the remark that one of the priests had his head broke.

sermons. By that time fresh troops had been drafted to the Tower, and probably had taken over also the task of protecting the chapel.* So it remained, calm in its outward history, until the royal power was on the decline in 1688.

Clearly, however, in the internal polity of the chapel there was a disturbance, and a few words may now be said about the change in the staff which took place during the first months of its existence. We have already pointed out that Andrew Giffard in his account makes no mention of the parts played by the King and by Stamford. He is also not to be credited for the implication that the chapel was prepared solely by the efforts and generosity of the Clergy and their friends, unless a chapel was already in existence in Betts' house before Stamford fitted up the building in the garden at the back. Perhaps a private chapel did already exist, because the priests speak of a term of six months, whereas the first mass was said in

* Van Citters, June 1: "It is likewise very remarkable that last Sunday, while a sermon was being preached in English by a priest in Papal dress, and Mass was being said, the soldiers who were guarding the Popish chapel in Lime Street disturbed a Presbyterian conventicle but left undisturbed a Quaker meeting." Van Citters is discussing James' theory of toleration and alliance with Dissenters and Recusants.

It cannot easily be held that James in this matter of the chapel was going farther than the Catholics wished to go, though it is tempting to think that the clergy were dismissed because they hung back from extreme measures. James refused openly to ally himself with Stamford, and few had certain knowledge that he was concerned in the foundation of the chapel. Bishop Leybourne, on the other hand, approved of what was done in the matter. Certainly James did not rush headlong into the project *as a means* of overawing London, though undoubtedly this was one of his policies when it should be safe to carry it out. Only after a number of riots and a series of reprimands for the Mayor did he take the task of guarding the Resident's house from the half-hearted City officers. By that time Stamford was thoroughly frightened and making plans to remove to Holborn, a broader and safer thoroughfare (Barillon). It was only then, perhaps, that James considered it necessary to give Stamford more open protection, for he and the more confident of his ministers opposed the change, "juguant qu'il y auroient beaucoup d'inconvenient et de peril de se relascher dans une chose aussi bien fondée qu'est la Chapelle du Ministre d'un Prince Etranger" (Barillon, June 3). Notice that a display of royal power is not the pretext. The cloak is still the law of nations. But that James did not wish to go to extremes is proved by a note by Stamford, May 10: "L'Ambassadeur d'Espagne m'a proposé comme les affaires de la Chappelle touchent esgalement à leur maistre, que luy avec l'ambassadeur de France et les autres, yront trouver le Roy pour prier, que sa Majesté voudrat trouver moyen de prevenir aux insolances du peuple, je luy réplique, qu'au moins que sa Majesté ne vient aux extremités, il ne pourra faire plus qu'il ne fait, il m'a toute fois prie, que je voudray scavoir le sentement du Roy, sur cette matiere, par ce moyen ils rendront obliger sa Majesté et pouvanter la Ville, mais je crains qu'ils souhaite que sa Majesté voudra venir aux extremités, pour causer des confusions, mais je consulteray sa Majesté."

Stamford's chapel only in April and the Clergy were probably replaced in June.

On the isolated point of the quarrel between the Clergy and the Society we cannot say that Giffard was inaccurate (and to explain that point was the purpose of his memorandum); but we have no support for the story that the reason for the change of staff was (as the Jesuits asserted) a violent quarrel between the Resident and his chaplains.

It is hardly a work of grace to dig up a dispute buried these two and a half centuries. It is enough to say that there was then a certain suspicion and ill-feeling between the Clergy and the Society of Jesus. No doubt the Jesuits gloried in their efficiency, their learning, their persuasiveness, and their personal devotion to the Holy See. No doubt they were inclined to think of the Clergy and the older orders as mediæval anomalies, not quite abreast of modern thought, a trifle timorous when affairs of moment were to hand. It was rather like the recent shades of difference between converts and old Catholics. Certainly the Clergy and the Orders resented the Jesuit attitude and saw double-dealing in Jesuit methods. They charged the Jesuits over and over again with using royal power, or false charges of heresy, for the purpose of placing themselves in an important outpost of the Catholic army. At Holywell,* said the Clergy, through royal intervention they were replaced by the Society; the Benedictines had the same story of usurpation at Bury St. Edmunds and at the Savoy;† and here at Lime Street was found a connection between Petre's influence with James and the priests' dismissal. No wonder Lime Street was brought up as a warning when the English College was accused of Jansenism in 1710.

But, on the other hand, the mere fact that this charge existed makes us careful to inquire in a particular instance whether it is secular suspicion or Jesuit guile that taints the new incumbents. This may be the one case where the suspicion was false; or this may be the one case where the Clergy were Jansenistic. What were the facts?

* Catholic Record Society, Vol. III., p. 105.

† Taunton, *English Black Monks of St. Benedict*, Vol. II., p. 175 and note.

In the first place, Dr. Gother and Andrew Giffard, as we know from the records of their works, were not the men to fall into the errors of Blackloism and Jansenism, nor was Bishop Leybourne a poor judge of orthodoxy. At the beginning of 1686, however, James was already under the influence of Father Petre. Later, as he admitted in his Memoirs, he was "so bewitched" by Sunderland and by Petre as to number the latter, foolishly, among his Privy Councillors.* This, if the charge of the Clergy is true, would explain James' strange insistence when he first mooted the project to Stamford, that the priests selected as chaplains should be quite unaffected by Blackloism, Jansenism, or Gallicanism. We can take it that they were not so affected. Were the Clergy replaced, then, because they quarrelled with the egregious Stamford? Or were they replaced because they were accused of heresy?

On May 14 Stamford wrote to Philip William: "Et comme 4 de mes Chaplains sont suspect de Jancymes, sa Majesté ma prié de prendre des autres, et ordonnat de fair la liste de ses propres prédicateurs qui sont ordonnés de prêcher dans la chappelle palatine, dont l'ormis la chappelle du Roy on n'a jamais fait prédiction, et sa Majesté ne veut que nul autre y prêche." This clearly shows that rumours of Jansenism were flying about and that the preaching at Lime Street was to be by priests from the Royal Chapel, of which Father Petre had charge.†

On May 22 Stamford mentioned that "sa Majesté at esablis deux prédicateurs et donne à chacun cent livrs starlin par an, et ses mesmes doit estre encor suplé par les Prédicateurs de sa Majesté en sort que cette Chappelle coûtera au Roy six cent livrs . . . mais il ny a personne du monde qui sait que sa Majesté contribut une souls, que un R. Père Jesuit."

* Lingard, Vol. X., p. 110 (ed. 1855). Note the phrase in the Annual Letters that Privy Councillor Petre "had procured this foundation from the King."

† The unceasing and successful labours of the Society are described in the Annual Letters: "Ut igitur a regni capite Londino incipiam, hoc de nostris illic degentibus sine vanitate dicere licet quod plus omnibus laborarunt, plures enim diebus festis conciones habitae sunt ab illis solis quam a reliquis omnibus. Praeter duos illos quos Rex sibi delegit concionatores ordinarios, nempe P. Joannem Persol et P. Joannem Dormer, reliqui fere omnes singulis prope festis vel in sacello regio, vel in coenobio Sancti Jacobi . . . vel in sacello Somerhetano Reginae viduae vel oratoris Galli vel Hispani, vel aliis denique sacellis publicis dicebant, non minore fructu quam applausu."

So the problem stands with only Tootell's statement that Whitsuntide was the anniversary of the Clergy's expulsion as a date vaguely coinciding with Stamford's evidence that in May the Clergy were in disfavour, and the Society was obtaining an interest in the chapel. It is still possible to hold that Stamford did, after all, quarrel with his chaplains when he heard from the King that they were suspected of Jansenism. It is also still possible to believe, but not proven, that the Society was the source of these charges.

For a period of more than two years, until November, 1688, the Jesuits maintained the Lime Street Chapel with every success. Their sermons and instructions were popular, as the vague Jesuit account indicates by that vivid picture of Londoners hanging on to the window-sills for a glimpse inside the Catholic church. The precautions taken to prevent riots answered so well that those who came to them for instruction were unmolested; and we know practically nothing of the internal history of the place until rioting once more broke out in 1688. Only in the doubtful *Letter from a Jesuit of Liège to a Jesuit of Fribourg** (which passes many ironic comments upon the Catholic activities of the time) do we find an intimate mention of Lime Street. "Father Alexander Regnes,† the Provincial's nephew, to whom is committed the care of the chapel belonging to the Elector Palatine's Envoy, is continually taken up in solving and answering the questions of hereticks who doubt of their Faith, of whom you may see two or three walking together by the Chapel door, continually disputing about some point of religion."

It seems that even in 1686 the King relaxed for a time his guard over the chapel. The first opposition of the London apprentices must have died down, or the precautions taken to watch over their exits and entrances were efficient. In July Stamford wrote: "The City of London is so reconciled with the Palatine chapel that there is never any disturbance now; and even the guard has been withdrawn not only from the chapel but also from the City. That being so,

* *Somers Tracts*, Vol. IX., p. 77.

† An obvious error for Keynes.

if your Electoral Highness really desires me to visit Heidelberg I shall ask the permission of his Majesty."

In the frequent letters that passed between the Elector and his representative the Elector continually ordered Stamford to revisit Heidelberg at once to discuss the chapel affair and to adjust the money difficulties outstanding between them. Stamford appeared most anxious to fall in with this suggestion. Possibly he was. But he managed to postpone his visit more than once on the pretext that James urgently required his presence at Court. "You know very well, his Majesty replied, that you may not go for twenty reasons. Then I found, or at least I apprehended, that he was a trifle angry, and when I was at Windsor . . . he said, the least you can do is to go back to London and stay there!" This excuse the Elector obviously did not believe, and in July Stamford left England for a month. The upshot of his representation to Philip William and his son, the Electoral Prince, was that they agreed to share in paying Stamford annually 2,100 crowns for his salary and for the upkeep of the chapel, the arrears to date from December, 1685. But even then Stamford's financial difficulties were not at an end. In October, 1687, he wrote: "Mr. Peters* has advised me that his Majesty is very dissatisfied because my creditors are not contented and that he has no desire to negotiate with the Ministers of Princes who do not pay them. And so, at the end of the year, he will make other arrangements for the Chapel. Your Electoral Highness may write to his Majesty about this as you see fit, but I am amazed that all my warnings have had no effect and that the Residency here has been lost, with its Resident reduced to bankruptcy and dishonour." A week later he wrote: "The non-payment of my salary has destroyed my credit and ruined me. My only course is to beg your Highness humbly to allow me eight or ten months' preparation and then to recall me; and his Majesty will then—as I have already told you—make other arrangements for the chapel. . . . I should have imagined, however, that your Highness would find it very much in your interest to oblige

* Father Charles or Father Edward Petre.

in every possible way such a Prince as the King of England."

We do not know whether Stamford was displaced from the Lime Street house. He was still there in February, 1688, for only then Van Citters heard "that Mr. Stamford, Resident from the Electorate Palatine, is also likely to be dismissed, and a religionist appointed in his place." Possibly it was in James' mind to secure the position of Resident for the Jesuit Superior at Lime Street, as he had appointed the Benedictine Father Corker* to the Residency of Cologne. It does seem from d'Adda's despatches that the property was handed over exclusively to the Jesuits on Lady Day, 1688, though, on the other hand, he may only have repeated a rumour which he had not investigated.† But there is no other mention of Stamford's departure anywhere, and to the end the Elector Palatine's Envoy gives his name to the chapel.‡

As the Jesuit account tells us, the College was formed on Lady Day, 1688, and Father Charles Petre, the brother of the Privy Councillor, was appointed Superior. At the same time "a separate school" was opened, for which purpose one of the neighbouring houses was hired or bought.§

* Hoffmann, February 13, 1688 (from *Les Derniers Stuarts à Saint-Germain-en-Laye*, by the Marquise Campana de Cavelli, 1871): "Après que l'ancien résident de l'Electeur de Cologne a cette Cour, Gloxin, a été rappelé, il a été remplacé par un Anglais nommé Corcker, de l'ordre des Bénédictins, revêtu du même caractère et qui a été reçu aujourd'hui en audience publique. D'après l'ordre du Roi il a paru dans l'habit de son ordre précédé de quatre autres Prêtres. . . . Or on sait que le changement de ces gens dépend plus du Roi que de Cologne (qui a peut du point d'affaires ici) et comme ce Père, a fait bâtir à ses frais et à ceux de ses dévots une chapelle où il est supérieur de quatre ou cinq religieux . . . (at St. John's, Clerkenwell) . . . autant pour le service des Catholiques que pour propager la religion, cet événement est assimilé à l'élévation du Père Jésuite Petre au poste de conseiller privé, et excite une jalousie qui ne manquera pas d'augmenter les divisions et les mutineries."

† D'Adda, March 26, 1688: "Essendo stato dimesso dal ministero che faceva in questa Corte le incombenze dell' elettore Palatino li Padri della Compagnia entreranno in possesso dell' abitazione ove egli stava, e della direzione della Capella, anzi ivi si stabiliranno per aprirri altre scuole al commodo della gioventù nel mezzodella Città."

‡ D'Adda, October 22, 1688: "Domenica scorsa il dopo pranzo successe un disordine grave alla Capella del Ministro Palatino nella Città, che e in cura de Pri. della Compagnia. . . ."

§ Van Citters, March 27: "The Jesuits in London have bought a house adjacent to their chapel in Lime Street, which they will appropriate for a school to instruct the children of the city therein." Venetian Riporti, April 1, 1688: "The Jesuits have purchased a house and opened a school therein for the instruction of youth gratis."

The school was probably successful, but in a small way. Hoffman described it as a college, or rather an imitation college; that is to say, simply a house fitted up for the purpose, because so far it was not legal for religious establishments to possess bell or belfry. Nor had they any funds, he added, but existed solely by the liberality and the devotion of the King and of various private individuals.

In the spring of 1688 the public chapels attained their greatest number, but shrewd observers saw a greater danger to Catholicism under royal patronage than under the penal laws. "And since all the privileges enjoyed by Catholics depend upon royal authority," Hoffman wrote prophetically, "their adversaries maintain that though Catholics do indeed progress during the present reign, nevertheless Catholicism in general and as a power in the land is declining; that is to say, after the death of the King they will undergo even greater punishment and be completely extirpated."

At Easter time it was possible for James to travel incognito around London, accompanied by the Earl of Dumbarton and a few other noblemen, to visit the chapels, including those of the Catholic Ministers.* On Holy Thursday Hoffman thought there were about nine Altars of Repose to be visited, in addition to the ambassadorial chapels. There was, for instance, the chapel at the Tower of London, and we know there was a chapel in Bucklersbury in the City which was demolished by the rabble at the end of the year.

The riots began at Lime Street in October, though there was most likely a succession of disturbances long before. At any rate, when a preacher in the chapel cast aspersions upon the translation of the Authorized Version he was given the lie direct by one of the congregation. A mob collected, and all the Catholics present would have been killed and the chapel pulled down had not certain Protestant preachers interfered to prevent it. Taking his opportunity, the preacher slipped quietly into "the house of the Resident of Heidelberg."† The next Sunday

* Van Citters, April 17, 1688; Hoffman, April 23, 1688.

† Van Citters, October 2, 1688.

Father Petre improved upon the occasion to indulge in more "licentious preaching," and again narrowly escaped with his life by taking flight.

From that time forth the chapels were doomed, for James' power was broken in the City, which he was trying to placate by a restoration of the Charters. Lord Craven, in command of the troops, was sometimes able to break up the crowds, and on one occasion at St. John's, Clerkenwell, a number of apprentices were killed by the Guards. The Lord Mayor, though reprimanded by the King, was powerless. It was only James' continued presence in London (where he stayed at the Queen's request to overawe the rioters) that kept the chapels open. In November, however, they were all closed, except those of the palaces and embassies.* The "masse-house at Bucklersbury" was already destroyed.† The Lime Street Chapel survived in some sort, though frequently attacked,‡ until the night of December 11, after the King's flight from London. A more terrible experience than the rioting of this time Catholics were not to endure until the Gordon Riots. All over London the chapels were wrecked and their contents destroyed. Even the houses of the ambassadors were not free from attack. At Lime Street the mob swore that they would destroy the place, though it were as strong as Portsmouth; and having torn down the doors "they carried all the trumpety in mock procession and triumph, with oranges on the tops of swords and staves, with great lighted candles in gilt candlesticks, thus victoriously passing by the Guards that were drawn up."§

That was the ignoble end of the high hopes which Gother and Betts had once entertained for the future of the house in Lime Street, and for the triumph of Catholicism in England under James II. The men who worked for the fulfilment of their ideal were in prison or fugitives. Bishop Leybourne was in Newgate, where he was joined a little later by Father Petre "that used to preach in Lime-street."|| Andrew Giffard had already been turned out of

* Luttrell, November 15, 1688.

† Luttrell, October 29, 1688.

‡ Ellis, Luttrell, Bramston.

§ *Ellis Correspondence*, Letter CCXXXV.

|| *London Mercury*, December 15, 1688.

Magdalen College, Oxford, of which, since June, he was a Fellow. Doctor Betts, perhaps ill-used or insulted by the mob, could only look back upon his failure, forward to disgrace and imprisonment. James, who was in his own blundering way a martyr, went into exile rather than abate one shred of his ambition to undo by despotism the despotism of Henry VIII. The Lime Street Chapel was only an episode after all.*

GREGORY MACDONALD.

* I am indebted to Mgr. Canon Nolan, Rector of St. Mary Moorfields, who placed at my disposal unpublished material used in this article. Even so, it does not pretend to be a complete historical account, for the reign of James II. has never been fully investigated. Collections of documents are few, transcriptions have been made of only one or two of the ambassadors' despatches, and there is no series of these documents in English libraries that is not incomplete and interrupted. Partly this is the fruit of revolution, partly of the apathy of historians. When something has been done to facilitate research in foreign and domestic archives the history of this reign will be rewritten.

ART. 2.—DR. WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Science and the Modern World. Cambridge University Press;
Religion in the Making. Cambridge University Press.

IN attempting to call the attention of thoughtful men to the recent important volumes of Professor Whitehead I am undertaking, as I well know, a most difficult task. Dr. Whitehead never writes a book which does not contain many delightful pages, but he has always too much that is weighty to say to be an easy author, if that means a writer who can be understood without a very resolute effort on the part of his reader to think hard about the highest abstractions. And it is noticeable that in his successive books on the principles of our knowledge of nature each fresh volume makes an increasingly severe demand on the reader's power of sustained abstract thinking. By comparison with *Science and the Modern World*, the *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, so much of which is simple and straightforward mathematics, was easy indeed. There the adventurer was called on only to breathe the comparatively comfortable atmosphere of geometry; here he must adapt himself to the almost intolerably rarefied air of the barest mountain-peaks of "first philosophy." Not all of us can make the adaptation successfully, and I am only too conscious that my own senses may be painfully confused at the heights to which Dr. Whitehead invites us to follow him. And, again, it is clear that Dr. Whitehead's own thought is growing and changing, as thought which is really alive should, in the process of exposition, and thought which is still growing is never quite consistent with itself. It is easy to understand why he finds himself definitely attracted by men of genius like Plato, Francis Bacon, and Leibniz, whose thoughts never crystallized into final system, and as definitely repelled by the great system-makers of whom we might take Aristotle and Descartes as typical. Probably no man living understands better

18 Dr. Whitehead's Philosophy of Religion

why Plato is always careful to warn us that all his conclusions need to be "reconsidered another time"; none, probably, is further removed from the temper of Kant, who ends the *Critique of Practical Reason* with the suggestion that Newton and himself between them have finally settled for all time the principles of natural and moral philosophy, so that nothing is left to their successors but to build higher on the foundations they have laid.

What makes Dr. Whitehead's book, with all its difficulties and obscurities, so important to us all is that it is only one sign among many, though perhaps the most striking sign, that, thanks to the unprecedented advance of the last thirty years, natural science is standing at the parting of the ways. The opening of the twentieth century has definitely brought with it the most astounding crisis in scientific thought which history has witnessed since the challenge of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo to the old Ptolemaic conceptions in astronomy and cosmology. What is taking place under our eyes is that the great constructive effort of the scientific thought of the last three centuries, the Newtonian physics, has, as far as can be seen, definitely worked itself out to its conclusion and been found inadequate to cope with the fundamental problem of translating the world of fact and concrete "happening" completely and coherently into a logical scheme satisfactory to the demands of the intellect. To speak more precisely, we might say that until yesterday it seemed as though the complete rationalization of nature could be effected by simply developing the main thoughts of Newtonian mechanics to their inevitable conclusions; if outstanding domains of natural fact still remained refractory to this process, the source of the difficulty seemed to lie simply in the temporary inability of our men of science to apply the Newtonian principles in these particular fields. To-day we know, by the fairly unanimous consent of the leading representatives of physics, that the root of the trouble lies deeper. Our real trouble is that the Newtonian conception of nature rested throughout on an unconscious metaphysics, and that the metaphysics assumed was radically unsatisfactory. One man, indeed, in the eighteenth century,

David Hume, was alive to the real situation, but Hume stood alone among his contemporaries and successors. As Hume saw clearly, on the assumptions of the "classical" mechanics, the undeniable success of science in divining the course of nature was a standing "miracle"; no rational justification could be given for the confidence with which we all habitually treat the anticipation of experience made by the man of science; up to date, indeed, his predictions have "come off"—we really cannot say why, but we can see no reason in the nature of the case why we should put more faith in them than the scientifically-minded are accustomed to repose in the predictions of the interpreter of a scriptural apocalypse. The same stick may be used equally effectually as a rod for the backs of the "theologian" and the "philosopher." Each, in his own special way, foists on nature a principle of "connection" between events which, as far as we can see, are, in fact, merely "conjoined" or juxtaposed.

Unfortunately, Hume for long enough spoke to the deaf. The metaphysicians, indeed, were impressed. Kant, as we know, ascribed it to Hume that he had been awakened from his "dogmatic slumber." But unhappily the problem with which Kant was impelled to grapple was only one half, and not the most important half, of the problem which had troubled Hume. What Kant asked himself was the question of our right to apply the *general* scheme or "category" of relation in the way of cause and effect to nature. Hence he could fancy that he had disposed of scepticism about science by the mere contention that the causal relation is one which thought itself inevitably brings with it to the task of interpreting its data. As creatures who think, we set ourselves to understand the world of events, and we cannot understand without connection in the way of causality. This may be true enough, though in all seriousness it does not seem to amount to much more than what Hume had never denied; the statement that we do assert "connection" where, on the face of it, the facts seem to present us with nothing beyond juxtaposition. But the answer, whatever it is worth, leaves the real problem of Hume wholly unsolved. Hume's real

problem was that which is still the scandal of an "inductive" logic of natural science: What justifies us in asserting that a *specific* A, rather than anything else, is the "cause" of a *specific* B? Why are we justified, if we are justified, when we see A in assuming that B, and not C or D, will follow? And on this question, vital to the vindication of science as a rational interpretation of fact, the *Critique of Pure Reason* has nothing in particular to say. Nothing is more characteristic of Kant than his confident assumption that, if it be once granted that we are justified in believing that there is a coherent scientific interpretation of nature, science of the Newtonian type must obviously be that interpretation. Since Kant's time the leading modern metaphysicians have not usually had Kant's advantage of being themselves closely acquainted with the physical sciences. Natural modesty and the fear of making themselves ridiculous by venturing into an unfamiliar region have combined to induce an almost complete divorce between their work and that of the natural sciences. The physicist has been, on the whole, allowed by the metaphysician to go very much as he pleases, on the single condition that he is willing to admit that there are problems which fall outside his own province as physicist. Modern "idealism" in our own country has done valuable work in combating the pretensions of natural science to annex the domains of theology and ethics and "epistemology"; it has done little to follow up the pertinent question raised by Hume's scepticism as to the coherence of the unconscious metaphysics of the scientific interpretation of nature itself.

Still more curious has been the treatment accorded to Hume by the representatives of natural science themselves, so far as "inductive" science has troubled itself about a philosophy of its own procedure, and, naturally, it has given itself very little concern about the matter—the men of science have actually professed to find their philosophy in the very writer who set himself to expose the complete irrationality of "induction." Hume's scourge has been duly plied on the backs of the "theologians" by Huxley and others with a zest which would surely have

entertained that amiable sceptic, in complete disregard of the manifest fact that all the blows recoil on the wielders of the whip. As Dr. Whitehead truly says, Hume's allegation that our science is as much "founded on faith" as our "holy religion" has left the Royal Society quite unperturbed. A metaphysic which, rightly understood, challenges the whole right of reason to interpret the world has been thoughtlessly treated as though it were no more than a useful implement for keeping the "clergy" in their place. The greatest irrationalist of modern philosophy has actually been made to furnish the philosophical foundations for an anti-theological rationalism. With what perfect good faith this has been done can readily be seen by a study of such a well-known work as Karl Pearson's *Grammar of Science*, the latest (unfinished) edition of which bears so recent a date as 1911.

What gives its special value to the present growing volume of criticism of the unconscious metaphysical assumptions of the "classical" science is precisely the fact that it is not criticism from the outside, affected by all the misunderstandings inevitable when, even in the best of good faith, the assumptions and methods of a great body of specialist workers are submitted to the scrutiny of the "layman." The demand for revision of fundamental conceptions has come from within and is being urged by the very persons who are necessarily most familiar with the meaning of these concepts "in use" and the difficulties their employment creates. In many ways it is much more profitable to listen to the voice of natural science criticizing itself than it could be to ponder the acutest criticisms which might be raised from the outside by the most penetrating of metaphysicians or epistemologists with no personal experience of grappling with the problems of the physicist. In view of the character of Dr. Whitehead's proposed remedy for the defects of the current philosophy of the sciences, it is most instructive to note the sources of the defects of which he has most to say. We hear in his pages, naturally enough, of the now familiar physical and astronomical facts which have played the most prominent part in leading physicists themselves to call for a revision

22 Dr. Whitehead's Philosophy of Religion

of the classical mechanics. "What is more striking is the stress laid by Dr. Whitehead on the necessity of remodelling our fundamental physical concepts in the light of evolutionary biology. It would hardly be going too far to say that, in Dr. Whitehead's view, the supreme defect of the philosophy of nature commonly presupposed by the nineteenth-century physicists is that it affords no foundation for biology. The avowed object of the difficult metaphysic of nature, expounded in the critical chapters of *Science and the Modern World*, is to make physics continuous with Darwinian and post-Darwinian biology, by taking the conception of an "organism"—in the sense of a whole with a characteristic pattern of its own which repeats itself in the sub-patterns of its constituent parts—as the fundamental conception for physics itself. This means, of course—and Dr. Whitehead shows himself fully conscious of the fact—that the physics of the future, which is to be the base-science of all our natural sciences, has to be thoroughly "teleological." The physics of the future, according to this forecast, is likely to be very much more like the once despised *Physica* of Aristotle and the mediæval Aristotelians than anyone but a dreamer would have fancied thirty years ago. We shall hear once more a great deal of the once decried maxims that "every process has an end," that "God and nature do nothing *frustra*," that the business of science is to investigate "final causes." And the man whose influence will count for most in giving a new and deeper significance to these ancient principles will be just the man who was probably looked on in his own day, by followers and opponents alike, as the typical empiricist and anti-metaphysician, Charles Darwin. If the prophecy should be fulfilled, what a lesson against the over-anxious timidity which is afraid to accept new disclosures of fact for fear that they may prove disturbing of established principles. "Was Milan," we ask ourselves, "thrust from Milan that his issue might become heirs of Naples?" Did Darwin, as was supposed, banish final causality from plant and animal biology to bring it back on a more universal scale as a feature of all physical process?

It certainly looks at first sight startling enough to say that the logical consequence of Darwinian conceptions is the reintroduction of "finality" into the very ground-plan of nature. Yet it is, at least, plain that the consequence of accepting them has, in Dr. Whitehead's own case, been the reintroduction of "finality," much as conceived by Aristotle, into the ground-plan of his philosophy of nature. This comes out, for example, in his comments on the "epiphenomenalism" of Huxley and his contemporaries which caused so much spiritual distress to the poet of *In Memoriam*, in common with so many of the great Victorians who were honestly trying to be at once devout and scientifically-minded. Their trouble was that, if science can be believed, the atoms "blindly run"; the atoms which make up my living body then must run blindly, like all the rest, and there seems no room left for the belief that my thought and will can make any difference to the course of natural happening. Everything, within my body or without it, goes on exactly as it would if I were a machine without either thought or will; consciousness seems to be, as Huxley suggested that it is, no more effective than the sound given out by the whistle of the railway train as the steam escapes through it. And thus there is an end of our moral being; in a world where will does nothing it is an illusion to talk of "voluntary actions" as right or wrong, good or evil. But hear Dr. Whitehead on the same theme. Yes, he tells us, the electrons "blindly run," whether in our bodies or in the inanimate bodies around us; the electron certainly does not know where it is running. But, for all that, an electron which is part of the pattern we call a human body, though it runs as "blindly" as an electron which is part of a stone, runs a very different kind of course. The pattern of the type of "organism" to which the electron belongs makes all the difference to the way in which the electron itself behaves. Thus the "blindness" of the electron need not in the least jeopardize the reality of the contingency which is a necessary feature in a moral world. The course of the electrons which make up my "voluntary muscles" is set for them by the very fact that they hold the place they do in a larger pattern or organism

24 Dr. Whitehead's Philosophy of Religion

which is the living body of an intelligent and willing being.

I venture to suggest on my own account the link of connection between this reply to the "epiphenomenalist" and the characteristic ideas of Darwinian biology. If there is one thought more than another which is typical of post-Darwinian as compared with pre-Darwinian biology, it is perhaps the thought of the constant process of reciprocal modification of organism by environment and environment by organism. Now this process, from first to last, is conditioned by the selectiveness of the living organism. The living organism, however simple, is not merely set in the midst of its surroundings and exposed to them passively and impartially. It selects or distinguishes among the constituents of its environment, accepting some, rejecting others, showing itself indifferent to still others. So much is implied in the simple relation between the living organism and its food supply. The organism will assimilate some ingredients from its environment and transform them into its own living substance; other ingredients it cannot assimilate, but must eject, if it is not to be poisoned by them; yet others it merely ignores. The selection may be quite unconscious, as we believe it to be in the case of a plant, but it is none the less real. Now, on the assumptions of the nineteenth-century physicist, we have here a feature of the life of organisms to which there is nothing corresponding in the inorganic world. There, it was assumed, there is no reciprocal modification of individual and environment by one another, and there is no selection. The "real" component units of a "system" are supposed to run through the whole series of their transactions with one another without any internal change, remaining all through simply self-same. Whatever exhibits internal modification is taken to reveal itself by that very fact, as not a "real" unit. (This, by the way, was the reason why Leibniz rejected atomism as a true philosophical account of the constitution of nature.) Dr. Whitehead puts his finger on the weak spot in this construction when he selects for special commendation a striking passage from Francis Bacon's *Silva Silvarum* to the effect that "all bodies what-

soever, though they have no sense, yet they have perception . . . for else all bodies would be alike one to another." In other words, unless there is to be an unbridgeable gulf between our physics and our biology, selective activity must be traced down into the realm of the transactions between constituents of the inorganic realm itself; even here, the electron must, in its own way, "take note of" the "pattern" of the whole to which it belongs. It must "run" differently when it belongs to the pattern of a living body, just because it belongs to *that* pattern. (And, though Dr. Whitehead does not say this so explicitly, it may also equally be that the electron "runs" differently according as the pattern to which it belongs is the living body of a mollusc or of a man who, being not only living but intelligent, is *dominus sui*.)

It is clear, of course, that this introduction into physics of the conception of "organism" as a pattern which, as a whole, determines the structure of its constituent sub-patterns, is as significant for the logic as for the metaphysics of the sciences. Metaphysically, it means, as I have said, the return, with added insight, to the Platonic-Aristotelian thought of "final causality" and the "end" as everywhere dominant in nature. Logically, it puts Hume's problem about "induction" in a wholly new light. If there is no pervasive "pattern of patterns" running through nature, if nature is, in fact, what it is on the philosophy of Professor Alexander, a mere product of the "restlessness of space-time," Hume's criticism of scientific method is unanswerable. Events in that case are, as Hume said, only "conjoined," never "connected," and there can be no logical warrant for the attempt to argue from the character of a present event to the characters of other events with which the present is merely "conjoined." If nature is a "pattern of patterns," the case is altered. Then the structure of the present event will actually mirror in itself, to speak with Leibniz, the pattern of the whole to which all events belong. Each event, to use Dr. Whitehead's latest terminology, will "prehend," in its own uniqueness, "aspects" or "perspectives" of all the rest, and there will thus be a sound logical foundation for the "inductive"

26 Dr. Whitehead's Philosophy of Religion

process, the attempt to gather light from analysis of the present concrete "occasion" upon other "occasions" which it in this way "prehends."

So far we have said nothing about what may fairly be called the most sensational feature of Dr. Whitehead's philosophy of the natural sciences, and to some of us the most welcome, the reappearance of the thought of God as absolutely necessary for the complete analysis of the concrete "occasion." It is to be noted that Dr. Whitehead is not content, like many thoughtful physicists of yesterday, to permit belief in God as a possible, but extra-scientific, supplementation of the ideas with which natural science works, much as Kant does in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Thirty years ago this was, perhaps, as much as it would have been safe to ask of a natural philosopher. The late Professor James Ward, himself a sincere Theist, began the first chapter of his *Naturalism and Agnosticism* with an arresting paragraph. He told the familiar and possibly apocryphal anecdote of Laplace's retort to Napoleon's question why the Creator is never mentioned in the *Mécanique Céleste*, with the comment that, though Laplace's *Je n'avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse-là* might have been meant as a sneer, the most devout of astronomers might make the same remark for Theism, however certain on other grounds, is not an "hypothesis" necessary for the work of the physical sciences. Dr. Whitehead could not endorse the observation without making an important distinction. If the question at issue is the truth of some particular physical theory, the preferability of the Newtonian to the Aristotelian or Ptolemaic mechanics of the heavens, or of Einstein's version of the laws of motion to Newton's, Theism is certainly irrelevant to the issue, and to anyone who forgets this there can be only one answer, *Lasst unsern Herrngott aus dem Spass*. If we distinguish science from philosophy by confining the former name to the detail of concrete established results of inquiry, we may fairly say that Theism is irrelevant to natural science. But, as Dr. Whitehead holds very earnestly, if the issue before us is the philosophical one of making a true analysis of the universal characters of nature, or, as the Greeks

said, "becoming," Theism becomes at once of supreme importance. It is irrelevant, and therefore irreverent, to drag God into the discussion of any particular problem of natural science, but without the presence and activity of God in all natural process whatever, there would be no order of nature and, by consequence, no science. Of course, it is only fair to remember that this has been the standing contention of most of the British "idealists" in their criticism of natural science and its methods ever since the day of Berkeley or earlier. The importance of Dr. Whitehead's work is partly that in advocating the same doctrine, he is basing his case directly on analysis of the natural world of becoming itself, not on more general theorems of epistemology. This enables him not only to avoid the besetting temptation of the epistemologist to mistake psychology for epistemology, but also to present Theism directly as a necessary constituent of any coherent scheme of physical thought. Partly also, the same independence of the psychological enables Dr. Whitehead to formulate a doctrine of God which, whether or not it fully satisfies the demands of a rational religion, is definitely theistic. His doctrine cannot possibly be mistaken, as that of T. H. Green, for example, might be mistaken for some kind of Pantheism. It is clear enough to any reader of Green's *Life* that the philosopher was no Pantheist; yet a student unacquainted with the *Life* might be excused for understanding Green's teaching in a pantheistic sense. It would be easy to see in Green's "spiritual principle which makes nature" only a personification of the Kantian *Bewusstsein überhaupt*, the "*I think* which accompanies all our perceptions," and it is not easy to see anything more than this in Lord Haldane's "knowledge which knows itself." Lord Haldane seems to be pretty certainly what Green might be hastily supposed to be, a kind of belated Averroist. The mistake cannot well be made about Dr. Whitehead, precisely because his own preoccupation with the concepts of physics leads him to leave the psychology of knowing altogether on one side. The neglect, apparent in his earlier volumes, has been noted for a defect by some of his critics, whose own interests are more in psychology

28 Dr. Whitehead's Philosophy of Religion

than in physics, but the fault, if it is a fault, is more than redeemed by the consequent freedom of the Theism of *Science and the Modern World* from all suspicion of being a fanciful personification of a human cognitive function.

Dr. Whitehead's most careful statement of his position, given in the chapter on *God*, is directly led up to by the preceding chapter on *Abstractions*. As the reviewers have not been slow to complain, this chapter on *Abstractions* is the very hardest of reading and is not made the easier by the employment of a very individual terminology, not obviously quite equivalent with that to which the author's earlier books have accustomed us. I doubt if I could condense the whole point of the argument into a few brief paragraphs, and I am equally doubtful whether, at every point, I have myself seized the full force of the writer's expressions. I must be content, if I can, to indicate in a rather general way what I take the main purport of Dr. Whitehead's thought to be, and to interest my readers in it, leaving them to make closer acquaintance with details in the writer's own pages. In its general character, as I have said before, Dr. Whitehead's conception of nature takes us back in a very striking way to the ideas of the great men of the Christian Middle Ages and the great Greeks who lay behind them. Dr. Whitehead himself is keenly conscious of the fact. He, unlike so many contemporary students of the sciences, is not under the delusion that the history of modern science is primarily a story of the triumphant revolt of "reason" against unreasoning credulity. As he lets us see, he knows well that the disease of the "science" of the Middle Ages was rather a plethora of "reason." The men of the thirteenth century were only in too much of a hurry with the construction of a theory of the universe which was to "save all the appearances," to furnish an articulated, reasoned and final account of everything. What they had not enough of was interest in and respect for sheer brute fact, on the face of it "unreasonable" and refusing to be accommodated with any neat rational framework. And unfortunately the brute facts were so imperfectly known in the thirteenth century. The real conflict of the seventeenth century was thus not

one of rationalism with unreason, but one of respect for the factual with rationalism; the triumphs of modern science in its great century of golden youth were triumphs of the *historical* over the rationalistic and philosophic spirit. And yet, under all the successive victories of the strictly historical spirit, modern science has always persistently retained a lesson learned in the first instance from mediæval divinity. Even to-day, when, as Dr. Whitehead himself puts it, the apparently wildest nonsense may prove to be only what will be the accepted science of a few years hence, we are still confident, if we are "scientific," that the course of nature can be and ought to be understood as a coherent pattern, however far we may be from being in a position to formulate the scheme of the pattern. This obstinate faith in the "uniformity" of nature can hardly be accounted for adequately unless we see in it, as Dr. Whitehead does, the ultimate consequence of the teaching of the Church which had built upon the foundation of Hebrew scripture with its resolute insistence on the personality and transcendence of God. And thus it is not surprising that Dr. Whitehead's remedy for the present chaotic state of the philosophy of the natural sciences is that we should revert in principle to the "rationalistic methods" of the great schoolmen—that is, we should, I take it, be less reckless in "bolting" meals of crude indigestible fact, more alive to the need of a strictly rationalistic analysis of the concepts we employ in digesting the facts. It has long been the favourite ground of depreciation of the Aristotelian physics that it is rather an analysis of such concepts than an inquiry into facts, and there have been times, notably the seventeenth century, when the complaint was very much in place. Dr. Whitehead is clearly of opinion that we of the present moment are not suffering from an inadequate supply of unassimilated fact. What is the matter with us is rather that our "digestive apparatus" of concepts is too rudimentary for the facts with which it has to deal. What we need is, quite strictly, a better "stomach" for our facts.

Notoriously, Dr. Whitehead's own analysis of nature and natural process make its directest contact with a way of thinking about the course of things not yet crystallized

30 Dr. Whitehead's Philosophy of Religion

into the technical formulæ of the Aristotelian *Physics*. In *Science and the Modern World*, even more obviously than in earlier volumes, the author starts from the general point of view expressed by Plato's *Timæus*, the work which, more than any other, dominated the thought of late antiquity and the earlier Christendom in all matters of natural science. If we leave on one side controverted points, the general account given in the *Timæus* of the natural world may fairly be recapitulated as follows: The natural world is a vast complex of events occupying durations and filling volumes. These events are connected throughout into a unity of pattern by all-pervasive structural laws, and these laws, which are, in the last resort, laws of geometrical and kinematical structure, are due to the work of Mind or God. But for the pervasive activity of God, the volumes and durations which are now filled with events forming a connected pattern would be filled with random movements exhibiting no structural pattern. Random and patternless movement are what *Timæus* calls "necessity," in the sense of that for which no good reason can be given, what is there just as "brute" fact. In the actual world such "necessity" is never found anywhere alone; everywhere it is "persuaded," "overruled" into pattern by the pervasive divine activity. "Necessity" is thus just a name for what *we* have learned to call the element of "contingency," obstinate "particularity" in things. It is always there, since we can never reduce the whole course of any concrete process to "law" without remainder, but it is always there as a subordinate element in a pattern which, as a whole, is rational.

At bottom it is just this analysis, more elaborately refined on, which we meet in *Science and the Modern World*, and more briefly worded in its sequel *The Making of Religion*. The natural world is a vast complex whose constituents, "concrete occasions" as they are now named, are "four-dimensional" events—events, that is, taking place over a volume and through a duration. Now any such "occasion" is "prehensive," and that in two ways. In the first place, as we have said already, every "occasion" prehends all other "occasions" in its own special way. It is

what it is largely because it enters in the various ways in which it does enter, with the other "occasions" into a variety of patterns and sub-patterns within nature, and it is this which makes "induction" possible.

But besides this general relatedness of every concrete "occasion" to every other, there is another factor to be taken account of. Each "occasion" has a core of character which is specially its own, and is constituted by the special way in which that "occasion" combines a number of what we commonly call "universal" characters (shape, colour, savour, and the like). These are what the *Timæus* calls "forms" (ἰδέαι) and Dr. Whitehead calls "eternal objects." (In earlier works he had called them simply "objects"; we shall not go very far wrong if we say that they are what the early mediæval realists seem to have meant by *universalia ante rem*.) Now some "prehensions" or combinations of the characters which Dr. Whitehead calls "eternal objects" are, in fact, impossible (for instance, I suppose the "prehension" into the same "occasion" of red and green), and many others are possible, but are never actualized. Hence, as I venture to expound Dr. Whitehead's thought, the concrete course of nature could not be accounted for by simply considering that every "occasion" "prehends" every other. For the way in which it does so, the full concrete character of the event depends on the fact that *this* "occasion" is the special "prehension" of "eternal objects" which it is, and that the occasions it "prehends" are, in their turn, the special "prehensions" of "eternal objects" which they are. The existence and unity of nature as the concrete flow of events, then, depends on the existence of a supreme source of "limitation" or "determination" whose all-pervading activity determines both what combinations of "eternal objects" shall be really possible (I suppose, *e.g.*, that reddish-green shall be impossible, but bluish-green possible), and which of these real possibilities shall, in fact, be actualized in the flow of events. Such a source of determination, manifestly standing above and distinct from the whole system of concrete "occasions" we call nature, is God. The reality and all-pervasive action of God is thus necessary in order that there

should be any "nature" at all. (For without the double determination by which real possibilities are discriminated from impossibilities and the actual from the really possible, there would be no concrete "occasions" with characters of their own. All events would "be alike," and that is as much as to say that there would be no "real world.") At the same time, Dr. Whitehead is unwilling to say of the God whom he pronounces to be a necessity of scientific thinking some things which Christian theology very definitely says of God. He will not call God the sole source of being, and presumably would not, then, call Him the Creator. His reason apparently, is that to his mind, to say that God is the source of all would involve saying that He is the "author of evil," since we all admit that there is such a thing as evil. But God, being the supreme principle of discrimination and distinction, must be before all things the principle of distinction between good and evil, and therefore the supreme good and the source of all good—a point upon which *Religion in the Making* is admirably emphatic. Hence Dr. Whitehead seems inclined to agree with a suggestion of Socrates in the *Republic* that God must be called not the cause of all things, but only of those which are good.

The reserves thus made in the doctrine of God are carefully stated in the concluding paragraph of the chapter devoted to the subject (*Science and the Modern World*, p. 258). "Among mediæval and modern philosophers, anxious to establish the religious significance of God, an unfortunate habit has prevailed of paying to Him metaphysical compliments. He has been conceived as the foundation of the metaphysical situation with its ultimate activity. If this conception be adhered to, there can be no alternative except to discern in Him the origin of all evil as well as of all good. He is then the supreme author of the play, and to Him must therefore be ascribed its shortcomings as well as its success. If He be conceived as the supreme ground for limitation, it stands in His very nature to divide the Good from the Evil, and to establish Reason 'within her dominions supreme.'" If this passage stood alone it might suggest more than one possible interpreta-

tion. The implied denial that God is "the foundation of the metaphysical situation," taken with its accompanying censure of "philosophers anxious to establish the religious significance of God," might be read as a hint that the "religious" attitude of adoration is not rationally justified, that God, in fact, is a word of merely cosmological significance, much as the God of whom we read in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* need be, so far as the argument goes, no more than a "something" ultramundane which incites the "first heaven" to its diurnal revolution. The contemplation of such a God might, no doubt, be the highest effort of the speculative intellect, but would clearly have no particular value as a source of noble living and ordered affections. He would emphatically be the *dieu des savans et des philosophes*, not the *Deus pauperum*. That Dr. Whitehead does not mean to be understood in this sense, however, is clear from the concluding pages of *Religion in the Making*, where Dr. Whitehead's God is spoken of in language only significant when taken to be used of a supreme and perfect person. Omniscience is there formally ascribed to Him. He, "who is the ground antecedent to transition, must include all possibilities of physical value conceptionally, thereby holding the ideal forms apart in equal, conceptional realization of knowledge.* Thus, as concepts, they are grasped together in the synthesis of omniscience" (p. 153). There is equal stress laid on God's goodness, and this goodness is made, once more, the reason for refusing to speak of God as "infinite" without some qualification. "The limitation of God is His goodness. He gains His depth of actuality by His harmony of valuation. It is not true that God is in all respects infinite. If He were, He would be evil as well as good. Also this unlimited fusion of evil with good would mean mere nothingness. He is something decided and is thereby limited. . . . The kingdom of heaven is God. But these [ideal] forms are not realized by Him in mere bare isolation, but as elements in the value of His conceptual experience. Also the ideal forms are in God's vision as

* This seems to be just the familiar doctrine of the archetypal presence of all "ideas" in the "Word."

34 Dr. Whitehead's Philosophy of Religion

contributing to His complete experience, by reason of His conceptual realization of their possibilities as elements of value in any creature. Thus God is the one systematic complete fact, which is the antecedent ground conditioning every creative act. . . . The depths of His existence lie beyond the vulgarities of praise or power. He gives to suffering its swift insight into values which can issue from it. . . . God has in His nature the knowledge of evil, of pain, and of degradation, but it is these as overcome with what is good . . . He transcends the temporal world, because He is an actual fact in the nature of things. He is not there as derivative from the world. He is the actual fact from which the other formative elements cannot be torn apart" (pp. 153-156). "He is the binding element in the world. The consciousness which is individual in us is universal in Him; the love which is partial in us is all-embracing in Him. . . . He is not the world, but the valuation of the world. . . . In the actual world He confronts what is actual in it with what is possible for it. Thus He solves all indeterminations" (pp. 158-159).

Some of these utterances are not easy to interpret, but their sense seems clear so far as this, that the God of whom they speak is a supreme person other than the world, knowing and caring for all that is in the world, converting all the evil into greater good, and without whom there would be no actual world at all, since He is the source of all definiteness of character and quality in everything. Here it is clear that we have a Theism much closer than that of many philosophers who have used theistic language freely, and no doubt sincerely enough, to what a Christian would call an adequate doctrine of God. Yet the reserves still remain. We still find Dr. Whitehead declining to make God "the foundation of the metaphysical situation." Without Him, indeed, there would be no world, but we still hear of certain "other formative elements." What these are taken to be is shown by an earlier passage in the same work (p. 90), where the formative elements which go to make the actual world what it is are said to be three: (1) The "creativity whereby the actual world has its character of temporal passage to novelty"—in fact, I

suppose, the *élan vital* of Bergson; (2) "the realm of ideal entities or forms," which is plainly the same thing as the totality of the "eternal objects" of *Science and the Modern World*; (3) "the actual but non-temporal entity whereby the indetermination of mere creativity is transmuted into a determinate freedom." This is "what men call God." It is in keeping with this that Dr. Whitehead, like so many modern philosophers, is careful to add to the statement that without God there could be no world, the complementary statement that without an actual world and its creativity "there would be no rational explanation of the ideal vision which constitutes God" (*ib.*, p. 157).

Reaction against the traditional Christian language about the infinity of God is, of course, by no means a very new thing even among men of a genuinely devout and, using the word in a broad sense, Christian temper. In some minds it is readily enough explained as a mere survival of the old-fashioned deistic preference for clear thinking over deep and the deistic dislike of acknowledging any mystery which resists resolution into compact and transparent formulæ. Dr. Whitehead's mind is plainly not of this "eighteenth-century" type. The whole character of his metaphysic of nature, no less than his appreciation of the "romantic" reaction of the early nineteenth century, protects him against any such imputation. Indeed, it is as if to make a formal protest against such Deism that he expressly calls God the supreme "irrationality," meaning, of course, that the true God is a *deus absconditus*, not to be comprehended or "explained" by any formula, a being for whom it is idle to demand a *raison d'être*, precisely because He has no *essentia* other than Himself. When we find Dr. Whitehead scrupling to make God the full "ground of the metaphysical situation," or to recognize Him as quite the Creator, we may fairly ask very seriously whether his reserves are quite compatible with all he has himself admitted. Could God be quite so much as, by Dr. Whitehead's own showing, God must be without being also the something more which would remove the reservations? It may be, as I am very ready to own, that, even after repeated re-readings, I have lost my way among the

36 Dr. Whitehead's Philosophy of Religion

subtleties of the doctrine of the hierarchy of "abstractions" which lead up to the Theism of *Science and the Modern World*, and that it is my own misunderstandings which blind me to the coherency of the construction. But it does seem to me that the reservations of which I have spoken are inconsistent with Dr. Whitehead's positive contentions, and that their presence in his latest volumes is only evidence that the author's thought is still growing. If Dr. Whitehead should, as I trust he will, continue to follow his own line of thought, it would not surprise me if he found it leading him in the end to a Theism no longer distinguishable from that with which we are familiar in the natural theology of St. Thomas and the other great definitely Christian metaphysicians.

I own it seems to me a very unsatisfactory metaphysical position to make the distinction, fundamental to Dr. Whitehead's doctrine in its present form, between the "creativity" which figures as one of his three ultimates and the source of "limitation" or "distinction" which turns this purely "indeterminate" creativity into a "determinate freedom." For my own part, rightly or wrongly, I can make nothing of the "creativity" which is pronounced to be, in its own nature, pure indetermination, without any definite character of its own. At best, such a "creativity" would seem to be the purest of all unrealized potentialities, and I certainly should not have expected to find it figuring as an ultimate in the analysis of nature offered by a thinker who, rightly as I myself believe, finds insuperable difficulties about the purely potential "first matter" of Aristotelianism. I am quite at a loss to know how this "urge" which cannot be an "urge" in any specific direction is to be conceived. Of "creating," in any case, we can only think by an analogy, and whether we are guided by the analogy of generation suggested by the etymology of *create* or by reflection on the artistic "creativity" which seems to be bound up with self-expression of some kind, I find it equally hard to think of creativeness or creativity as belonging to a something which has no character to express, being, by hypothesis, purely indetermined and void of all characterization. I cannot

conceive of a pure nothing which, remaining a nothing, has a vague impulse urging it on to acquire some sort of features for itself, and yet it seems to me to be just this inconceivability I am asked to conceive when I read in Bergson of the *élan vital*, or in Dr. Whitehead of the "creativity" which is to be a factor in the "ground of the metaphysical situation" distinct from and independent of God. When I seriously try by mental experiment to think away from the actual world everything which must, on Dr. Whitehead's own showing, be ascribed to the action of the source of "limitation," what I seem to find myself left with is not an undirected but real *élan*; it is just nothing at all—just as, if I tried to think away from the actual world all the definite events which fill it, I should be left, as it seems to me, not with a vast empty hole and a vast empty duration, a four-dimensional *ginnunga-gap*, but with nothing. I do not suggest that Dr. Whitehead wants us to regard the indeterminate "creativity" of which he speaks as anything but a bare potentiality. But, as I understand him, it is his own doctrine—and it seems to me a true one—that the source of the very distinction between a potentiality and an impossibility is to be found in God. If God were not eternally what He is, there would be no distinction between that which, though not now actual, is, at any rate, a possibility for actualization and that which is flatly impossible. How is this position compatible with the insistence on the difference between the first and the third of Dr. Whitehead's ultimates?

And, again, what are we to make of the remaining ultimate, the plurality of "eternal objects" or *universalia ante rem*? Their part in determining the concrete course of nature appears to be precisely that of the "archetypal." Forms or Ideas as conceived, for example, by Augustine and the great scholastics who inherited his doctrine, and the language employed in speaking of God's knowledge of these objects, has the genuine Augustinian ring. Where does the need come in to conceive their "eternal" existence otherwise than as Augustine understood it—that is, otherwise than as their presence to the eternal understanding of God?

38 Dr. Whitehead's Philosophy of Religion

Perhaps, however, the argument which is most commonly effective in inclining men to-day to quarrel with the doctrine of divine "infinity," and so, whether they know it or not, to set up some other source or sources of the actual by the side of God, is the ethical difficulty, also dwelt on by Dr. Whitehead, that to say that God is the source of all that is—and the only source—seems to so many to carry with it the implication that God is the source of what is evil. "Will you make God the author of evil?" is an effective rhetorical question. And yet I should have thought that Dr. Whitehead, at any rate, would have known that the great Christian philosophers of the past have been very far from overlooking this apparent problem. And, I take it, we all know also that a rhetorical question very commonly owes its effectiveness simply to its unfairness. It is meant as an attempt to extract a simple Yes or No where clear thinking demands a careful *distinguo*. A metaphysician needs to be jealously on his guard against the use of such questions for the very reasons which commend them to the advocate. In this particular case, for example, we obviously have to draw a careful distinction between the thing, act, or what not, which is pronounced evil and its character of being evil. It is clearly one thing to be the source or cause of something which is bad and another to be the cause of its badness. If the charge suggested against "orthodox" philosophers is that, by making God the sole "ground of the metaphysical situation" they make God the cause of all the things which actually are and are evil, this is a charge which recoils directly on Dr. Whitehead himself. For, on his own doctrine, God is the source of all determinate character in things, and the evil things have their determinate character no less than the good. They are bad with the kind of badness and the degree of badness they have, just because they have the determinate character they have and no other. What is "pure indetermination" is neither good nor bad. St. Thomas and Dr. Whitehead, as it seems to me, are both just as much committed as Spinoza to Spinoza's proposition that God is the ultimate cause of all the "positive reality" in what is evil. There is no ethical objection to be raised

against the proposition in itself; the ethical difficulties only come in when the causality of the ultimate cause is understood, as it is by Spinoza, in a way which excludes any free causality on the part of second and proximate causes. Possibly what Dr. Whitehead really means to say is that a Theism of St. Thomas's type really does, like Spinozism, exclude the free causality of any secondary cause, because it provides no "source of indetermination." If this is what is meant, it is pertinent to reply that St. Thomas, and other Christian philosophers whose Theism is of the same type as his, at any rate thought otherwise. They believed that their doctrine of God left full room for the recognition both of contingency as a feature of natural process in general and of human freedom, and they have been at very great pains to establish the point. It is permissible, of course, to argue that their belief on the point is mistaken, but at least it requires to be argued and argued with full consideration of the case the "orthodox" philosopher would make for himself on the other side. One cannot dispose of the argument which "asserts eternal Providence" at the tail-end of a disquisition on the principles of the natural sciences. But it may be in place to remark that the sting of the charge that the ordinary Theist makes God the source of the "evils" of existence is drawn, when it is admitted that there is none of these evils out of which God does not bring a more exceeding good. And this admission is made in so many words by Dr. Whitehead himself. "In its union with God that fact is not a total loss, but on its finer side is an element to be woven immortally into the rhythm of mortal things. Its very evil becomes a stepping-stone to the all-embracing ideals of God" (*Religion in the Making*, p. 155). Where do I seem to have heard something like this before? It ran, did it not, *O felix culpa*?

Perhaps, however, the insistent scruple we are considering is still not silenced. The trouble, it may be said, if one will have only one ultimate source of all things and that source God, is not that this means the harmless position that God is the source of all that is real in the evil act or thing, but that it further means that He is the source of

its character as evil. A sole ultimate source of all must be the source not merely of the bad act or man, but of their badness. It might give us no intellectual uneasiness merely to say that God made the snake in Paradise, but what if we have also to say, "Thou madest man in the garden; Thou temptedst man, and he fell"? We know the lines on which the *Doctor Angelicus* and others have dealt with the question. Is it so clear that their answer is not the true and sufficient one? On Dr. Whitehead's own theory we have ultimately to find in God the source of the determinate character of "forbidden fruit" which makes it so tempting to the curious palate, and also the source of the determinate character of the tempted man which makes him at once keenly susceptible to the lusciousness of the fruit and able, if he will, to listen to the voice of reason which forbids tasting. Is there anything left in the situation, as an element of it, which needs still to be accounted for by reference to an "ultimate ground"? Not, as it seems to me, if we believe in any kind of human freedom which makes moral accountability intelligible. Adam is a "first cause" of his own "disobedience"; for that, there is no more ultimate cause to be found. Adam is a real *originator* of his own act, of whom we may say, in the famous Platonic phrase, *αἰτία ἐλομένου, θεὸς ἀναίτιος* ("the wite is with the chooser, God is clear"). On that point, that a responsible act of choice is genuinely a first cause, not an intermediate link in the chain, no moralist, I submit, can have any ground to quarrel with Kant, but rather to give him every credit for recalling men's minds to the awful significance of their own moral freedom. It is true that a more pronouncedly Christian metaphysic of morals than Kant's would supplement his account of the matter by leaving room for the influence of Grace. But it would make no compromise on the points that Grace influences without forcing, and that it co-operates with genuine originitive human action without superseding it. If so much is admitted, are we not, in effect, asserting with St. Thomas that evil *as such* has no cause? What I do has always its causes, and among the constituents of such a cause there

is one which is genuinely new, originating with myself and my own choice. The dissonance of that thus caused with the rational law, which is what I mean by the badness of my bad act, requires no causal explanation. I confess that the suggestion that, unless some such cause other than God is assignable, God becomes the direct "author of sin," if this is what is in Dr. Whitehead's mind, seems to me to involve an unconscious relapse into the very kind of pure determinism from which the refounding of science on a better metaphysical basis was to set us free.

A. E. TAYLOR.

ART. 3.—A FORGOTTEN FRANCISCAN MYSTIC,
BERNARDINO DE LAREDO

TO describe Bernardino de Laredo as forgotten is in no way to stray from the truth. No modern edition of his works can be purchased even in his native Spain, while in English-speaking countries it may be doubted if there is anyone who knows, and has read, the well-worn but beautifully printed volume, containing, in Spanish, *Ascent of Mount Sion*, and certain of his other writings, which is to be found in the British Museum, and will diligently repay the attention of any who are attracted by the singular penetration and devoutness of the Spanish mystics. A few brief extracts from this book were printed in my *Spanish Mysticism: a Preliminary Survey* (1924), together with an account of Laredo's life, though little is known of this beyond the fact that he was a doctor of medicine who found that he had a vocation to the religious life, and entered the Franciscan Order, in the south of Spain and the province of Los Angeles, living and dying a lay brother.

The *Ascent of Mount Sion* was published, in its "newly revised" and permanent form, as long ago as 1542 and dedicated to the Cardinal Archbishop of Seville. Laredo, who wrote it under obedience, describes himself in the preface as the "least and most unworthy of his (the archbishop's) friars minor," "a lay friar of small understanding," resembling only too closely "a crier who proclaims to the people that which his lord commands him," though understanding little or nothing of it himself. At first glance the book is very similar to the *Treatise of Prayer and Meditation* of St. Peter of Alcántara and to the *Spiritual Exercises* of García de Cisneros, a book which served as rough material for St. Ignatius of Loyola. The first of its three divisions—after a brief description of the contemplative life in general—gives exercises of an ascetic nature to be used daily for three weeks, based mainly on such questions as: Who am I? Whence come I? Where am I? Whither go I? Laredo did not, however,

consider these exercises as an end in themselves. He cautions the reader not to use too many of them or to stick too closely to them, using an illustration from his experience as a doctor: "We allow a sick man five grapes, but give him a whole bunch that he may choose from it those he wishes." The exercises form the lowest rungs of the mystical ladder: "He who in the contemplative life walks perseveringly and labours discreetly, according to the measure of his strength, need have no doubt that he will obtain of the Divine clemency more good things and more riches than he could desire." As a child sucks the breast before taking any other food, so the soul must "suck milk at the breasts of mental prayer" in order to grow strong, and neither the child nor the soul can afford to fast for days together.

The second division of the book treats "of the most lofty mysteries of the Humanity of Christ" and leads us from purgation pure and simple to meditation, and "to contemplation with the mind's eye"—i.e., contemplation in the Ignatian sense of the word. Here, and in the third division, which deals with higher states of mental prayer, Laredo becomes more illuminating than in the first, and it is these latter divisions of his book that one would like principally to see in translation.

He begins his second division by expounding a highly-developed similitude of rivers flowing into the ocean, under which he presents the ideals of the contemplative life. The soul is the river, flowing onward "till it be engulfed in the ocean, which is God." It bursts through all obstacles that it meets, or finds a way round them: the soul must do likewise. Occasionally it reaches quiet places where it seems to cease flowing and to be completely still, yet in reality it is progressing all the time, even as the soul is doing when it appears to be wholly passive in states like the Prayer of Quiet. When at length it reaches the sea, it loses its identity entirely, and even its name, becoming nothing more than a part of the ocean. Does the similitude break down here, or is its interpretation pressed to the point of unorthodoxy? Neither the one nor the other; on the contrary, it is touched very lightly:

When the river reaches the sea, it is received by the sea in such manner that it loses itself wholly, so that not even its name remains to it, but it is engulfed in the ocean. And the soul journeys to its God in like manner, believing that it will reach Him, and find itself engulfed in Him in such a way that it will no longer be able to speak of itself, but will be wholly in God (Bk. II, ch. 10).

In these words and others like them, the mystic's aim is set, and the author goes back to his immediate theme, the use in the contemplative life of meditations on the Human Nature of Christ. He describes in some detail the method to be followed in this exercise, laying great stress on the necessity of vividness, concentration and persistence in meditation. "If thou thinkest on the scourging of Christ Jesus," he says, "let thy heart be the column to which He was bound. If thou thinkest on the crowning with thorns, let thy heart be the throne or the purple robe, and let there be in the crown no thorn that wounds thee not." Or, again, when the contemplative sees a crucifix or an image, he is not to stop there, but to put on the "spectacles (*anteojos*) of the understanding," and see it with the intellectual sight as clearly as with the corporal (II, 13). Laredo then leads us, chapter by chapter, through the principal events of the Passion: the Prayer, Agony and Bloody Sweat of Christ, the Trial, the Binding to the Column, the Parting of the Vestments, the Nailing of the Feet, the Commendation of Our Lady to St. John, the Dying Thief, the Seven Words, the Surrender by Christ of His Spirit, and the Dolours of Our Lady. A series of further meditations on Heaven and Hell closes the second section.

Laredo lays great stress on the importance of meditating on the life of Christ, which he considers a necessary step from the purgative to the unitive way. "The life of our most sweet Christ Jesus," he writes, "is doctor sufficient for us. It is the most perfect school of all, which more than any other form of instruction leads the soul to lofty contemplation of incorporeal things and of its Creator" (I, 2). The soul that aspires to the practice of contemplation, and would arrive at the summit of Mount Sion, must "found

itself" for a long while—"some years"—upon the mysteries of the life of Christ, and take them for its principal master. Fray Bernardino is quite certain of this, both from his own experience and from that of many contemplatives whom he has consulted before coming to his conclusion. It is true that two men "of praiseworthy life and lofty contemplation" have told him the contrary, and said that one day in a week suffices for such meditation. But while he respects their opinion as coming from holy men, he adds that "between them, in many years, they have made but one single disciple"—a fact which he takes as bearing out his thesis and militating against theirs.

Before passing to higher things, Laredo makes it clear into what stages he divides the mystical life, and what experiences properly belong to each. There appear to be three, corresponding to the three divisions of the book, and also, roughly, to the three traditional stages of Purgation, Illumination and Union, though they are in no way identical with them. These stages he terms respectively "meditations upon our misery," "meditations upon Christ's Humanity," and "intellectual quiet"; he goes to such pains to make clear the significance of each that his words must again be quoted:

The meditation of annihilation is by the way of inquiry and reasoning with the understanding, and the contemplation of the mysteries of Christ is and must of necessity be by inquiry with the understanding and by receptiveness of will. So that the former must be sought in outward things . . . and remains in outward things of necessity, for we cannot stand still, or shut ourselves in, in this process. The second must likewise be sought in outward things, though here we carry them within ourselves. But the third stage consists in quiet contemplation of things incorporeal, of pure spirit and of God most high; and this must be entirely a matter of receptiveness without the presumption upon our part of attracting aught to ourselves, nor of retaining that which comes to us by any skill of our own. All is according to the will of the Giver, Who comes when He pleases, and when He pleases departs (II, 14).

This third stage is the highest known to Laredo—"the summit of Mount Sion"—and undoubtedly to the vast

majority of his readers also. It was his detailed and realistic descriptions of it which recommended him to St. Teresa, Juan de los Angeles, and a number of other Spanish mystics to whom his works were known. We shall, therefore, do well to consider the third section of the *Ascent of Mount Sion* most carefully.

Contemplatives in the earlier stages and in the third stage of the mystic life respectively are compared to two merchants, one of whom is young and active and makes journeys through towns and villages, obtaining business as he goes, and the other, being "older and more reverend," remains at home and transacts business which comes to him (II, 15). The lot of the latter is the happier, though it can only be after such a busy, restless life as that of the former that it comes. In another and alternative plan made by Laredo of the mystical life, this "quiet contemplation" appears as the summit of five stages—viz., reading, prayer, meditation, contemplation, and spirituality. "By reading, the soul seeks that which it desires; by prayer, that which it asks; meditation receives it; in contemplation the soul possesses it and has fruition of it in all quietude and peace; and in spirituality pure and simple and true it knows its Maker, Who wills to be sought in spirit and in truth" (II, 16).

It is difficult to find any sort of progression in the third division of the book, which resembles not so much a treatise as a collection of essays on contemplation—in particular on the state of Quiet—generally suggested by a text from Holy Scripture, the Fathers, or mediæval mystical writers. The author repeats himself a good deal, and labours his few apt similes, in the effort to drive home truths which he considers essential to an understanding of his subject. Those familiar with mystical writing will guess what these are: the summit of the contemplative life is reached through love; the understanding must cease to work in the Prayer of Quiet; experience in such a state is more important than theory and maxim; constant recollection is necessary in the mystical life from first to last. The hush and quiet atmosphere of this division of the book is itself very beautiful, and predisposes even the

casual reader to devotion. The silence of "quiet contemplation," it teaches, is not merely a silence from words. It is a silence of the understanding, a serenity of the memory, a quietness of the will, which will not admit so much as a moment of thought, a *punto de pensamiento* of any kind whatever (III, 8).

When for a time the state of Quiet leaves the soul, the powers of the soul, which have been stilled, will return and become active. This must not surprise or grieve us: "Being men, those of us who are least practised in contemplation are not always ready to uplift the affections to a state of perfect Quiet" (III, 20). As we grow more and more practised, we shall find that the seasons of Quiet which we have enjoyed in the past bring a strong influence to bear upon the rest of our spiritual lives. "To souls that are most adept (*ejercitadas*) in quiet contemplation, there comes from periods of Quiet such a refreshment of the powers that when they require them to be active they find them, as it were, already instructed and ready for work of whatever kind (III, 20). This explains why it is that one who has had personal experience of the "infused science" of mystical theology can understand Holy Scripture better than a learned doctor in the "acquired science" of theology.

To the action of Quiet upon the normal spiritual life Laredo devotes much space. One of his typically metaphorical passages may be quoted:

When the contemplative soul enters not into its hidden quietness it has to work with the powers, which come out like bees buzzing around the flowers. . . . Having found the truth, it returns at once to its hive—that is, to recollect itself within its own substance. And in this recollection it understands without noise of words what it is that it has gathered. This the will takes and seals as in a honeycomb and the memory keeps it. And when that Quiet ceases wherewith it worked within its own substance, like a bee that works within its own hive, the understanding returns. . . . (III, 20).

"But it must be realized," Laredo continues, "that this reasoning of the understanding and operation of the memory are in no way contrary to progress in Quiet by the

path of aspiration, since, by means of the understanding, souls can readily soar who find themselves impeded in flying by means of the impetuosity of the affections. And if at such times they exercised not the understanding, they would often be slower in recollecting themselves and in soaring aloft." At the same time, it must never be forgotten that Quiet is the highest state of all, and that meditation is lower: we shall aim, therefore, at passing from meditation to Quiet, not from Quiet to meditation.

How comes it, the author suddenly asks, that we use images of continuous or rapid movement—journeying, flying, soaring, and the like—to express aspiration towards God, if God is really within us and if to seek Him we enter within ourselves? This interpolation is very much to the point in its position in a long and, for the most part, eloquent description of the highest mystical states, throughout which are used the metaphors of flight. Laredo shows that such language is merely metaphorical, and whenever he counsels the soul to "raise" the affections and to "aspire" in spirit, it is always to be understood that a process of introversion is implied. In the terms of this metaphor, when we are united to God within ourselves, then we are higher than the heavens: "For all their loftiness and sublimity is not so great as that of this Presence wherein through recollection we abide" (III, 22).

After a number of chapters which discuss the knowledge of God that can be gained through created things, the secondary gift of contemplation, the fourfold nature of love, and other subjects, Laredo considers the precise degree of passivity which characterizes Quiet, and describes the "tiny spark of love," familiar to all readers of the mystical works of St. Teresa. He seems always to have been a little uneasy lest his description of the Prayer of Quiet should be taken as teaching what became notorious in later days as quietism, though it does not seem, in fact, that such inferences were drawn from the *Ascent of Mount Sion*, still less from his other works. There follow some chapters on the Blessed Sacrament, at the end of which he returns to this theme, and in some verses, rude indeed, but not ineffective, which were quoted by more than one

of his immediate successors in Spain, he extols the state of Quiet. The trend of the verses, which are too long to quote in full, has been unwittingly misrepresented by the quotation from them of lines which do not express the whole of their spirit:

Quien supiese navegar: y engolfado no remar. . . .

Quien pudiese descansar: sin descanso y sin parar.

(O, that one could sail, without rowing, and be engulfed! . . .
O, that without ceasing and without resting therefrom one might rest!)

But with these must be read others:

Quien pudiese caminar: sin pararse a resollar. . . .

Quien ha de seguir a Cristo: ha de andar justo y bien listo.

(O, that one might journey without once pausing to take rest! . . .
He who has to follow Christ must walk aright and be ever alert in spirit.)

It is generally thus with the Spanish mystics: those who condemn them for a supposed quietism forget or ignore the important fact that a description of one state in the mystical life is not a description of the whole.

The foregoing notes do not pretend to be an analysis of the *Ascent of Mount Sion*, the 131 chapters of which are full of interesting matter which it would take a book to describe. It is so far the most important of Laredo's works that in justice to it the remaining opuscles must only be mentioned briefly. One of these is the *Josephine*, a "brief treatise written for the instruction and inspiration of those who desire devoutly to venerate the most glorious patriarch, St. Joseph." This is modelled on Gerson's poem of the same title, and refers to it frequently. More original, and perhaps more interesting, is the *Extravagante*, a collection of twelve letters written to different persons, but in no way personal, as are the letters of St. Teresa and St. John of the Cross. Sometimes one even suspects that some or all of them are really discourses or meditations put into epistolary form. Their interest consists largely in the fact that most of them are strongly coloured by

mysticism. Letter V, on the importance of active lives being ordered aright, and of the contemplative life as above the active, is almost wholly mystical, and hardly inferior to the *Ascent*. Many times in that book Laredo wins the affection of his twentieth-century readers by his sympathy with actives—a sympathy which is shared, it is true, by most of his great Spanish contemporaries, but which none of them expresses more forcibly and yet more tactfully than he. “I will not describe as truly spiritual,” he says here, “those contemplatives who despise actives: such a tendency is rather to be called a great temptation than pure contemplation. . . . I do not know what it can betoken save a great want of spirituality in any who because of their contemplation have disdain for actives.” Yet contemplation is the better part. “It is more licit to follow the contemplative life without knowing aught of the active—save obedience and charity—than to lead the active life without seeking the life of contemplation.”

In treatises and letters alike Fray Bernardino contrives to make himself and his personality very real to his readers, not least to his sadly few but devoted readers of to-day. His style is hardly in the slightest degree Latinized: rather it is so unaffected as to be in the main conversational, tending to the formless, and bearing out entirely its author's assertion that he was not, by temperament or training, a man of letters. He was widely read both in the Fathers and in mediæval writers: St. Augustine, St. Gregory, Dionysius, Richard of St. Victor, Balma, Herp, and Gerson are frequently quoted by him. His weakness lies not in assimilation, but in expression and arrangement. Many a desultory reader would give him up in despair, unless perhaps such a reader's eye was caught by one of the many personal anecdotes which abound in his books and add to their interest. For like his fellow Franciscans, Francisco de Osuna and Juan de los Angeles, he reveals just sufficient of himself to make us wish that we knew more.

E. ALLISON PEERS.

ART. 4.—THE CHURCH AND THE HOUR OF FASCISM

Sulla Soglia del Vaticano (1870-1901). Giuseppe Manfroni.

Two vols. Nicola Zanichelli, Bologna, 1920.

*Una Nuova Discussione sui Rapporti tra Chiesa e Stato in Italia,
Ministero degli Affari Esteri.* Ufficio Stampa, Roma, 1921.

Italy and Fascismo. Luigi Sturzo. Faber and Gwyer, London,
1926.

The Fascist Experiment. Luigi Villari. Faber and Gwyer,
London, 1926.

“TWO parallel lines that cannot meet” has been said of the positions respectively of the Church Universal and Italy about under Fascism to initiate the experiment of the corporate all-controlling State. Lines drawn to the vanishing-point appear to meet, and yet the retrospect upon fifty-seven years of Italian national unity proves the simile to be little more than an optical illusion. We have noted deflection under the strain of the hour’s passions; we see to-day how lines resume coherence through a clearer vision of the past errors of a national spirit prone to overrate its power against the Church Universal with Time ever upon her side. “Dieu ecrit droit sur des lignes courbes.”

For “ultramontanes,” in the geographical sense, to apprehend the change from the Roman Question regarded as a mere national interest for Italy, we should remember that the line of Italian Pontiffs, the brief reign of Pope Adrian VI excepted, extends far back into mediæval mists. Pope Pius IX (1846-1878) and King Victor Emmanuel II (1848-1878), since 1859 King of Italy, were the sole rulers in the Peninsular mosaic of States to claim national birth. Their minds travelled upon the same plane: Italians together. Both were drawn to each other in the spirit by belief in the *grâce d'état* of sovereigns, and both, in accordance with *ancien régime* use into which King and Pope had been bred, knew how a confidential channel of intercourse with official relations broken off could alone avert disaster and, in the terms of the Italian adage, give Time time.

52 The Church and the Hour of Fascism

The choice of confidential agent fell upon Cavaliere Giuseppe Manfroni, summoned to Rome on September 20, 1870, from the Police Commissariat, Questura of Genoa, to organize the Trastevere Police. A Piedmontese and a devout Catholic, Manfroni discharged his duty to spiritual and secular authority with rare singleness of purpose, and throughout his thirty years' service none found cause to regret the activity of an agent whose instructions, couched in terms of delicate implication, only read, "To watch and guard the Vatican." They brought Manfroni into relations with the makers of revolution, which, "like all revolutions long prepared for and like all successful revolutions, resulted in something different from what their authors meant," as well as with the sufferers from the heat and dust of the day; and his experiences, 1870-1903, set down in journals edited and published in 1920 by his son, offer not only picturesque footnotes to yet unwritten history, but a "survey of Rome from a watch-tower open on the Vatican palace, and across the Tiber looking towards the capital of Italy," showing the Time-spirit at work; and the editor adds shrewdly: "The countless threads spun between both are clearly visible."

Cavaliere Manfroni was ahead of his generation. Temporal sovereignty, which in the hundred years of his own and his parents' lifetime, had witnessed at least three Pontifical rulers departing under duress from Rome, and as many heavy-handed acts of outside "protection" found in Manfroni no believer. His travelling companion to Leghorn was a Franciscan Missionary Friar, who, having attended the Council, enlightened Manfroni further. And if the Friar, like most contemporary onlookers—as much published correspondence of the time recalls, coloured by writers' hopes or prejudices—is sceptical as to the new order's permanency, both are fellow-disbelievers in temporalism. On September 26, the date of Manfroni's arrival, Rome offers the aspect of an entrenched camp, with civil authority in subordinate military hands; the King's Lieutenant, General La Marmora, absent, confusion reigns. Placed in temporary charge of the Trastevere "police presidency," Manfroni found his district to include, beyond the pre-

cincts of the Borgo or Leonine City, an extensive ill-defined area of straggling suburb, where his Pontifical predecessors' writ scarce ran. The Trastevere from remote ages had governed itself. "Every man, woman and child has a stiletto and knows what to do with it," he observes grimly. These are traditional lines; licence qualified by loud-voiced personal devotion to the Holy Father, and not less vocal abhorrence of his paternal rule. Manfroni's pages are sprinkled with humorous episodes: official property regarded as legitimate perquisites, trophies, and the like.

The terms of the plebiscite proclamation to unite Italy, with Rome for her capital, having caused searchings of heart among many, the general formula had to be re-drafted to emphasize the safeguards to the independence and spiritual authority of the Holy Father. If, on the one hand, the vote of October 2 was a foregone conclusion, speculation yet eddied round the old and new order's stability. The position viewed historically justified doubters. Romans had seen so many incursions: one more would prove an episode, at worst a short story. The Piedmontese were strangers speaking a dialect jarring upon soft Roman ears; itinerant chestnut-vendors, they were "buzzuri," a familiar seasonable invasion. But the invasion was found to be no longer seasonable, when ten days later the orders of General La Marmora were that the Pontiff's summer palace was to be taken over for royal use, if need be forcibly. The act and manner spread dismay, both recalling Napoleonic methods, while the reproof valiant following laid the Quirinal and its dwellers under interdict for years to come. But the autograph letter addressed to the Holy Father by King Victor Emmanuel on his first visit to Rome—when the royal progress, December 31, avoided the right-hand Tiber-side, and, as Manfroni observed, "Those outlying quarters are the hub, not the rim of the wheel"—was to mark the initial move of *ancien régime* use to mitigate the era of difficulty now opening. Disturbances in the Borgo, for which the Feast of the Immaculate Conception had offered the pretext, stressed the need of a closer definition of unofficial relations embodied in Manfroni's plea for a free hand, avoidance of

54 The Church and the Hour of Fascism

all parade of authority and action liable to misconstruction. The annual Tiber floods, which had assumed alarming proportions, were to prove Manfroni's foresight. On Christmas Day the Borgo was under water, and the problem of "Vatican extraterritoriality" had to be met in view of the position created for the troops quartered in Castel S. Angelo. Both ends of the *chemin de ronde* above the wall to the Vatican had been bricked up, and when the Colonel in command at the Serristori barracks required those troops to assist in provisioning and rescue work among the Trastevere population, he bluntly called upon Manfroni to invite "those Vatican gentry" to remove obstructions. Manfroni speedily invoked friendly interest, but the request being "passed up" was negatived; the creation of precedent, the time involved were pleaded; yet if ladders were set up near the Macherino alley, they afforded the needed exit . . . into the Precincts. There was a way out. The hint taken and the ensuing diplomatic protest against trespass, both discounted to the satisfaction of the men on the spot, are an instance among many of the diplomatic Police Commissioner's experiences.

The New Year, 1871, opened untowardly with the Law of Guarantees, while the debate pending in Florence disclosed a cleavage in opinion also with regard to more than a titular change of capital. Feeling ran high in Rome, and rumours of the Pope's departure were rife: Malta, Belgium, Austria, and even Corsica were mentioned as possible destinations; this last, accompanied by the French Government's invitation to board the *Orénoque*, stationed now and for several years longer at Civita Vecchia. The Easter Allocution to the Consistory had indeed quelled rumour, but the protest against the Law of Guarantees placed on the Statute Book of Italy, couched in the scathing words of the Brief addressed to Cardinal Patrizi, set the essential lines from which, if modified in terms by the world's recognition of the Holy Father's spiritual supremacy, none of Pope Pius IX's five successors in S. Peter's Chair have departed in respect of their prerogative in Italy. Insults to the clergy were met by the curtailment of Easter ceremonies, and Manfroni observes,

in common with published correspondence of that day, that much as the Romans mind castigation, the foreigners at whose expense they would voice it are conspicuously absent. The conciliatory thread was strained when the autograph letter of congratulation for the 25th anniversary of the Pontiff's reign, carried in state by the King's general *aide-de-camp*, was received by proxy only, Cardinal Antonelli alleging the Holy Father's indisposition; and public opinion, reasoning upon *post hoc propter hoc* lines, regarded the King's pronouncement, July 2, at his state entry, "We are in Rome, and here We shall remain," as a challenge. Confidential threads continued nevertheless to be spun, Manfroni being assured that whatever the tone of public utterances a working agreement might come to pass all the sooner that conviction was gaining ground *al di là* of the Bronze doors that expectations from persons and parties smarting under adversity who look to the Vatican for recovery of their lost positions were a fallacy. Yet though the solemnization of the breach opened at the Porta Pia evoked renewed protests at the year's close, 1872 was ushered in once more with congratulations, and the autograph letter carried by Conte di Pralormo was acknowledged by Cardinal Antonelli with only the studied avoidance of a territorial title in the reciprocated felicitations to His Majesty.

Rumour of the Pontiff's serious illness perturbed opinion, and Manfroni was summoned to a departmental interview with Ministers beset with apprehension lest the Conclave deemed imminent (1873) be held outside Italy, a contingency to be forestalled at all hazards. Manfroni's most earnest examiner was Marchese Emilio Visconti Venosta, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cavour's nephew. The author of *La Chiesa Libera nello Stato Libero*, Count Cavour, had died in 1861 at an hour when the transfer of Italy's capital to Rome could only be deemed the dream of a visionary who had passed away without leaving any hint of how, had he survived the event, then far below the horizon, he would have translated his pronouncement in terms of practical policy. But Marchese Visconti Venosta's conciliatory attitude suggests that uncle and

56 The Church and the Hour of Fascism

nephew had in mind an agreement between gentlemen, to which indeed the Risorgimento, a revolution inspired by aristocrats of birth and lofty ideals, lends colour. Cardinal Antonelli's decease nevertheless—1876—coincided with the tightening of the secular curb. The speech from the Throne at the opening of the Parliamentary session hinted at changes which Sr. Stanislao Mancini, Minister of Justice, elaborated in restrictive measures against "associations." These, which involved the secularization and eviction of all religious from their houses, were condemned by all but a handful of sectarians. The sense of distress was general in Rome and South Italy, where religious foundations were numerous and well-endowed. The picture drawn by leading novelists of the hardships entailed upon the aged and friendless nuns thrown back into secular conditions upon a pittance from which income-tax was deducted stirred public opinion, nevertheless unripe for a change of heart.

In January, 1878, there died La Marmora, first Lieutenant of Rome, and Victor Emmanuel II, first King of Italy, forerunning by a mere span of days Pope Pius IX, of whom it may truly be said that, born in the decade of the French Revolution, having seen the Napoleonic and Holy Alliance orders crumble and the millenary Holy Roman Empire enter history, the impressionable years of their lives pictured a vast uncharted sea beset with perils. His accession in those crucial years for Italy, together with the experienced failure of a policy that had only the mile-stones of a dead past for future guidance, left Pope Pius faced by the issues of 1870 without any precedent upon which to frame an effectual constructive policy for the Church in Italy. The recognition of her spiritual supremacy alone and intangible—to-day a commonplace—had yet to crystallize for opinion, with the result that a negative attitude embodied in the *non licet* order to Catholics prepared to share in their country's life, deemed analogous in some measure with the mediæval interdicts against states rebellious to the Holy See, had received the Holy Father's sanction. The Conclave opened within the fortnight according to precedent on February 16, in virtue of the

Constitution of 1874 in Rome, closing two days later with the elevation of Cardinal Pecci under the name of Pope Leo XIII. Minds were bent towards a change: another era might open with successors, alike to the late Pope and King, and the Apostolic blessing given from the outer Loggia of S. Peter's was to be its sign. Nevertheless two words, "In Chiesa," uttered after protracted thought, created the precedent from which no departure was to be made until thirty-four more years, 1878-1922, had elapsed. The query in all minds is what next? Would the *de facto* conditions remain, or, temperamentally and intellectually otherwise equipped, would Pope Leo break down national barriers set up against the Universal Church? Pope Pius IX's impassioned accents were not heard in the Pontifical allocution to the Consistory, March 28, the terms suggesting rather the reserved strength of the call to all Catholics to close their ranks around the Church and her Pastor, to be evidenced in the near future. The policy initiated by the Government three years before (1875-6) of radical sectarianism supported by a parliamentary majority worked oppressively. Secularism was introduced in the primary schools with the catechism placed among voluntary subjects left to teachers' discretion, while the award of study-diplomas, also restricted to State secondary schools and University faculties, placed candidates from institutions directed by religious at a disadvantage of which examiners hastened to avail themselves. Persecution spread to other fields, for which the privilege of episcopal presentation vested in former Italian rulers and now claimed by the King offered a pretext. But the unyielding attitude of the Holy See in the cases of Mgr. Sanfelice, nominated to the See of Naples at the July Consistory, 1878, in lieu of Mgr. Capecelatro from Capua, and that of Mgr. Ruffo Scilla to Chieti in spite of a Ministerial caveat launched through the Law Courts, proved the test intended by the Holy Father. Agreement, 1879, to end the German *Kulturkampf*, with success for the essentials upheld by the Holy See during its five-year-long strife, moreover, offered incontrovertible proof that henceforward spiritual supremacy, while claiming essential

58 The Church and the Hour of Fascism

freedom, was not necessarily to be linked with Roman city topography.

The Italian elections in 1880, the first held under the new reigns, offered the opportunity long sought by thinking minds for a departure from the stand taken against the country's Parliamentary Government. Whether the ruling "neither candidates nor voters" applied in Pope Pius' mind to his own subjects or to Italians in general can only be conjectured; the effect, however, the abstention of a mass of right-thinking voters opening the door to politicians of another colour, had not perhaps been considered with all its untoward possibilities. Moreover, the acceptance of Italian unity under the House of Savoy was general, felt not alone by the laity, excepting only loyalists from personal motives, but by the junior clergy even in Rome, and more particularly outside the Pontifical State, in the measure that State-secularism had not thwarted sacerdotal obligations. The wisdom of mitigation of a rule, now a palpable disadvantage to the Church, became apparent when the substitution of *nunc non expedit* for *non licet* at these elections (1880) revealed an unexpected strength in Catholic opinion: straws yet, but pointing the wind's way. Garibaldi's death removed another irreconcilable, blocking even the Cabinet's purpose, as was felt when the Prime Minister, Sr. Depretis, speaking at Stradella, suggested transformism—i.e., a centre party to hold the balance true between extremes. The indirect light flashed by the observation of a Cardinal whom Manfroni records only by an initial that, "had this Cabinet held the reins in 1878, Italy would no longer have the thorny Roman Question upon her hands," illumines the ground already covered, and if revealing rather the alleged speaker's generous optimism, also shows the hand of Time at work clearly, as Sr. Francesco Crispi's pronouncement did in 1887: "Italy's greatest Minister will be he that will settle the Roman Question." Crispi was fast upon the clock, but international developments were to give the hands the push which the present century has realized, in part so far, the morrow being hid to all.

A party to the Triple Alliance, Italy had marked step

with autocratic Germany, and while reacting to French anticlericalism that sought to buttress an unstable tenure at home with religious persecution, and abroad by the position of elder daughter of the Church, she smarted under the invisible but tangible rope drawn round her by Catholic opinion. But "Young Italy" was to feel the "urge of the Roman Question," officially declared a dead issue when merely driven underground. She is not dead, but sleepeth. The initial step can be traced to the year 1891, when, as Don Sturzo notes, the social Catholic workers' movement throughout Europe won Pontifical sanction. The Encyclical Letter *De Conditione Opificum* restated the rights and duties of employers and workers. In Italy the letter stood for a Charter of Liberties to the co-operative movement then rapidly developing; and this spirit worked in with the younger "intellectuals." Carducci's anticlerical slogan, to which indeed Sr. Mussolini in a memorable speech in the Chamber (June 21, 1921) will refer with amused contempt, had then already begun to lose its value, but parliamentary liberalism was still, and remained for years obsessed by fears of "militant" clericalism, while in the country many shirked the Roman Question as though, as Sr. Villari avers, restating the official view, the Law of Guarantees had settled all for the best. The influence in North Italy, especially of ecclesiastics such as the late Bishop of Cremona, Mgr. Bonomelli, and of writers like the late Antonio Fogazzaro (d. 1911), afford abundant proof not only of Catholic vitality, but also of the part that the *non expedit* ruling could play under ecclesiastical guidance.

When in 1903 Pope Leo followed King Umberto (d. 1900) to the grave, the Catholic party had become a factor to be counted with. The Conclave elected Cardinal Giuseppe Sarto, Patriarch of Venice, Pope, by the name of Pius X, and his Allocution, while reaffirming his two predecessors' attitude, was felt to take the changed conditions into due account—changes indeed with which his own episcopal career both at Mantua and at Venice had familiarized him. The position demanded delicate handling; advocates of conciliation were vocal in speeches and

60 The Church and the Hour of Fascism

books, some even like Fogazzaro having recourse to fiction to set a ready-made course for the movement. Whether this somewhat *previous* action retarded the event can be argued; it is certain that Pope Pius X remained averse from a Catholic party so labelled, but Catholics might stand for election. The *non expedit* ruling was to be waived unofficially now, and be rescinded altogether for the elections held in 1913. Cavaliere Manfroni had long retired from the "confidential" agent's position, but the method had been found so useful that its continuance remained "confidential" only as regards the personage chosen for the channel. When therefore the Prime Minister of the day, Sr. Giolitti, sought Catholic support, he entered into an agreement with Count Gentiloni, their recognized leader, conditional upon the Government's abstention from obnoxious legislation, the introduction of a civil divorce law, and the like. The secret of the so-called Gentiloni Pact was not kept, and the fate of the Catholic or Popolare party, organized and led in his secretarial capacity by Don Sturzo from 1919 onwards, is directly traceable to the practice of opportunism from which the movement, claiming lofty principles for their own, was expected by public opinion, largely among Catholics, to be free.

The world-war broke out in August, 1914, and within a few days Pope Pius X passed away. Like the majority of his countrymen, Don Sturzo took the mere national view of those eventful years. Catholics in Italy, to adopt the colloquialism "more Catholic than the Pope," viewed with scant sympathy the tide turning in favour of non-Catholic allies. And when the text of the London Agreement for Italy's entrance into the war, 1915, was divulged in 1917, Article XV, excluding the Holy See from a then hypothetical Peace Conference, left them aggrieved, much as the "Young Italy" party, then styled National, was roused to an angered sense of humiliation by the stipulated limits to conquest. Thus at the Armistice the Catholic party found its slogan in the *désarroi* of the hour and the people's cry for the fulfilment of war-promises and the Nationalists theirs in "Fiume." The Nationalists, be it noted, representing the Young Italy of twenty years' stand-

ing in politics and literature, were first in the field with their patriots' programme, a brand to be scrapped and worked over into 1919 super-socialist Fascism by Sr. Mussolini, to whom the words of Victor Hugo (d. 1885), "Je représente un parti qui n'existe pas encore, le parti révolution-civilization, ce parti fera le XX siècle," apply with almost prophetic vision. The Catholic Popolari in that year stood for a corrected up-to-date variety of Christian social democracy, and both groups, saviours of society, saw their way to power over the prostrate bodies of Liberal *cum* Socialist ministries, incompetent to get the wheels driven by war at artificial speeds back into normal working order. Astonishment, however, was general, when at the General Election of 1919 proportional representation first adopted disclosed a Catholic voting strength of one-fifth in the Chamber, running the Socialists close, while National Fascism was a handful, definable by character rather than numbers; and these groups lent Cabinet Ministers a mere day-by-day countenance, the latter powerless to carry on except through vote-bargaining. Don Sturzo (1919-1922), the power behind the nominal party leader, laboured under the disabilities of his cloth. This laid the Popolari as a body open to the suspicion of tactics derived from alleged priestcraft, calculated also to thwart the independence defined by Pope Pius X: "Catholic Deputies, but not Deputies labelled as such." As the event showed, the charge, though unfounded, was fatal to their party's organization.

Cabinet-making went on to the disrepute of the Popolari, and also of the Parliamentary Liberal party, for whom the Socialists alone counted as a danger to office of close upon fifty years' scarce interrupted duration. Disorder was rife throughout the country; the successive short-lived Ministries seemed bent only upon keeping the ring for Socialism, Communism, and the Popolari, their extremists found more often than not with the latter. The national conscience now crystallized round the Fascist movement to fight anarchy wherever met and with all weapons whatsoever. The appeal thus made to discipline the serviceman's spirit, which post-war Ministers, selected for the

62 The Church and the Hour of Fascism

most part among parliamentarians of the old gang, had ignored, found immediate response. Fascism too was quick to seize upon the Popolari's weak spot—namely, their toying with parlour-socialism; and taking the Catholic party programme largely for their own, Fascism gathered the forces behind them which, after winning them over, Don Sturzo had failed to keep. The debate in the Chamber, June 21, 22, 1921, opened all eyes. France after a seventeen-year-long breach had renewed official relations with the Holy See, the British Empire had made a temporary Legation permanent, Imperial successor States swelled the ranks of diplomatists accredited to the Holy See, and the appointment of Nuncios to replace Apostolic Delegates of lesser rank emphasized the present prestige of the Church Universal. What of Italy now? queried opinion. Had the hour for the Italian conscience now truly struck? Three group leaders stood up to render answer, foremost Sr. Mussolini. His sarcasms levelled at "Carducci literature" concluded with a pronouncement: the necessity for Italy to recognize "that the Latin and Imperial tradition of Rome is to-day represented by the Catholic Church." These words to which the event has in a great measure given effect were echoed with a not less open repudiation of past errors by Sr. Alfredo Rocco, the Nationalist spokesman, who admitted "at the risk of derision as church-mice" that his party held Cavour's pronouncements to have been then perhaps timely, but now out of date. Sr. Tovini, leader of the Popolari, could but acquiesce with his colleagues since his party's desiderata—freedom of public worship, equity in the status of the clergy, equality recognized as between secular and religious secondary schools and University faculties, and lastly religious instruction made obligatory in primary schools—were likely to result from group co-operation in the teeth of Liberal-Socialist opposition. This occasion, like others past and to come, opened the door to hypothetical reconciliation of Church and State castle-building (in the air). This castle-building regularly drew official denial from the *Osservatore Romano*; the more necessary that a certain tone of patronage was to be detected in the

speeches of Sr. Mussolini and Sr. Rocco, obviously unacceptable to the Holy See.

Pope Benedict XV, who had shown the Partito Popolare his fatherly sympathy so long as their movement actually constituted a brake upon anarchy, did not conceal his misgivings, as the last months of his life were saddened by the open antagonism between them and the Fascists, whose attacks upon and outrages against ecclesiastics and destruction of church property, assumed sectarian aspects at variance with Sr. Mussolini's protestations. Pope Benedict XV passed away in January, 1922. The Conclave was surrounded this time not only by unanimous public respect, but also official deference. Cabinet Ministers attended the Proclamation of Pope Pius XI, fourth in succession to Pope Pius IX, and when the Holy Father gave his Apostolic blessing, for the first time after the lapse of thirty-four years, from the outer Loggia of S. Peter's adorned with the crimson draperies wrought with the Mastai-Ferretti arms beneath the Tiara, the latter pointed, it seemed now, to converging lines in the paths of spiritual supremacy and secular territorial conditions. Seemingly remote in February, a step was to be realized in October, 1922. The Fascist March upon Rome, October 29, had filled the public mind with apprehension, dispelled happily through the King's decision to make Sr. Mussolini his constitutional adviser. The Duce was summoned to form a Cabinet and put to the test the tenets which his own henchmen—fighting anarchy—had interpreted too often in terms of wrath against the Catholic party.

Pope Pius XI continued his predecessor's benevolence to Don Sturzo, recognizing his singleness of purpose, but Don Sturzo and Sr. Mussolini were fundamental irreconcilables; and with higher interests involving the reinduction of the Christian spirit in secular rule thus jeopardized, Don Sturzo was bidden leave the work in hands—those of the Church herself—more qualified than the individual to deal with the problems adumbrated by Fascism. The brief collaboration of leading "Popolari" with Sr. Mussolini, 1922-23, was but a trial of apparently opposing forces, while the enemy, apart from former now disowned Socialist

64 The Church and the Hour of Fascism

friends, remained in the form of the traditional parliamentary Liberal spirit, to be eliminated not alone from public life but also from any formative influence in the body politic. Measures aiming at the realization of Sr. Mussolini's super-state—in his own words “all within, naught without, naught against the State,” such as the abrogation of rights and liberties secured by the Statuto, the predominance of the Executive at the expense of the other powers of a Constitutional State, and the installation of one-man rule to which royal countenance has lent constitutional validity—lie outside consideration except in the measure of results for the Church and her attitude towards the new order governed by the logic of events. Fascism had garnered the harvest the Popolari had sown. Secularism abandoned in primary education found its practice checked also in secondary schools and Universities, in the State examination introduced by the philosopher, Giovanni Gentile, and modified by Sr. Fedele, the present Minister of Public Instruction, no longer handicapping colleges directed by religious. The restoration of the Crucifix in the schools, law courts, public buildings, such as the Capitol and the Colosseum, in memory of countless martyrs, freedom to hold religious processions outside churches, were first fruits of Gentile's administration. In those early years of fervour, too, patriotic ceremonies opened with Mass solemnized at temporary altars. The number of Army and Naval Chaplains was increased and field officers' rank enforced respect. Official courtesies to prelates of rank multiplied indeed the nuance of patronage in their expression, giving occasion more than once to reminders that nothing more should be read into such traditional observance than the deference claimed by the Church to her hierarchy. Such was notably the case during the Jubilee Year and subsequent Hepto-centenary of S. Francis of Assisi.

Advocates of national conciliation have been ready to seize upon “superficial consonance, while leaving untouched the real sources of difference” with the Church Universal, and perhaps undue scope was lent by opinion to the purpose of the departmental commission set up by

Sr. A. Rocco, Nationalist leader in 1921, and to-day Sr. Mussolini's Minister of Justice, who includes the Ecclesiastical Commission, *Economato e Fondo Culti*, in his province. Attended in "observers' capacity by ecclesiastics of rank, the Commission's findings are important. Restitution of certain property, monasteries, and secularized churches has been followed by the abrogation of perpetual secularization, while a diocesan Ecclesiastical Commissioner appointed by the Ordinary confers agreed sanction upon administrative measures hitherto decided by State officials alone.

So much for light, yet the picture without shadow would lack vital quality. The spirit of Fascism, arrogant, impetuous and intolerant, militant as an army in battle is abroad. Its Duce, Sr. Mussolini, has the defects of his qualities. His own words, "This epoch after the war is a new epoch, and new epochs call for new behaviour," are his interpretation of power, of his will to realize Crispi's forecast of the greatness that belief in his infallible star would attain. In Italy and abroad Mussolini has grown to immortal's stature, with a measure of truth undeniable in spite of his countrymen's congenital emotionalism. But the Duce is human, he has wilfully foregone the benefits of opinion's makeweight. Hence the displeased amazement at disapproval voiced in the Holy Father's Allocution at the Christmas Consistory (1926), at the continued outrages upon Catholics individually and against their work going unpunished, and yet more the indictment of the corporative State idea, "which cannot be Catholic since all-absorbing and monopolizing, it makes the State the end and the Citizen, the Man but the instrument only therein." The Press, nicknamed today "the Master's Voice," has sought to explain away criticism directed also against compulsory absorption of Catholic Youths' Associations, Boy Scouts, etc., by the National Fascist Balilla organization. But the Holy Father's words were understood, and while his paternal insight counselled the first step to dissolve, the appointment as an essential condition, as offset, of chaplains to each Balilla unit, will forestall the danger felt by all observant minds of creating

66 The Church and the Hour of Fascism

a generation of swelled heads. Diocesan authority is prepared.

What of the future relations between the Church and Fascism? Enlightened opinion can only answer, "As you were." The hour is too early for any to judge how closely the corporate State will conform to the Holy Father's far-sighted axiom. At present all activities, social and economic, virtually conscripted by the State, have yet to line up at work, as distinguished from the parade ground which they now fill in serried ranks of enthusiasts. Upon paper all the parts fit with mathematical accuracy. It remains uncertain yet what form human reaction will take against such controls as the corporative State purposes, nor yet can we discern clearly what is maturing behind the smoke-screen of incense to the war and the police-mind at present uppermost in Fascism. And at the inevitable turning-point there can be no doubt of the influence of the Church brought to bear upon an impressionable organism such as this, yielding outward homage, not all lip-service. It may be taken for certain, however, that the "Roman" tradition sought to be impersonated by Sr. Mussolini can but strengthen the Church Universal in Italy herself, what time, as is likely through the union and reunion of many outside the fold, the Sacred College will represent a majority of non-Italian Catholics also in its composition.

M. MANSFIELD.

ART. 5.—THE PERSECUTION IN MEXICO

EVERYONE knows that the Mexican Constitution, formulated by a victorious faction that excluded from the so-called Constitutional Convention all Catholic and liberal elements, and which changed the former constitution by violating the necessary conditions provided for its change or amendment, is a tyranny that seeks to cloak itself beneath the name of Law. Since 1917 no President has sought to apply it, for it was clear that such application would inevitably cause disturbance; hence President Carranza, a few months before his assassination by his own adherents, proposed to Congress the reform of the anti-religious provisions.

The laws of Calles made impossible the exercise of the priestly office in the churches, for they demand an explicit recognition of the right of the State to Church property which it has usurped, and practically destroy the Catholic hierarchy. The registration of the priests in charge of the churches has as its object, according to the definite declaration of the President, that they recognize that ecclesiastical property belongs to the nation—that is to say, to the State; and since such registration is what empowers the priest to fulfil his clerical duties in the churches, and all are registered who present themselves, even those who are not priests and without any authority whatsoever from their superiors, there would ensue the most complete anarchy among the clergy. For these reasons the Mexican archbishops, with the approval of the Holy Father, resolved to suspend public worship and the administration of the sacraments in the churches. The remaining recourse was for the priests to minister to the faithful in their homes, and they were doing this for the first few months following the suspension of church activities, but there were imposed, forthwith, laws and regulations to prevent even this.

An extreme vigilance is exercised to prevent the Sacrifice of the Mass in private homes, the administration of baptism and the viaticum, and the reception of the sacrament of matrimony. It being impossible to maintain watch

over all the priests, the Government has adopted the procedure of ordering the governors of all the states to seize all clerics and concentrate them in the capital of the Republic. They have succeeded in this with the priests of Durango who, having refused an offer of entire liberty and five hundred Mexican dollars a month on condition that they renounce the Pope and the bishops, were sent to Mexico City, detained in the military prison and remained thereafter securely incarcerated in the city, under obligation of presenting themselves daily to sign the register of prisoners. In other states of the Republic the priests have preferred to hide themselves or flee, and thus the majority of the Mexican people have remained without the sacraments or the aid of priests, for the Government has a vast army of spies who publicly proclaim a priest wherever he may be found. To this unheard-of tyranny may be added the arbitrary policy of all classes of authorities, civil as well as military; for, without the presentation of evidence, with no trial whatsoever, for the sole fact of being a priest or a Catholic layman, many have been shot. Among the priests we have certain knowledge of seven, while among the Catholic laymen, who were not guilty of rising in arms, can be counted many, some dying after the severest tortures. There is the case of one who suffered the loss of his tongue before being shot, while others have been suspended by the thumbs to torment them and coerce them into disclosures against their co-religionists.

Furthermore, the Government has sought to discourage armed resistance and sow the seeds of terrorism among the people, so that the armed defence to which the Catholics have been forced to appeal may be stamped out. In vain did the episcopate present to Congress a petition for constitutional reform, supported by some two million signatures of citizens: the reply was a bitter sneer from that body, which refused to recognize the right of the bishops to petition for such reforms on the ground that they owed allegiance to a foreign sovereign (the Pope); but Congress chose to ignore that behind the bishops were those two million signatures, which could have been

increased if liberty and security had been afforded to gather them. Neither did Congress recall that the President himself had answered the bishops who raised objections to the Constitution and the laws by advising them to apply to Congress for the reforms that they deemed necessary.

Peaceful methods being useless, the Catholics have begun to rise in arms since September, 1926, the first movement occurring at Perijamo, in the state of Guanajuato. The purpose of the Catholics who have risen in arms is solely to recover their lost liberties, not exclusively for Catholics but for all. But the Government has slandered the defenders of liberty, denouncing them as seeking to re-establish the dominance of the Church, the Inquisition and the privileges that the Church enjoyed in the sixteenth century. From this has come the determination of the Government to assert that the episcopate has instigated the revolution, and that the priests are actively engaged in leading the rebels. An example of the campaign of lies and calumnies indulged in by the Government is seen in the following incident: On April 18, 1927, a band of revolutionists attacked a Guadalajara train, and several second-class passengers were killed. The following day the chief of the presidential military staff issued an official dispatch from Mexico City, saying that a band of rebels organized by the Catholic episcopate had attacked the train, and that the rebels, led by three Catholic priests, had committed atrocities against the second-class passengers. The bishops have organized no armed bands; no priest goes about in arms, and the attack on the second-class car was brought about by a convoy of Government soldiers, who finding themselves attacked, instead of descending to the ground or remaining in their own car, sought to convert the second-class coach into a temporary fortress, despite the protest of the passengers. A further example: On April 21, at seven o'clock in the evening, an attempt was made to seize the fifteen bishops detained in Mexico City, but they succeeded in seizing only six. It was intimated to the bishops that by order of the President they were to be deported that same night at nine o'clock to the American frontier, and without allowing them time for any prepara-

tion they were taken to Laredo under police guard. The official bulletin, published by the Government of Mexico, announced that these six bishops were the leaders of the rebellion, for it happened that it was only six whom they managed to arrest. The bulletin says that they were allowed to choose between trial and punishment for rebellion or voluntary exile from the country, and that they had decided to leave the nation of their own will—a statement that is an absolute lie.

Twelve bishops have now been sent into exile, and as soon as those who remain in Mexico have been seized they will suffer the same fate. The priests are undergoing inexpressible sufferings and persecutions in Mexico, and are exposed, as are the lay Catholics, to the arbitrary measures of all classes of authorities. There are no tribunals, no judges, and no guarantees for Catholics.

✠ LEOPOLDO RUITZ,
Archbishop of Michoacan.

SAN ANTONIO,
TEXAS,
May 2, 1927.

ART. 6.—AFRICA, THE ARABS, AND FRANCE

Life of Mohammed. By Muir.

Islamic Spain. By Dozy.

Histoire des Arabes. By Huart.

L'Islam et la Psychologie du Musulman. By André Servier.

FRANCE, in her rule over Algeria and her regency in Tunisia, deals mainly with the Arab—that is, with Islam. From the holy city of Kerouan to the salt lakes that lie by Tunis, from Carthage to Constantine and down to Tourghourt and the desert, the traveller sees a scanty European population almost hidden among the sweeping garments of Arab men or the dense veils of their women, and of these native dwellers in North Africa almost all profess the Mohammedan faith. France is a great Mohammedan power in this sense, that she has under her tutelage, in Northern and Western Africa, some twenty of the three hundred millions who are at once a nation and a religion—a religion, says De Castries,* without sceptics and, we may add, a nation without frontiers. Moreover, by natural and abundant increase as well as by propaganda and conversion, this forceful nation of Islam grows daily greater. In British India alone, the number of conversions during twenty years is estimated at six millions, and like progress is reported from China, Siberia, Turkistan, and Malaya. In Africa itself Cardinal Lavigerie's White Fathers can testify to what an extent the semi-barbarous races of that dark continent are falling to the lure of Mohammed.

France, therefore, besides being involved in the ordinary difficulties that beset any colonizing nation, must face besides the special problems that confront a European power in North Africa. She should frame, in the definite French way, not only a colonial policy, but an Arab policy as well. A recent and much-discussed book by M. André Servier,† the fruit of twenty-five years of specialized study, throws a more than ordinary light upon a mass of inter-involved questions, and professes to point out to France her reasonable course with regard to them. M. Louis

* De Castries, *L'Islam*.

† André Servier, *L'Islam et la Psychologie du Musulman*.

Bertrand, that distinguished writer on North Africa, gives to the book a Preface both discriminating and laudatory; in the main, he agrees with M. Servier's conclusions.

Two policies have been proposed to France since her occupation of Algeria in 1830. General Bugeaud, when Governor of Algeria, set out the first in a circular of September 17, 1844, and it had, at all events, the merit of extreme simplicity. This was, in effect, to found in Northern Africa an outlying province of France. To this end he proposed the generous encouragement of French colonization, especially of an agricultural kind. He desired to see both large and small properties, the latter owned by those "little" farmers whom he regarded as the backbone of any sound settlement. The Arabs, he thought, would learn by degrees the higher civilization of the colonists, begin to hold land individually instead of collectively, adopt modern methods of production and become, instead of a floating population, fixed holders of the generous African soil. In the end, they might fit themselves for the status of French citizens, for he had no shred of doubt that civilization in Africa must be French civilization, although this might differ eventually in some minor respects from the civilization of actual France. Meanwhile, the administration of the country was to be direct, whether by means of the French common law or by the action of military power.

Napoleon III, however, had another conviction. He considered Algeria as being, simultaneously, an Arab kingdom, a French camp, and a European colony, and he did not contemplate any eventual fusion of these elements. The Arabs he declared to be "*maîtres incommunicables de leur sol*";* by a decree of December 27, 1866, French citizens, Arab Moslems, foreigners, and Jews were put upon a basis of complete equality, and the officers of the existing "*Bureaux Arabes*" were told not to occupy themselves, in any detail, with the administration of native affairs. France, he conceived, was suzerain in Algeria; he did not desire to see her colonize it, nor did he contemplate the Arab as a future citizen of France. Admini-

* *Senatus Consultus*, April 22, 1863.

stration of the country was to be indirect, as far as possible, and was to consist chiefly in supporting the authority of native chiefs, who would be themselves the direct rulers. A loose, tutelary general control was all that France was entitled to exercise. The European rôle in Africa was mainly economic; capitalists might practise commerce and found useful industries, drawing therefrom a moderate and legitimate profit.

Waldeck-Rousseau, in 1901, on the occasion of the Margueritte revolt in Algeria, used in the Chamber this unhappy phrase, "the evolution of the native in his own civilization," and that idea, of course, underlay the whole policy of Napoleon. It supposes, however, that the Arabs have a civilization and are capable of evolving it, suppositions contradicted by the whole of Arab history; and yet France in her North African policy, ever since 1830, when a North African policy had to begin, has vacillated between the ideas of Bugeaud and those of Napoleon and Waldeck-Rousseau, has applied the former in part to Algeria, and the latter in part to Tunisia, following no coherent plan, but relying instead on the chance turn of circumstances and the inspiration of contradictory moments. This way of thinking and acting is not clear, how then can it properly be called French?

The policy to be pursued by a civilized and European power in dealing with what are commonly called "native" races should be framed only after an intelligent examination of their racial elements, their history, and their religion. Now the racial basis of the North African populations is Berber, and this was, of course, a fair-skinned race having perhaps Celtic affinities. This basic Berber element was so tough and resisting that it has survived all its Carthaginian, Roman, Vandal, Byzantine, and Arab overlays. The vulgar tongue of North Africa to-day is largely Punic, its grandiose ruins are Roman and Byzantine, what for want of a better word we describe as its civilization is Arab, its religion is wholly that of Islam, but for all that the indestructible Berber emerges. In the great Atlas ranges—in the Rif, in Khabyle, Koumeria, the Aures, at the foot of Djebel Amour and up to Djebel

Hoggar—we can see, even now, the original lord of the land. In the Berber dialects spoken to-day—Kebailya, Chaouïa, Zénatya, Tifinar—lie the open traces of an ancient and common tongue, Tamachek. But the vigorous, prolific, and sober race that spoke it seem to have been almost incapable of political stability; their long history is one of chronic anarchy and of no less chronic perfidy. Seven Berber dynasties rose and crashed between the eighth and the twelfth centuries, and in the matter of perfidy, these experts betrayed in turn the Carthaginian to the Roman, the Roman to the Vandal, the Vandal to the Byzantine, the Byzantine to the Arab. They accepted, with fatal fluidity, the civilization and the religion of each new master, and the student of Christian theological history does not need to be reminded that North Africa was the forcing house, or one might say the cockpit, of hot-blooded heretical sects; its population approached as nearly as possible to the status of that *materia prima* which, changeless itself, was said to underlie all the changes of the material world. The indigenous inhabitants of North Africa are currently spoken of as Arabs, but of the healthy blood in the veins of this so-called Arab a really insignificant quantity derives from his Arabian conquerors, about one-sixth is probably negro and at least a third may be considered as Latin. In estimating the blood of North Africa, we have to reckon not only with the main currents of conquest, but with Turkish strains and negro taints, with slaves and the booty of pirates, Circassian, Greek, Sicilian, Spanish, Georgian, and Provençal women. The oddly-composite being that resulted lies, and has lain for centuries, in the cold and unrelaxing grasp of Islam, and it is with this being that France has to reckon to-day.

What, then, is Islam? Islam is, at all events, the characteristic secretion of the Arab brain and the Arab character. This intellectually sterile race has produced little else, but this, at least, is their own, a religion strong with the strength of primitive barbarism, concentrated in the singular Eastern way on one or two much simplified truths, hot with all the fervour of undisciplined passions. Narrow, forcible, unbending, it asks but for faith and a

sword. It has no internal principle of growth, but can spread externally, like water. It can satisfy an extremely crude craving for something rather like religion, without lying too heavily on human passions; for nine-tenths of the questions that human nature ought to ask it has no answer whatever; its riches consist mainly in the poverty of its spiritual wants. If this appears, as it may well appear to be, a hard saying concerning what is popularly called a "world-faith," the answer can only be that many unfavourable judgements are true, and that Islam, so far from being a world-faith, is no more, in origin and essence, than the faith of an Arab—and of a barbarous Arab at that. How should it be anything else? The Arab is, *per se*, a barbarian.

"The Arab," says Dozy,* "despite a widespread belief to the contrary, possesses very little imagination. Their blood is more impetuous than ours, their passions are more ardent, but they are, at the same time, the least inventive of races. Pre-Islamic Arabia had its gods, its uncouth symbols of natural forces, its names of power, its holy places ringed about with horror or with awe, and above its shifting host of gods was said to loom the figure of Ilah, of the One. But Arabia had no mythology. The shadow of a great rock in that land of weariness gave some hint of provident love, the priceless oasis also, where human life might at least survive and sustain itself; the storm and the implacable sun spoke of a power mainly malignant; the rough logic of a rough life gave its own lessons, and the baffling nonsense of confused and uncontrollable events contradicted them. But the Arab wove neither poetry nor myth, he had no lore of the malignant or impotent gods, no fables of the kinder powers by whose grace he lived. The eyes indeed saw, but the unfruitful mind was silent. When at last the Arab brought forth Islam, Islam was "the least mysterious of all positive religions."†

To understand Islam, then, we must study the Bedawin Arab who created or, rather, compiled it, for the Arab does not create. But the Bedawin is, as far as possible, the creature of the Arabian desert. An immense plateau of sand and rock, circled by wild and tormented mountains,

* Dozy, *Spanish Islam*, p. 8.

† Dozy.

to the west of the mountains, between them and the sea, a narrow strip of fertile earth—that is, roughly speaking, Arabia. Lava-waste and waste of sand, the sterility of stone, the bitterness of salt, the heat of a savage sun, the appalling cold of a sudden night—that is, briefly, the Arabian desert. Life, dislocated, is like a dream of thirst and terror and thirst again. Before the sand-dunes like petrified waves, the fields of unyielding stone, the baleful plains covered with gypsum as white as snow, human imagination dies. And the Arab, in fact, is destitute of imagination. How should it be otherwise? To wring a hard living out of any earth that is less than desert, to feed a few sheep and camels on fugitive vegetation, to drink from scanty springs half smothered in sand, to prey upon caravans in their tormented journeyings, to rob the more sedentary tribes of some of their poor possessions—this is the life of the nomad Bedawin. His mind must be bent incessantly on the barest and most necessary things, his keen hard body must never fail him; life has but this one preoccupation—to live. Here is a born materialist, but here also is the male, adventurous, remorseless thing, the Arab *par excellence*, the same to-day as we find him in the documents of Genesis and the sculptures of Nineveh, for to deal with the desert requires always the same qualities. And he must deal with the desert, since it is not to be placated. The sandstorm sweeps and is never arrested, no prayer will move water to flow in a dead well, a strong enemy does not fail to strike and kill, again and again is the desert-man brought face to face with what knows nothing of pity. Islam did not create fatalism, the desert long before had preached it to her nomads, and a life of violence drove the lesson home. “Never was lord among us died in his bed,” sings a rough bard;* “on the blades of swords runs our blood and it runs but on the sword’s blade.” “We arose,” says another, “and our arrows flew and the blood that stained our garments perfumed us better than musk.”†

The finest virtues the Arab possesses lie in the sphere of his reaction to tribal obligations. The tribe, indeed, is a

* El Samaoual.

† “Safy Il Dine Il Holli.”

primitive necessity, for only in its shelter is the nomad in even comparative safety; for its own sake the tribe must hold together and renew itself; for the good of all it must exact an inflexible fidelity from each single member. "Love thy tribe," it is written, "for to it thou art bound by firmer bonds than is a husband to his wife." Tribesmen, therefore, were accounted brothers and duty to the tribe the most sacred of human obligations. These fraternities of desert-fighters knew how to devise and to enforce hard law.

The Prophet Mohammed was not of this virile part of the race, but came of the tribes who had drifted from the austere desert to the softer eastern coasts of Arabia. These had become apt in trade, had enriched themselves and lived in a kind of crude luxury connected with copious and uncritical drinking. Medina, then called Yathreb, was of purer blood and the natural foe of Mecca, whose people were largely mingled with Syrians and Chaldeans. Jews and Christians, in fairly large numbers, had settled in Medina and were more or less respected, but in Mecca was the notorious temple of Kaaba, where pilgrims came to take part in rites connected with a certain Black Stone. The tribe of Mohammed were the official guardians of this temple.

The Prophet was a man apart, of that sickly impressionable nature that lends itself so easily to something between conviction and illusion, often called faith; he was melancholy, roving, haunted by vague terrors; so highly-strung that he could weep and sob like a nervous woman; so subject to epilepsy as not to be wholly his own master. We are not to deny to him the virtue that perseveres; during thirteen lean and troubled years he continued to preach his new faith and to preach it in vain, and there can be little doubt that he believed in the reality of his revelations. His physical weakness made him cowardly according to the standard of his day; the humiliations of his earlier life had rendered him overpliable; of the political, or rather intertribal, animosities that surrounded him he was by turns exploiter and victim. In spite of his fatalistic doctrines, he believed in prayer. He could be a faithful

friend. The moral *débâcle* of his later years—it was only at fifty-four that he took to a singularly nauseous polygamy—is apt to make us forget his early sincerity. But there can be no doubt of that *débâcle*, of the “messages” from heaven invented to justify any gross whim, or of the hot cruelty that rejoiced in the sight of men slaughtered before him. It is certain, moreover, that he incurred the contempt of many of his followers. His own secretary, for instance, when writing down the “divine” revelations vouchsafed to his master, mocked him by altering them to a ludicrous sense, and since his moral character would not, in the end, bear even the easy scrutiny of his entourage, it is without surprise that we read of the insults sometimes flung at him. But he succeeded as better men have not been able to succeed; his meagre theology was carried at the point of the sword home to the minds of innumerable converts, and although the Arabs themselves had little either of legend or illusion about their Prophet, in the brains of Islamized Syrians, Persians, and Egyptians, he grew into a romantic figure, even into a myth.

Roughly speaking, Mohammed took from the Judaism and the Christianity in the atmosphere about him a few doctrines and a few precepts, leaving aside their characteristic mysteries, whether of belief or of conduct. Pagan Arabia had guessed dimly at One God; the fiery Jewish conviction on this point did but help to drive the doctrine deeper into his mind. Both Jews and Christians proclaimed the advent of a divine messenger of God: Mohammed readily believed himself to be that messenger. The doctrine of the undying soul was sanctioned by the Arabic cult of the dead, the last judgement and doctrines of hell and of heaven came from Jew and Christian alike. The more mysterious teachings of Christianity perhaps never came within the Prophet’s ken or he might have been troubled at that spiritual anomaly, a religion without a sacrifice. As it was, the doctrines he was able to take hold of grew deformed in his hands. Even the famous formula that is chaunted so impressively from every mosque tower, “La Ilah illa Allah” (“There is no God but Allah”), bears only too easily another meaning than that understood by

Europeans. For it signifies to many that God is sole force and sole agent, that all being and events are exclusively what He wills them to be, so that fatalism is the one possible view of life and man is divested of moral responsibility.*

Again, for the "believer" was no question of genuine moral conversion, to believe sufficed and to fulfil certain external obligations. By violence, conversion could and should be brought about. Believe or die! was accounted a reasonable exhortation, and did the terrorized "infidel" yield all was well. Victorious force, indeed, in the eyes of the Mohammedan is the most convincing demonstration of the will of God that can be arrived at. Finally, the Paradise proposed by the Prophet to his followers is in every way worthy of one who in his lifetime loved above all things "les femmes, les parfums et les fleurs," and had, as his wife Ayesha pathetically tells us, his fill of the first and the second blessing. We need not dwell on the five duties of the Mohammedan cult—the fivefold daily prayer, preceded by washing; the fast of a month, Ramadan; the Zekkat or almsgiving; the pilgrimage to Mecca; the imperative Jihad, or holy war upon non-Moslems, comprehensively called "infidels." But we must note that Islam accepts those complications of evil that go by the names of polygamy, concubinage, divorce, and slavery.

As St. Augustine the African† reminds us, however, "Nulla falsa doctrina est quæ non aliquid veri permisceat," and we are not to deny that the worship of One God is vastly better than the crude idolatry of Arabia before the Prophet's day, nor that some of the good works prescribed by the Koran are good, nor yet that sincere and ardent minds have lived, comparatively well, by the modicum of truth that Islam contains. But by a cruel paradox, Islam seems to close the door to anything greater than itself, so that gross and idolatrous Arabia, had it never been Islamized, might well have become Christian. "They labour under a miserable delusion," says Muir, "who

* The commentaries of Beydaoudi and the Miskat el Mesabib give the tradition that when God was creating man He took clay and dividing it into two lumps threw one down, saying, "This half for hell," and then throwing the other upwards said, "And this half for heaven."—v. Servier.

† St. Augustine, *Quæst. Evang.*, ii, 40.

suppose that Mohammedanism paves the way for a purer faith . . . the sword of Mohammed and the Koran are the most stubborn enemies of Civilization, Liberty, and Truth which the world has yet known.”*

As the bond of the tribe was the most powerful known to the Bedawin Arab, so the bond of the faith is the strongest known to Islam; to the Moslem his fellow-believer is a brother, at all events as against the non-Moslem world. Obviously, too, this solidarity is a support to weaker nations, and acts as a potent inducement to them to accept the Koran. The pilgrimage to Mecca also, where believer meets believer from the uttermost Mohammedan countries, tends to cement this unity and to impose everywhere a common conviction.

But, while abjuration of his faith is treason, the Moslem should avoid anything like martyrdom. The Prophet insists again and again on this point, and the doctrine of “constraint”—a fundamental one in Islamic legislation—declares that a believer who yields to *force majeure* incurs no possible blame. For he yields but in appearance, while his beliefs remain intact. In this legalized complacency towards the “infidel” lies a grave danger for those countries who have a subject Mohammedan population, silent but none the less immovable for their silence; while under Mohammedan rulers, although the infidel may be spared, the principle of the holy war against him remains unaltered. What, indeed, in Islam does not remain unaltered? The believer may not accept a truth of any order which does not follow from the Koran’s teaching, or rather from one or other of the four “orthodox” interpretations of it which can never be either supplemented or set aside. The Caliph who burned the library at Alexandria, saying that if the books agreed with the Koran they were useless, while if they contradicted it they were pernicious, was perfectly true to the original spirit of his religion. Let us, however, conceive what would have been the state of Europe to-day if Christianity had allowed no distinction between secular and religious truth, so that no truth that

* Muir, *Life of Mohammed*, p. 522.

did not follow from the Scriptures or the Fathers was admissible.

No doubt we must admit a necessary harmony between the "creator" and the creature, the Arab mind and Islam, but it is hardly too much to say that not faith but hope—the hope of booty—gave to this religion in its early decades the main impulse. To fight great fights, to carry off great prizes, whether of camels, merchandise, or women, were the natural employments of the Bedawin. Let this but be done to the infidel and it was active religion. The wild delights of war and conquest were sanctified. Afterwards, when the Arab became the ruler of a vanquished province, he hastened the process of conversion by law. For instance, it was decreed by the rulers of Africa that anyone who was willing to repeat in public the formula, There is no God but God and Mohammed is his prophet, should be thereupon exempt from the poll-tax. The result of this was most clearly seen in Egypt, where the poll-tax fell to less than one half, owing to the speedy conversion of the Copts.

This is true, and yet the sword remained always the main preacher. After Arabia itself had been converted, Irak and Syria, lands of a soft luxury, were attacked. The Arabs pillaged, burned, violated, destroyed, and these great provinces were converted also. Palestine followed and Egypt. Assyria, Media, Persia and the Persian provinces ruled by China fell to the sword. That sword then swung to the west, along Northern Africa, through Tripolitania, to Tunisia and Algeria, and on to the uttermost coasts of Morocco. Here the great General, Okba ben Nafâ, rode his foaming horse into the sea, shouting, "God and Mohammed! Were it not for this accursed water, I would carry your name and your glory to the ends of the earth." And in quite plain fact, within half a century or so of the Prophet's death, the domains of Islam ran from India to Spain. Then Spain also fell, and France barely saved herself from the yoke.

Burton wrote of the Arabia he knew so well that "there is no religion in the desert." Now Islam as Islam issued from the Arab brain may be as hard and as material a

religion as ever existed, for the Arab, says D'Escrayac de Lautare,* is perhaps "le plus sceptique et le plus irreligieux des hommes," but Islam outside Arabia became another thing. The populations of India, the peoples of Syria and of Persia had another mentality; in particular, the Berber of North Africa was naturally religious. In him, Islam took on an aspect of sterner ardour, of more passionate and religious conviction. The faith was really preached to some regions of Africa by the fiery sect of the Khareyites, rigorists of an extreme type, rejected by their own race. Something in the Berber responded to their ardour, "the Calvinists of Islam had at last found their Scotland."† Okba himself, the conqueror, saw the need for something more than the sword if he was to hold the Berber tribes faithful; he set himself to play the part of a saint to whom the very air was pregnant with voices of prophecy; he claimed to be a sorcerer also who could daunt deadly serpents by his words of authority.

It is said that from the schools of Alexandria came the impulse to whatever of mysticism Islam has known, but perhaps we need look no further for "origins" than the unquiet human heart and the endowed intellect that knows vaguely of the infinite. Mysticism, however, as worked out by the numerous Mohammedan confraternities is not kin to any Christian teaching. Union with God means to them annihilation of man's separate existence, some pantheistic return of the One to the One. The means to union are not prayer and virtue, but physical actions, a sacred word repeated rapidly ten thousand times until the bruised brain fails of its consciousness, the fatigue of innumerable prostrations, the banishing of sleep, the poisonous working of drugs. *Non tali auxilio*. Not so does the soul of any man meet God. One of the latest apologists of Islam‡ admits frankly that such virtues as humility and chastity have never appealed to it, and "la virginité ne l'a point touché." What soil is this for souls to grow in?

The Arabs, says Dozy, were the least inventive of races.

* *Le Désert et le Soudan*, p. 340.

† Dozy.

‡ Baron Carra de Vaux, *Les Penseurs de l'Islam*, iv, p. 239.

Let us hear him further: "Finally, when the Arabs, established in vast provinces conquered at the point of the sword, turned their attention to the sciences, they manifested the same lack of creative power. They translated and commented on the works of the ancients; they enriched certain branches of science by their patient, accurate, and minute observations; but they made no capital discoveries, and we are not indebted to them for a single great or fruitful idea."* On the other hand, Margoliouth, who sees in the Koran "the starting-point of a new literary and philosophical movement which has powerfully affected the finest and most cultivated minds among both Jews and Christians in the Middle Ages,"† has to admit that the progress of the Mohammedan world was "somehow" arrested. Jules le Maître says of this falling off, "C'est un des mystères et une des tristesses de l'histoire." Let us, however, examine history more closely. The first thing to ask is why people like the Syrians, the Egyptians, the Berbers, who, under their Greek and Roman masters, were capable of real energy, initiative and intelligence, in a word of civilization, lost all this under their Arab conquerors, sank into barbarism, and have remained in it ever since, immovable? If the Arabs were, indeed, the brilliant teachers of the Western world, how did they themselves lose so rapidly all traces of culture? The answer I believe to be that they did not lose what they never truly had, and that there is no such thing as Arab civilization, by which I mean a civilization with its roots in the Arab race. What there has been is a civilization carried on for a time by men of other races converted to Islam.

"Une science superficielle seule," says M. Louis Bertrand, "a pu accepter sans vérification le préjugé chrétien du Moyen Age qui attribuait à l'Islam les sciences et les philosophies grecques que la Chrétienté ne connaissait plus. Par la suite l'esprit sectaire a trouvé son bénéfice à confirmer et à propager cette erreur. En haine du Christianisme, il a fallu faire honneur à l'Islam de ce qui est l'invention et, si l'on peut dire, la propriété personnelle de

* Dozy, *Spanish Islam*, p. 9.

† *The Koran*, in Everyman's Library, Introduction, p. ix.

nos ancêtres intellectuels.”* It was not unnatural that works written in Arabic should have been accepted by the Middle Ages for works of Arab origin, but the fact is that they are usually translations, compilations, and glosses on Greek works of the Alexandrian school, made second-hand from Syriac visions. This work, too, was frequently done by Syrian scribes. For the countries conquered by the Arabs were already highly civilized, and Greco-Latin culture did not perish because the inhabitants turned Moslem. For a time these neo-Moslems continued to be learned and civilized beings, and their conquerors assimilated what they could. There ensued something that might be loosely called Mohammedan civilization because those who continued the ancient tradition had become Mohammedan by faith. But the result of Islamizing, which means the Arabizing, of the conquered races was that civilization disappeared; “somehow,” Margoliouth says; no, but precisely in this way—because Islam is not, ultimately, compatible with civilization; of its nature it imposes barbarism.

In the capital matter of philosophy the Arabs learned mainly from the Greeks of Alexandria, who were more or less Aristotelians or more or less Platonists. They knew the works of these commentators in Coptic or Syriac versions, from the original fonts they never came to drink. “Ils adoptèrent les idées de ces auteurs; ils les déformèrent souvent, soit parce qu’ils ne les comprenaient pas, soit parce qu’ils voulaient les faire cadrer avec les dogmes musulmans, mais ils n’y ajoutèrent rien d’original.”† Thus Averrhoës, who passed in the Middle Ages for an original philosopher, wrote commentaries on Aristotle with extracts from his works. But his doctrine is merely that common to the Arabian Peripeticians and copied by them from writers of the Alexandrian school. Avicenna, who made an *Encyclopædia*, put it together from Arabic translations of Syriac versions of Greek writers of the same school.

* *Vide* his Preface to Servier's *L'Islam et la Psychologie du Musulman*, p. 9.

† Servier, *L'Islam et la Psychologie du Musulman*, p. 325.

The Arabs have been praised for their skill in medicine and their aptitude for mathematics and the allied science of astronomy. The astronomer Maschallah, famous under Haroun-al-Raschid, was credited with original and learned works. These, however, are but compilations made from Syriac translations of Ptolemy, and it was a convert Persian, Ahmed ben Mohammed Alnehavendi, who made the well-known astronomical tables. To the Arabs is sometimes given the invention of algebra, but they did little more than copy the treatise of Diophantes of Alexandria; while Arabic numerals came from India, and arithmetic was called by the Arabs themselves "Indian calculation," and geometry "Indian science."

In the matter of medicine, Avicenna's most famous work is a compilation in Arabic of Galen's treatises, known to him in a Syriac translation. Retranslated into Latin, it passed in the Middle Ages for an original Arabic work. Maimonides, so often spoken of as an Arab, was a Jew born in Cordova, while it was a convert Persian, physician to Haroun-al-Raschid, who composed treatises imitated from Hippocrates. Lack of creative imagination makes Arab literature prosaic and positive. There is no such thing as an Arab epic, or drama, or even a narrative poem. The Arab poets describe carefully what they see and feel, but no spirit moves over the dead waters of their verse. If by some chance a poet shows some sign of imagination, his Arab critics, far from praising him for this, call him frankly "a liar."* Aspirations after the ideal and the infinite are not much the affair of this race. The stories in the brilliant *Thousand and One Nights* are of Persian origin, and the Andalusian poets were chiefly Spaniards.

Painting and sculpture are arts unknown to Arabia. Architecture the Arabs first saw when they left their own country, for even the famous—or infamous—temple of Kaaba was no more than an enclosure of rough stones and sun-dried brick, and Mohammed's first mosque at Medina was of the same description. The architect, Anthemios of Tralles, when he laid down the plan of St. Sophia, about A.D. 532, showed us all the elements of what has been

* Dozy.

called Arab art, cupolas, lace-like carving in stone, coloured tiles, mosaics, even "arabesques." Byzantine art flourished in Syria and Persia; it was there the Arabs learned their architecture. The great mosque at Cordova, the Alhambra at Granada are as truly of Greco-Latin origin as St. Peter's in Rome.

This is not to say that the Arab took on no show of culture at all, but that he had no original genius. It was in the sphere of minute observation that he really excelled; his positive mind made him a good grammarian, a painstaking compiler, an admirable traveller and geographer.

We are now in a position to see better some parts of history. When Islam, slaying and burning, swept into Syria, seized upon Damascus and set there the dynasty of Omeiad Caliphs, the Arab conquerors found themselves in a world of Græco-Latin culture. The Syrians were heirs of Byzantium; science, art, philosophy were in that heritage. In Syria the great and classic authors were freely read, philosophy was discussed with a passionate subtlety, architecture took on its grandiose Byzantine form. In this luxurious and sophisticated world the Arab virility melted like wax; in the heat of endless pleasures he learned to copy something of the culture about him; he absorbed something, but he contributed little. On the contrary indeed. The course of Byzantine civilization was continued, for a time, by Islamized Syrians, then it failed and fell, as all civilization has ever done when the Arab touches it.

When, in the eighth century, the seat of the Abassid Caliphs was fixed at Bagdad, the Ruler of the Faithful became an oriental despot. The famous *Thousand and One Nights* bring us into this fantastic, splendid, unchastened Eastern world, where the half of a kingdom is a mere alms, where beggars are, literally, lifted from the dungheap and made to sit with princes, where incredible courage, rage, justice, cruelty seem the natural law. But the builders of this profuse world were not Arabs. For a century the Barmecides, ministers of the Caliphs, intellectual and able Persians, so little Islamized that their enemies spoke of them as still pagans, directed all things.

Under their activity the amorphous Moslem Empire was organized financially and legislatively—a stupendous task; colleges and libraries were founded; mathematics, astronomy, chemistry, medicine and alchemy were taught; Greek and Latin authors were translated by Persian scribes; scholars and students were in high honour. The court of the all but legendary Haroun-al-Raschid seems as if it could vie with the finest in Europe. But the Hellenic seed of this culture was nursed by Persian gardeners, and with the disgrace of the Barmecides it withered and died. Copyists, compilers, pupils, the Arabs could take no lasting hold of learning, much less make to it an original contribution; barbarous to the bone, they had neither political nor administrative capacity. The history of the Caliphs in Spain is analogous to what happened in Syria and Persia, the continuance of civilization by a conquered people, the failure of that civilization in proportion as the people became Islamized. On the other hand, when a semi-Islamized province succeeded in freeing itself from the yoke, the old instincts of civilization reasserted themselves. This is what happened when, in the ninth century, Khorassan, Taberstan, Djerireh, Armenia, Georgia, Egypt, and Syria revolted. Revolt indeed continued. By the thirteenth century the fantastic Arab Empire had broken into a hundred mean pieces; by the fifteenth the Arabs themselves had disappeared from the main stage of history.

To sum up so far. The implacable desert brought forth and nurtured the Bedawin Arab, but the Bedawin Arab is a being who, throughout his history, has shown himself incapable of a founded civilization. His solitary achievement is the creation of Islam, the dark reflection of his own mind, by which, in every department of life, religious, civil, and domestic, he is bound to live. But Islam is, *per se*, stagnant, petrified beyond hope of alteration, so that whatever people accepts it is bound to unchanging barrenness and, we add, to an essential barbarism.

For it is not only in the sphere of faith, as we have said before, that the Koran rules supreme; it regulates the whole of life, social, civil, and domestic, and secular government is, and must be, conducted on a *a priori* prin-

cles. In order to frame laws for a Mohammedan state, the qualities required are, not knowledge of men and experience of affairs, but a good memory so as to master the content of revelation and a knowledge of pure Arabic so as to decide on its precise meaning. Nothing could be conceived more alien from our Western civilization.

What, then, has France to do in Africa? This brief sketch of Arab history and Arab religion supplies a full answer to that unfortunate phrase of Waldeck-Rousseau, "the evolution of the native in his own civilization." The Arab has no civilization to evolve; in that matter he has always been a parasite. In so far as the North Africans are Arab, or imbued with Arab ideas, they are immovable. But although semi-Arabized and completely Islamized for centuries, their main current of blood is Berber, and this is mingled largely with the good Latin stream. For the effective rule of Rome in Africa began with the fall of Carthage, in 146 B.C., and it ended only with the Vandal invasion in A.D. 460. Moreover, the Vandals themselves were Christians, spoke Latin, and continued, in a sense, the Latin civilization. The Byzantines, equally of Greco-Latin culture, ruled Africa until the end of the eighth century; thus we have 850 years of what we may call Latin tutelage. Any civilization the Berbers have ever had has been the great Latin civilization, and that withered only when Islam had got a fair hold upon the country.

Cardinal Lavigerie, when Bishop of Algiers, addressed some Kabyle (Berber) chiefs in these words: "I have a special affection for you, because we are of the same blood. The French trace their descent partly from the Romans, you do the same. The French are Christians, as you were formerly. Look at me. I am a Christian Bishop. There were once, in Africa, more than 500 Bishops like me; they were Kabyles and among them there were some, great, famous and learned. And your whole people was Christian. . . ."

M. André Servier, of whose brilliant book we have so often availed ourselves, lays down strongly the line which, he conceives, should be followed by France in Africa. With General Bugeaud, he believes that France should

make Africa French; with Bugeaud, again, he believes that this can only be done with liberal colonization and that by small proprietors. Every French farm is a centre of French influence on the natives, and the peasant proprietor touches their lives and interests in a thousand ways. Moreover, all history demonstrates that the rulers of a land are, eventually, those who till it. M. Lutand, Governor of Algiers for ten years, said: "If we do not populate North Africa, we shall not keep it."

Now the peasants who emigrate to Canada are lost to France; she should, therefore, make Africa the easy and advantageous alternative. The climate of Algeria is incomparably better, the soil of the ancient "Granary of Rome" is fruitful. Concessions of land, freedom from taxes during a certain period, abridgement of military service—these are something of what France could offer to the new colonist. Bureaux of information in France itself, a special propaganda in the matter of emigration, employment bureaux in Africa are things greatly needed. The children of colonists—a most valuable element—should be kept in their own country by every inducement France can offer. The harrowing question of the birth-rate might find its natural solution in the freer and more primitive life of the colony. Soldiers serving in Africa should be encouraged to acquire farms, even during their term of service, and to remain on them permanently; on the other hand, native regiments might be sent for service in France, where, for several years at least, they would be free of Moslem influence and open to French ideas.

To French functionaries in Africa, says M. Servier, should be accorded the maximum of authority, if European influence is to prevail. Now the central Bureau for native affairs, so wisely instituted by General Bugeaud, was suppressed by Napoleon III and its powers divided among the local Mayors, while the number of native municipal Councillors was increased from a quarter to one-third of the whole. The Third Republic, in 1871, put the election of the Mayors (previously appointed by the Emperor) into the hands of the councillors. After a trial of this system, it was done away with in 1884, but the Jonnart law of

1919 restored it. It should, undoubtedly, be abolished once more. France is dealing for the present with those who are, politically speaking, minors; they are not yet of an age to exercise authority.

The North African Berber—we may cease to call him an Arab—was and still is capable of civilization; the ultimate aim of France should be to fit him for full French citizenship. With this end in view it is most desirable that the French administrator should live among the natives, especially in country parts, for it is here that he can really make himself felt. Round his house collects a little band of French and native functionaries; there is the doctor, the schoolmaster, the postman, the architect-surveyor, native Sheiks, native and French traders, agriculturists, labourers. In this little centre of French culture the native gradually changes. At Laverdine, for instance, M. Servier has seen the rapprochement of European and Berber, has met native women who read and speak French with their French sisters, pay them visits, and exchange with them a hundred small services and courtesies. The men, in this *milieu*, are apt to give up polygamy as uncivilized, and their children grow up largely emancipated from native ideas. It is a slow process, but quite sure, for in the Berber there is a real tradition, a real heredity to work upon; he is not by blood a barbarian.

French schools and the French tongue are, of course, essential, but every kind of institution or association, from hospitals to savings banks, that brings the natives into contact with Europeans has an important part to play. The more the native mass can be broken up and its best elements isolated and given special facilities, the more rapid will progress be. When France first occupied Algeria, the Jewish community of Berber blood was scarcely above the native level. But the Jews were comparatively few and much scattered, so that French influence bore strongly upon them. To-day they are all but indistinguishable from Europeans. Assimilation by selection and isolation—this is the open and possible programme for France.

There is a means of assimilation which must be spoken of with some reserve. M. Servier tells us that marriages

of mixed blood, in North Africa, give on the whole happy results, that is, if the woman be European. In almost all cases known to him—about seventy-five—the French woman married to a Berber has known how to impose her own ideas and faith, so that her children are French and Christian. The Berber woman, hardly yet anywhere more than a slave, “*bête de somme ou bête de luxe*,” is not, he considers, a fit mate for a Frenchman; but the Berber man of the bourgeois class, officer, teacher, or Government employé, is in a vastly different category.

Islam, the greatest obstacle to progress, cannot be attacked directly, but France has, unfortunately, given the impression that she favours and protects this obstacle. “Our religion,” observed an Algerian Mufti, “is the only one recognized by the French State.”* This is a suicidal policy. There is no question of a new crusade, but a masterly inactivity on the part of France is urgently required. There can be no need to rebuild mosques or to put up new ones,† and the same applies to all Moslem institutions. *Videant ipsi*. If France does not support religious schools of her own faith in Africa, why should she commit the political folly of supporting those of Islam? “Ce n’est pas en nous faisant Musulmans que nous gagnerons l’affection des indigènes,” said Louis Veuillot,‡ Secretary to Bugeaud in 1842, “mais en nous montrant Chrétiens, et en leur faisant du bien comme Chrétiens.”

M. Servier appears to preserve a complete detachment from all religion, but, as a clear thinker, he sees that the “free” thinker has not the least hope of a hearing in Africa, where the irreligious man is looked upon as a monster of abnormality and the sceptic as a fool. Lay schools are foredoomed to failure where Christian ones might well succeed. As a good patriot, M. Servier desires religious schools. “L’anti-clericalisme,” he says acutely, “n’est pas un article d’exportation. Gambetta l’avait compris. . . .” The lay school, says René Bazin,§

* René Bazin, *Charles de Foucauld*.

† During the recent visit of the Sultan of Morocco to Paris a mosque built at the public expense was ceremoniously opened in Paris.—*V. Tablet*, July 31, 1926.

‡ Louis Veuillot, *Les Français en Algérie*.

§ René Bazin, *Charles de Foucauld*, pp. 259-260.

“prépare un grand nombre de déclassés, qui seront demain des désabusés, après-demain des ennemis irréconciliables de l'autorité française. Enfin, comme elle ne fournit au petit Arabe pour toute nourriture morale qu'un ensemble de préceptes sans obligation, ni sanction, elle ne peut sérieusement le corriger d'aucun vice. Elle le laisse muni d'une collection de proverbes, de recommandations d'hygiène et de fragments de discours électoraux, en présence de toutes les passions, de toutes les cupidités, de toutes les tentations de révolte qu'il a dans le sang, de par son âge, sa race et sa religion. S'il cède, et presque nécessairement il cédera, nous lui aurons fourni le moyen d'être socialement plus dangereux que ses pères, puisqu'il sera plus instruit.” It is the White Fathers, with their religious schools, who are the best allies of France in Africa.

Finally, there are the women. Lord Cromer wrote that the key to the destinies of Egypt lay in the hands of Egyptian women. M. Jules Saurin, so much concerned with the welfare of Africa, asks whether the French Red Cross could not send out “vingt mille femmes de France” to work for the betterment of Berber women, since it is women alone who can reach these densely-veiled multitudes who meet the traveller everywhere with the enigma of their destiny. If indeed, the Berber woman could be put in a position to choose freely between Islam that enslaves her and Christianity that sets her free, can there be any reasonable doubt of her choice? By women, now so overburdened, so over-pampered, the heavy cloud of barbarism that hangs in Africa, that drifted there with the Moslem Arab, and has hung ever since, cutting off the light of the sun, but, by a singular paradox, letting through the light of one poor crescent, might be dissipated once and forever.

M. G. CHADWICK.

ART. 7.—A FURTHER NOTE ON EBION

RATHER more than five years ago* the DUBLIN REVIEW did me the honour to publish, among a series of articles which I wrote in criticism of Gibbons, a paper upon that historian's attitude towards the Ebionites.

In this paper, during the course of many arguments, one point appeared which has been the subject of adverse criticism since its publication. Indeed, upon one occasion it led to a comic passage in the Cambridge Union, where Dr. Coulton was moved to use very extravagant language against me in this connection, calling me, among other things, a welsher, and proceeding to other amenities before he was suppressed by the Chair.

But the more serious criticism to which I allude has a solid foundation, and deserves to be met and answered. As I propose to publish a few months hence, in book form, my article criticizing Gibbons' historical sense and information, I perhaps owe it to my readers to advance, in due time before such publication, what I will call a "Note" on this particular point; a certain argument which I use in defence of my thesis in the matter of Ebion.

By way of preliminary, let me summarize very briefly the original article.

There arose in the early ages of the Christian Church a small and obscure sect of heretics called Ebionites. We first hear of them in the second century, but their origin is referred to a long lifetime back—that is, to the latter part of the first century. They seem to have arisen shortly after the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70, and their rise to have been provoked by that event.

They split, as is the habit of heretics, into differing sects; but their common distinctive mark was the denial of the Incarnation and the affirmation that our Lord was of human generation. Though some of them admitted that He may have been born of a virgin, yet whatever degree of divinity may have been in Him descended later.

* In the October issue DUBLIN REVIEW for 1921, "Gibbon and the Ebionites." These words are written in the spring of 1927.

The discussion turns on this point: Was there an Ebion or is he a myth?

All the early documentary evidence in the matter is quite clear. The Ebionites were a sect started by a man called Ebion, and tradition is here in full support of documents. But it is to be noted that the word Ebion in Hebrew signifies "a needy man." Therefore an obvious verbal trope lent itself to the enemies of him and his followers. Just as men might play upon words in attacking the followers of a Mr. Needy (The Needyites) who should have started a Nonconformist sect in seventeenth-century England, so they punned on Ebion. This trope or pun appears not infrequently. Origen puts it forward in his answer to Celsus and in lesser known passages elsewhere, remarking that such a name "Needyites" or "The Needies" means in Hebrew what it does mean, and is singularly apt because this sect is "poor" through its rejection of the chief treasure of Christians, the Incarnation.

We have four early and three later documentary authorities. The four early authorities are St. Irenæus (writing somewhere about A.D. 180), St. Hippolytus, probably connected with St. Irenæus and writing perhaps twenty odd years later, Tertullian, contemporary with St. Hippolytus, but perhaps writing, in this connection, some few years later still, and (a point we must turn to in a moment) also Origen, living in the same age as St. Hippolytus and Tertullian, but in this matter probably writing again a few years later than the last.

The three later authorities are Eusebius, writing a good hundred years later than Origen; then, a long lifetime later than Eusebius, St. Jerome and St. Epiphanius.

Of the four early authorities, St. Irenæus, presumably the earliest (by a few years) talks of the sect, the Ebionites, without bringing in the actual name of their founder. St. Hippolytus mentions him by name. Tertullian mentions him by name more than once. Origen (in a translated passage to which I must turn in a moment, and which is the object of this paper) mentions him once by name.

Of the three later or secondary authorities we may eliminate Eusebius, for quite clearly he is only copying

what he has read in one part of Origen. The two others, St. Jerome and St. Epiphanius, mention Ebion continually as an undoubted historic personage and the founder of the heresy; the former by way of allusion, the second giving details of his life and devoting to him and his sect a whole division of his work.

The interest of the discussion lies in this. The Rationalists of the eighteenth century constructed an imaginary system (as is the wont of Rationalists, or as we call them to-day "higher critics") wherein they made use of Ebion and the Ebionites to attack the Incarnation. They put forward a theory that the Ebionites were the original Christian Church, which had known nothing of any such idea as the Incarnation, and had regarded our Lord as a mere man. This idea, they said, was later foisted on the Church by pagan influences, which ultimately drove out the primitive nucleus whose poverty after their expulsion caused them to be called "The Needy Men." To admit an historic Ebion would have been death to this theory. Therefore Ebion had to be got rid of if this, one of the many forms of attack upon the Incarnation, were to succeed.

Ebion was got rid of by saying: (1) That St. Irenæus, the earliest witness, never mentioned him but only talked about Ebionites; (2) that Tertullian, the next witness in order (as then known) was a vehement Westerner writing in Latin, not understanding the meaning of the Hebrew word, and therefore imagining that the Ebionites must have been started by a particular person whom he called Ebion.

Origen, said the Rationalists, was different; a far better authority. He wrote in Greek, lived in the Eastern world, knew Hebrew. Now Origen more than once played upon the word Ebion, "Needy," and, what was more, *he never mentioned a real individual, "Ebion."*

Eusebius only copied Origen,* and as for St. Jerome and St. Epiphanius, with their perpetual allusions to Ebion

* Gibbon did not know this; in fact, the whole of his passage is obviously based upon a rapid reading of Mosheim and certain Frenchmen; it is clear here, as in so many places, that Gibbon has not looked up his authorities and is writing (erroneously) at second hand.

and the details given by the latter about his life, they came so late that we may neglect them.

It will be seen from this very brief summary that everything in the Rationalist argument of the eighteenth century turns upon what Origen had really said. According to its supporters, Origen had never mentioned Ebion.

Now the excuse the Rationalists had for their imaginary theory (and too many Christians, and even Catholics, suffered the influence of the Rationalists, and denied the existence of Ebion) was the well-known passage where Origen, in his answer to Celsus, makes the conventional pun upon the name Ebonite, "Ebionites," "Needyites." Origen tells his readers what they might not otherwise know, that "Ebion" in Hebrew means "Needy"—whence the name of the sect. But the critics did not read very thoroughly or they would have found at least two occasions upon which Origen—as they then accepted his work, I mean in the eighteenth century and in the time of Gibbon—mentions Ebion. Once in his commentary of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans and once in the seventh book of what was then thought to be from his pen, the *Refutation of the Heresies*. It was the usual case with which we have now grown familiar, of the Rationalists perpetually appealing to documents and yet not reading those documents thoroughly.

The proper thing for the superior person to say from the early eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century was that Ebion was a myth, because Origen had said nothing about him as an historical figure, but had only pointed out that the name Ebion meant "Needy," and had noted the application of that term to the spiritual poverty of the Ebionites. That attitude of the "intellectuals" lasted, I say, into the mid-nineteenth century.

Then came a bombshell. In 1842 the lost work of St. Hippolytus was discovered upon Mount Athos by an Emissary of the French Government of the day. Hippolytus was a very early authority indeed, writing in Greek, before Origen, and almost certainly in touch with St. Irenæus. It was fairly established that the work in *Refutation of Heresies* formerly attributed to Origen was

really the work of Hippolytus, and this document was now carefully read on account of the interest it had excited. There appeared in it, what might have been spotted long before, when it was still supposed to have been the work of Origen, a phrase alluding directly to Ebion as an historical personage.

The Rationalists were therefore thrown back from their old position and had to make up a new piece of guess-work.

They never find any difficulty in doing this. Guess-work is their daily bread. Their new affirmation was that, though Hippolytus may have been in touch with St. Irenæus, this was no proof that St. Irenæus had ever heard of Ebion; that Hippolytus wrote in the west, and that his writing in Greek was no proof of his knowledge of the east. Whereupon they boldly affirmed that *he* had invented "Ebion," although he had no apparent motive for such an action and quite clearly writes of Ebion side by side with Cerinthus as a perfectly well-known historical figure.

There remained the task of discussing the second allusion to Ebion in Origen—that contained in his Commentary on Romans.

Note at this point that no such allusion was necessary to establish the historical reality of Ebion. If, indeed, Origen or anybody else had said that the story of Ebion was a myth, that there had never been any such person, this would have been an argument, although, even then, one would have had the right to set against it the positive statement of others. But Origen had said nothing of the sort: he had only made the usual pun upon the name "Ebionites," saying that it drew from and was consonant with the spiritual poverty of the "Needyites."

Meanwhile, said the Rationalists (and their too frequent orthodox imitators), Origen himself had at any rate not made any direct mention of Ebion.

Well, in the paper I wrote five years ago in the DUBLIN REVIEW, I pointed out (I think for the first time) that in the only form left remaining of a certain passage in Origen's Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (the Latin version by Rufinus) the word "Ebion" appears directly

mentioned: "This also Ebion does" (*Hoc et Ebion facit*).

My critics (who had never known the passage and therefore had never taken the trouble to discuss it) brought forward all that could be said against the passage—once they had come to hear of it. They said that Rufinus did not always make literal translations (which is perfectly true), and that he was therefore quite untrustworthy (which is perfectly false). They said that to bring forward the text of Rufinus as evidence for anything Origen had said was a fraud.

I will conclude my examining of this attitude of theirs carefully. Can we accept the words *Hoc et Ebion facit* in Rufinus' text as presumably a reproduction of the original Greek text of Origen? If we had that text, should we presumably find in it this word, *Εβίων*?

In the first place everybody knows that Rufinus introduced three main elements of discrepancy between the original Greek text of Origen and his own translations: (1) He often misunderstands a Greek metaphysical term, and on somewhat rare occasions gravely warps it in his Latin; (2) he omits passages for the purpose of condensing, or because he thinks they are unorthodox; (3) and (this is our point) *he occasionally puts in words of his own*.

In all these there is no element of fraud. Rufinus himself talks openly of his method. It is as though a man who did not know French well enough translated Voltaire's voluminous works for an English Victorian public and were to say: "I have left out what I think indecent. I have cut down the original in length in order to suit our public, and I have even now and then added explanatory phrases of my own to make the thing easier for the English reader."

Of course, to the modern precise dealer with documents, this makes Rufinus a very unsatisfactory authority. But that is neither here nor there. The point is *how* is he unsatisfactory? In *what*? Where may we expect, in this perfectly frank but rather insufficient translator and adapter, to find what was in the original text, and where may we expect to find something different?

Well, Rufinus' translation of Origen's Commentary on Romans has a preface attached to it which anyone may read in Migne. It is addressed to Heraclius. In this preface Rufinus says quite frankly that he has had to cut down Origen's text to something like half the original length. *The main character, therefore, of this Latin version is not that it adds to Origen's original, but that it cuts it down, and that heavily.* Rufinus was strongly concerned to save space by every means at his disposal in this abbreviation.

It is perfectly clear that, under such circumstances, any addition Rufinus might make would only be made under some strong motive.

His task was an arduous one. He sets out to give the version of a book that was much too long for him, and he condenses it as much as he possibly can. That he should have added sentences of a pious sort to soften what might seem heterodox in origin or that he might have added a gloss explanatory of an obscure passage, or even that he should put in some private opinion of his own to which he was specially attached, is conceivable, even so. But no reasonable man can discover a motive for an honest, laborious translator, who is not very competent and has to condense into reasonable size something far too long for his powers, adding such words as these.

There is no conceivable reason why the phrase "This also Ebion did," as attached to the denial of the Incarnation, should *not* have been in Origen's original text, and no normal motive whereby Rufinus should have wantonly added it.

He may have done so, of course. The thing is not physically impossible. He may, though desperately trying to cut down his work to half the original length, have wasted effort upon perfectly unnecessary additions of this gratuitous kind. But is it likely?

All historical evidence works upon degrees of probability only; what we have to judge here, as everywhere, is the degree of probability. If, indeed, we possessed an original Greek text with which Rufinus' translation could be compared, and if that text was found to omit the name

44

Ebion, the evidence would be strong. But we have no such evidence. Certain Greek fragments of Origen's original Commentary on Romans remain to us. They may be found quoted by Mr. Sidebotham in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, vol. 1911-12: in this particular connection pages 223-227. But these fragments do not support the Rationalists' contention. The whole passage, as we have it in fragments, is not a tithe of the original, and gives us no clue to what the whole section may have been as Origen wrote it.

My conclusion is, I think, a legitimate one: I will summarise it.

1. Even though it should be found that Origen had never mentioned Ebion as a person—that would not be sufficient to upset the perfectly clear statement of Hippolytus and the slightly later one of Tertullian.

2. It is not sound history to reject as mere myth the perfectly clear assurance of such a man as St. Jerome, or even, in spite of his marvels, of so detailed a writer as Epiphanius, where the question is merely the plain one whether a certain man lived or no.

3. In point of fact, we have got a direct mention of Ebion in a Latin translation of Origen, which, although admittedly defective in many respects, is *not* defective (for any reason we can assign) in the matter of the simple and plain sentence "This also Ebion did."

Whether better argument may be put forward by competent scholars (and I do not pretend to be one) I know not; but I shall watch replies with interest.

I shall, therefore, till I have further evidence to convince me otherwise, maintain an historic Ebion, and conclude, *first*, that positive mention by Origen is not necessary to the case; *secondly*, that under all the rules of historical probability such mention was made by Origen, and thereby clinches what was in any case a fairly certain conclusion.

HILAIRE BELLOC.

ART. 8.—THE COMING OF AGE OF THE IRISH DRAMA

THE Abbey Theatre, Dublin, celebrated its twenty-first birthday on the 27th of December, 1925, and with that celebration the Irish Drama came of age. The theatre was opened to the public on the 27th of December, 1904, with a programme consisting of three one-act plays, two of them by Mr. W. B. Yeats and one by Lady Gregory. It may be of some interest to note that on the same evening *Peter Pan* was staged for the first time in London, so that *Peter Pan* and the Irish Drama attained their majority simultaneously. *Peter* refused to grow up, but the Irish Drama has certainly grown and has contributed much that is of permanent worth to drama in the English language. Its first two programmes contained names that have since made history in the theatre, the names of W. B. Yeats, J. M. Synge, and Lady Gregory, and even if the Abbey Theatre had contributed nothing else to world-drama in the twenty-one years of its existence, these three names would suffice to give it a very high place in the dramatic history of its time. But it has contributed much more than these three names to the worth-while drama of its time, and it has contributed, in addition, some very remarkable acting to the stage of the English-speaking world. It has contributed a theory of acting which has done much to make the theatre a place where art and artists may be seen in combination, and it has aided very materially in bringing the drama back to literature and to life. It came into being at a very critical period in the history of contemporary drama, and its weight was thrown on the side of those who were striving in many lands to make drama an art in which there was space for brains. Of course, it has not always lived up to its own high ideals and high standards, but in its comparatively short history it has probably done more than any other theatre in the world to bring vitality into the drama and to bring the drama back into literature. No history of world-drama of the first quarter of the twentieth century can avoid giving the Irish Drama a very high, if not a dominating, position.

102 The Coming of Age of the Irish Drama

For a little country of four millions of people this is surely a great and a notable achievement. It is all the more notable when it is remembered that before the twentieth century Ireland had no separate drama of its own.

Ireland has had a long and very distinguished connection with the drama of England. The names of such dramatists as Farquhar, Goldsmith, Sheridan, Wilde, and Shaw have only to be mentioned to make that fact obvious. It is, therefore, something of an anomaly that until the early years of the present century Ireland should not have had a drama that was distinctively national. Literature in the Irish language is often dramatic in its character, but it was never intended for presentation on the stage of a theatre. In fact, the first play in the Irish language ever presented on the stage of the regular theatre was produced only in 1901 by the forerunner of the Abbey Theatre. Much of the literature in the Irish language is cast in dialogue form, and Irish folk-literature is as rich as that of any country in the world, but the very chequered history of Ireland during the centuries in which drama was being formed in Europe must be held accountable for the absence of an acted drama in Ireland. The Mysteries from which the English Drama evolved have no counterpart in Ireland, which is, perhaps, because the Guilds which produced such Mystery Plays were in Ireland dominantly English in their membership. Against these facts may be placed some others. The tradition of the Bards lingered into the nineteenth century, keeping for the epic in Ireland the place that in other countries was taken by the drama, and that tradition preserved the individuality of the nation through the centuries of disorder. In the people there is a love of acting, as there is for oratory and fine-sounding words. In fact, it might be said that the Irish people are born actors; they can impress the world, whether the impression be worthy or the reverse. The Irishman delights in dialogue and repartee, and it is obvious that the best acting of modern English plays is to a disproportionate degree the work of Irishmen. For centuries it seemed that Irish dramatists could not produce drama in Ireland, and that they had to cross the Atlantic Ocean or the Irish Sea to find expression

for their instinct for drama. It has been said that it was the mechanism of the stage that was the insurmountable obstacle to the "dreamy Celt," but it seems more probable, in the light of recent history, that it was the absence of facilities and encouragement that for so long kept Irish authors from the stage in their own country. But it may be said: Dublin has a long and honourable history as a theatrical centre. This is so, but it was an English Dublin, a Dublin that was the capital of the English Pale, to which that record belongs. It was a Dublin which aped London and which looked to London for its drama. Dublin as the capital of a conscious, and self-conscious, Irish nation, is a comparatively new city, and it is from such national consciousness that drama, in common with other things, springs. During the greater part of the nineteenth century Ireland was interested only in its political status, and it was not until the downfall of Parnell that the mind of Ireland turned towards national culture. Then it was that the Irish theatre came into being.

It was in or about the year 1896 that Mr. W. B. Yeats conceived the idea of an uncommercial theatre which would be at the same time literary and distinctively Irish. In England, France, Scandinavia, and Germany there were such theatres struggling to make the work of dramatists like Ibsen, Shaw, Strindberg and Hauptmann known to the theatre-going public. With the work of these theatres Mr. Yeats was familiar, as one of his own plays had been produced by the Independent Theatre in London. His Irish project was not quite so elaborate as these experiments. It was simple to hire a small hall in Dublin for a short season every year and there produce plays of a literary and national character written by Irishmen. As Irish actors were assumed not to be available, it was arranged to bring actors from London. This project came into being under the title of "The Irish Literary Theatre" in 1899, under the direction of W. B. Yeats, George Moore, Lady Gregory, and the late Edward Martyn. The play which was chosen to open the theatre was *The Countess Cathleen*, a play in verse by W. B. Yeats. The production of the play was greeted by an uproar, which has been many

times equalled and once surpassed in the years that have since elapsed. Suggestive propaganda was used unsparingly to influence the audiences against the play, though why it should have been used is now very difficult to understand. The play is based upon an ideal of self-sacrifice, against which it would now be thought impossible to find objection. The play has since become one of the most popular of Mr. Yeats' plays, and a regular feature in the repertoire of the Abbey Theatre. During the following five years plays by Edward Martyn, Lady Gregory, George Moore, J. M. Synge, Padraic Colum, and others were produced with varying fortune and but little success.

Meanwhile a company of Irish amateur actors had been discovered by Mr. George W. Russell (A.E.). It was called the "Irish National Dramatic Company," and was being trained and directed by the brothers Frank and W. G. Fay. This company was amalgamated with the original group under the title "Irish National Theatre Society," and provided with Irish actors the project of Mr. Yeats. In the fusion the support of Edward Martyn was lost, but that of Mr. George Russell (A.E.) was gained. To the brothers Fay, and to the company they collected, belongs the credit for giving to the Irish Theatre that unconventional, but natural, style of acting, which has been its distinguishing mark and which has made it famous throughout the world.

The company was still without a theatre, but that lack was shortly to be rectified. A visit by the company to London in the early part of 1904 brought its work under the notice of Miss A. E. F. Horniman, who shortly afterwards became very well known through her work at the Gaiety Theatre, Manchester, and has since been given the title Queen of Repertory by Mr. Frank Vernon. Miss Horniman became so interested in the work of the Company that she provided it with a permanent home at the Abbey Theatre, and an annual subsidy for many years. The new home of the company had been made by combining an old music-hall, known as the Mechanics Theatre, with the city morgue; seating accommodation being provided for about 650 people. The right of the theatre to

The Coming of Age of the Irish Drama 105

assume the title National has been challenged, quite a large number of people being of the opinion that it is neither Irish nor National. This section contends that such a title can be borne only by a Gaelic-speaking theatre, and such a theatre is now in its formative stages under the name of "The Gaelic Drama League," giving frequent performances of plays in the Irish language and enjoying a small annual subsidy from the Government of the Irish Free State in common with the Abbey Theatre. The theatre thus had the distinction of being the first subsidized theatre in Great Britain or Ireland as it now has the distinction of being the only State-subsidized theatre in either island, as it receives an annual subsidy of £1,000 from the Free State Government.

The Abbey Theatre began as, and has always remained, a Repertory Theatre—that is, a theatre which is, in the words of Mr. Frank Vernon, a "permanent local theatre with a permanent company reviving good plays and producing good plays with a little more regard for their artistic values than for their immediate drawing power." The Irish Theatre had also something more to accomplish; it had to create a National Drama. "Our movement," said Mr. W. B. Yeats in 1902, "is a return to the people, like the Russian movement of the early seventies, and the drama of society would but magnify a condition of life which the countryman and the artisan could but copy to their hurt. The play that is to give them a quite natural pleasure should tell them either of their own life, or of that life of poetry where every man can see his own image, because there alone does human nature escape from arbitrary conditions. Plays about drawing-rooms are written for the middle classes of great cities, for the classes who live in drawing-rooms; but if you would ennoble the man of the roads you must write about the roads, or about the people of romance, or about great historical people. We should, of course, play every kind of good play about Ireland that we can get, but romantic and historical plays, and plays about the life of artisans and country people are the best worth getting. In time, I think, we can make the poetical play a living dramatic form again, and the training our

actors will get from plays of country life, with its unchanging outline, its abundant speech, its extravagance of thought, will help to establish a school of imaginative acting. . . . If we busy ourselves with poetry and the countryman, two things which have always mixed with each other in life as on the stage, we may recover, in the course of years, a lost art, which, being an imitation of nothing English, may bring our actors a secure fame and a sufficient livelihood." Since the opening of the Abbey Theatre everything that was in the mind of Mr. Yeats when he wrote the words quoted has been realized. The repertoire of the Theatre has consisted in the main of plays dealing with the life of the artisan and the countryman, but it has also been rich in the poetic, the romantic, and the historical play. The plays which Mr. Yeats himself contributed to the repertoire did much to bring back the verse play to the English-speaking stage. The plays of Lady Gregory brought the rural cottager on to the stage, and her folk-history plays gave the stage the great figures of Irish history as they are to the folk-mind. In John Millington Synge the Theatre had the greatest romantic comedy writer of modern times. Behind these three there is a long list of dramatists who used the life of the common people as the material for drama. There is Padraic Colum and Lennox Robinson, T. C. Murray and Lord Dunsany, St. John Ervine and George Fitzmaurice, Seumas O'Kelly and Daniel Corkery, Brinsley MacNamara and Sean O'Casey, to name but a few of the dramatists whose plays have been conspicuous in the twenty-one years' record of the Theatre.

Since the opening of the Abbey Theatre the development of the drama has been rapid if not always consistent, and the development cannot be said to have been uninterrupted. The original company was dispersed in 1908 at the departure of the brothers Fay from Dublin. In 1910 Miss Horniman withdrew her subsidy, and the Theatre was compelled to become self-supporting, which it has since been, though that has been achieved only at some sacrifice of the ideals of its founders. New companies were formed, and they, too, in time succumbed to the

allurements of New York or London; and a period of civil war was negotiated with no little difficulty. But the Theatre has survived all its vicissitudes, and is now the only survivor of the great days of the Repertory Theatre in England or in Ireland. But the Repertory Theatre is coming again in England; there are now Repertory Theatres in Liverpool, Birmingham, Norwich, Bristol, and many other English cities, and they are all modelled on the system of the Abbey Theatre in Dublin. The Repertory Theatre exists with the object of raising the standard of dramatic taste by giving the public a variety of good plays. It is the function of a Repertory Theatre to give facilities to local dramatists to portray the life of their own people, and to provide such local dramatists with the best models from the drama of the world. The Abbey Theatre has done all this. It has created a national drama, has raised the standard of public taste, has given audiences in Dublin opportunities of becoming familiar with masterpieces of world-drama, and has itself given to the world some masterpieces of drama and of acting. Its record is such that any theatre might be proud to own. During its twenty-one years the Abbey Theatre has produced two hundred and sixteen (216) plays by eighty-six authors. Nearly all the authors are Irish, and the large majority of the plays were produced for the first time on any stage. There were some rivals of old plays, and some translations from foreign dramatists were produced. Thus, the plays of Goldsmith and Sheridan figure in the list, as does Bernard Shaw with a dozen of his plays, including a first production of *The Shewing-up of Blanco Posnet*. Foreign drama is represented by such famous authors as Molière, Goldoni, Hauptmann, Sudermann, Strindberg, Ibsen, Maeterlinck, Tchekov, Evreinov, Sierra, and Mazaud. There is in Dublin a separate organization, The Dublin Drama League, which uses the Abbey Theatre for the production of foreign plays and plays which are considered outside the scope of the Theatre itself. This organization has produced plays by such dramatists as Toller, Andreev, Eugene O'Neill, and many others.

In 1903, while the company was still giving its per-

108 The Coming of Age of the Irish Drama

performances in small halls in Dublin, there appeared among the playwrights the names of those who still dominate the Irish drama—W. B. Yeats, J. M. Synge, and Lady Gregory. That year also marked the advent of a young dramatist of great promise by the production of the first play by Padraic Colum. The great promise was, however, never fulfilled, and for many years Padraic Colum has resided in America, where he has published charming books for children, but no plays. The company had by this time established itself in the artistic life of the city, and with the introduction of the writers named, its character became definitely marked. Synge, Colum, and Lady Gregory made the "peasant" play the speciality of the Theatre, and by the "peasant" play it has gained its peculiar reputation. Until a few years ago very few plays dealing with the life in towns had been staged, and the Theatre came to have an exclusively rural atmosphere. This was strictly in accord with the ideals of Mr. Yeats. It was also inevitable in the circumstances of Ireland, which is, even in its town life, very definitely a nation of peasants. Every aspect of rural life, and consequently the essentials of the national life, has been presented on the stage of the Abbey Theatre, often with a realism that verged upon the brutal. In 1907 the first play by George Fitzmaurice was produced. Somehow Fitzmaurice has failed to receive from the critics the attention that his work undoubtedly deserves. In 1908 the first plays of Lennox Robinson and Conall O'Riordan were produced. In 1909 the first play of Lord Dunsany was staged, and in 1910 came the first play by T. C. Murray. In 1911 St. John Ervine made his first appearance on any stage. These names, with those of Seumas O'Kelly, Daniel Corkery, Brinsley MacNamara, and Sean O'Casey, constitute the more important section of the dramatists of the Abbey Theatre. The work of these dramatists accounts for more than half the number of the plays produced at the Theatre, and though the work of the remaining seventy-two dramatists is certainly not negligible, the bulk of it may be ignored without in any way depreciating the contribution of Irish dramatists to the world-drama of the twentieth century. Much of the

The Coming of Age of the Irish Drama 109

work of the lesser dramatists consists of farce and melodrama, which is neither better nor worse than the same kind of theatrical fare in other countries.

The dramatists whose plays made the Theatre prominent have all now practically ceased to contribute to its repertoire. Synge has been dead since 1909, and only one of his plays, *The Tinker's Wedding*, remains to be produced at the Theatre. It may never be produced there, as its theme is considered to be likely to outrage the feelings of most Catholics. W. B. Yeats and Lady Gregory are still Directors of the Theatre, but it is not to be expected that anything startlingly new is likely to come from either of them in the future. Seumas O'Kelly also is dead, and Padraic Colum resides in America, and is part of the life of America, as St. John Ervine and Conall O'Riordan are now part of the life of England. So the future would seem to rest with the group consisting of Lennox Robinson, T. C. Murray, George Fitzmaurice, Brinsley MacNamara, and Sean O'Casey, with possibly Lord Dunsany and Daniel Corkery. At the moment, Sean O'Casey is the great star of the Theatre, and certainly his advent is something in the nature of a Godsend after the long period of undistinguished plays which the Theatre has produced since the war. For some years little of any importance was seen on the Abbey stage, but it seems now, when the storms of politics have passed, that a revival of the great days are in prospect. Some are found to hail Sean O'Casey as the equal, if not a greater, than Synge, but he has yet to prove himself equal to such distinguished comparison. Much good work may yet be expected from Lennox Robinson, who has been experimenting for some time, and whose *Crabbed Youth and Age* shows him to be a master of satirical comedy; from T. C. Murray, who has recently produced a fine play in *Autumn Fire*; from Brinsley MacNamara, who recently revealed himself as a master of rural comedy in *The Glorious Uncertainty* and *Look at the Heffernans!* The days of drab realism and the melodrama of lunacy have passed, and it is probable that satirical fantasy will form the staple of the Theatre for some time to come. How very wrong was St. John Ervine when

110 The Coming of Age of the Irish Drama

he wrote two years ago that Ireland had begun a renaissance of her own which "speedily perished from lack of staying power"! After its twenty-one years the Irish drama is still as strong and vigorous as it was in the beginning.

At the special performance which was given to celebrate the coming-of-age of the Theatre the only thanks rendered were to "the players, past and present." The justice of this will be appreciated when it is remembered that the reputation of the Theatre was due as much to the acting as to the plays. The company, collected and trained by the brothers Fay, made the artistic reputation of the Theatre, and the company, of which Arthur Sinclair was the leader, made it a popular success. It is not too much to say that the acting at the Abbey Theatre has had a markedly improving effect upon the acting of the English-speaking world. The ranting and raving has given place to a naturalness which is the distinguishing mark of the Irish acting. "More than others," says C. E. Montague, "they leave undone the things that ought not to be done. None of them rants or flares, trumpets or booms, or frisks about when he had better be quiet, or puts on intense looks for nothing. They seem all alike to have seized on the truth that the way to do big things in an art, as it is to get into other parts of the Kingdom of Heaven, is to become as a little child, so long as you do it without thinking all the time what an engaging child you are. Without infantilism they contrive to reach back past most of the futilities, the inexpressive apparatus of expression, that overgrow and clog the stage; they take a fresh, clear hold on their craft in its elements. They know how to let well alone; they stand still when others would 'cross stage to right' to no purpose; when one of them has to be thrown up in high relief, the rest can fade into the background like mists at a dawn, or emit from their eyes an attention that fixes your eyes on the central figure more surely than the fiercest lime-light that ever beat on an actor-manager. So each character is played, in a sense, by them all. . . . The actors give you the force of one character through its impression on others, as Homer expressed Helen's beauty through its effect on the aged men, and as Thackeray tells you what

everyone did when Beatrix entered a playhouse." The personnel of the company has changed many times, but the character and the method of the acting have never changed. There have been variations in the quality of the acting, as might be expected, but on the whole the standard has been kept surprisingly high. Those who have seen Frank and W. G. Fay, Arthur Sinclair, J. M. Kerrigan, Fred O'Donovan, and J. A. O'Rourke, with Sara Allgood, Maire O'Neill, Maire NicShiubhlaigh, Cathleen Nesbitt, and Eileen O'Doherty, have seen some of the best acting this century has had. The present company has now reached the standard of the companies which preceded it. The acting of Miss Eileen Crowe, as Nora in *A Doll's House*, was a revelation of the resources which she can command. In Messrs. M. J. Dolan and F. J. MacCormick are two actors which it would be difficult to equal, and in Barry Fitzgerald is a comedian of excellence, whose limitations as an actor are, however, easily reached. The quality of the plays and the quality of the acting are now equal to the best that the Theatre has had at any time in the past.

The plays and the acting have both received from the Directors the attention their importance deserve, and have received from critics and audiences the praise that they generally merited. There is one feature in the work of the Theatre which has received little, if any, attention, even from the Directors. That feature is staging and stage effects. Much has been written on this feature of the work of the Theatre by Mr. Yeats, but beyond some experiments in the speaking of verse, and some very drab scenes by Mr. Gordon Craign, nothing has yet been done to improve the art of stage production. To the art of the theatre, as distinct from the arts of playwriting and acting, the Abbey Theatre has contributed nothing. Poverty, perhaps, is the cause of this. But when the wonderful effects of, say, the Lyric Theatre at Hammersmith, London, are borne in mind, achieved as they were by artistic instinct rather than by lavish expenditure of money, the failure of the Abbey is most marked. It is true to say that the Lyric Theatre has done more for the art of production in one year than the Abbey Theatre has done

in its entire career. The absence of a producer, a "man of the theatre," is very pronounced at the Abbey. At present three of its Directors are dramatists, the fourth is a professor of languages, added to the Directorate last year, with the subsidy from the Government of the Irish Free State. Throughout its career the Theatre has been under the direction of dramatists; never has it had the services of men like Sir Barry Jackson or Mr. Nigel Playfair to attend to the production and staging of plays. So the staging has lacked distinction, it has often had the appearance of mere casualness. It is probable that this branch of theatrical work will receive more attention in the future as the financial position of the Theatre is strengthened.

To everyone interested in the theatre and the development of drama the Abbey Theatre presents a model and an inspiration. It has survived its period of experiment and of political stress, and is now secure for the future. Its repertory system has proven its worth by giving to Ireland a national drama which is worthy of the attention of the world. It has made drama possible to Irishmen at home, and has produced dramatists and actors of whom the world has taken note. Before Mr. Yeats created his dream in the reality of the Abbey Theatre, Ireland had no place in the history of drama; now that has been so changed that every book on drama has a section devoted to Ireland. To all who have ideas for the development of folk-drama, too, the Abbey Theatre offers a model and a repertoire of plays that is unequalled elsewhere. Every community has its possibilities for the dramatist, but every region does not tempt the commercial theatre, and if regional drama is to be given the opportunities that its importance deserves, only the method of the Abbey Theatre, and the repertory system, will be available for guidance and inspiration. Efforts are being made in the United States, and in many parts of Great Britain, to foster national or local drama, and these efforts have been to some extent successful. So the drama is enriched by a Eugene O'Neill, a Susan Glaspell, or a Paul Green in America, and by a Stanley Houghton, a John Drinkwater, or a James Gregson in England. That is the great contribution of the repertory

The Coming of Age of the Irish Drama 113

theatre to the life of its time. "I am not yet convinced that, even at the present time, we have an American drama in the positive sense in which the phrase is used when we speak of . . . even the Irish drama," said Mr. Clayton Hamilton in 1924. "I say 'even' in the case of Ireland, because it seems astonishing that so small a country could have produced such a great drama in so short a time. The entire population of Ireland is no more numerous than that of New York City, and nine-tenths of the Irish people have never set foot inside a theatre. . . . Yet in the short time of twenty years, the Irish have initiated, developed, and perfected a really great contribution to the drama of the world." That is praise, indeed, coming from such a critic, but it is no less than the truth. The great dramatists of our time have all come from repertory theatres: Synge from the Abbey Theatre, Tchekhov from the Art Theatre in Moscow, the Capeks from Prague, Drinkwater from Birmingham, not to mention Ibsen, Strindberg, Shaw, and Hauptmann of an earlier day. Whatever the commercial theatre will do to amuse the populace, it can do nothing to give experiments in drama any chance. For these experiments small theatres are necessary, and there must be the driving-force of enthusiastic interest in the drama and in the theatre as an institution. Great funds and elaborate organizations are unnecessary. The Abbey Theatre grew from an idea backed with energy and enthusiasm. It has grown from very small beginnings, as other theatrical enterprises, such as the Provincetown Players in America and the Repertory Theatre in Birmingham, yet it has done more for drama than the commercial theatres of the large centres where there are many theatres but little drama. The Abbey Theatre has now entered upon its maturity, secure in the support of the Government of the Irish Free State. It is the only State-subsidised theatre in the English-speaking world. That its dramatists can still attract the attention of the outer world, the success of plays by Sean O'Casey and T. C. Murray, and the shortly to be produced play of Brinsley MacNamara, in London, stands as proof. Its acting has not declined, and it may be hoped that soon the Theatre will have several companies, some of which could

114 The Coming of Age of the Irish Drama

go on tour in Ireland and elsewhere while one would remain at the Abbey. When this has been done the great faith and energy of Lady Gregory and W. B. Yeats will have been completely vindicated, "and the ancient dreams come true."

ANDREW E. MALONE.

ART. 9.—SOME RECENT BOOKS ON MYSTICISM

Western Mysticism. The teaching of SS. Augustine, Gregory, and Bernard on Contemplation and the Contemplative Life. By Dom Cuthbert Butler, O.S.B. Second edition, with Afterthoughts. Constable and Co. 12s.

The Life of Union with God and the Means of 'Attaining it according to the Great Masters of Spirituality.' By Canon Auguste Saudreau. Translated from the third French edition by E. J. Strickland. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 10s. 6d.

La Vie Contemplative. By Canon P. Lejeune. Lethielleux, Paris.

Light on Mount Carmel. A guide to the works of S. John of the Cross. By Ludovic de Besse, O.S.F.C. Edited in English by a monk of Parkminster. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 2s. 6d.

The Revelations of Divine Love. By Dame Julian of Norwich. Burns Oates and Washbourne: Orchard Series, No. 11. 5s. and 7s. 6d.

THE life-blood of religion is prayer. When the quality and quantity of prayer are high religion flourishes. And the highest form of prayer is infused contemplation or mystical prayer. If, therefore, as we may trust, the unremitting output of books concerned with mystical contemplation proves that the minds and hearts of Christians are widely and powerfully attracted to the study and practice of contemplation, we may greet the appearance of the above-mentioned works—and they are, of course, but a selection—as the best auguries for the future of religion. Of the five works here selected for notice, the first four largely cover common ground, the theory and practice of contemplative prayer; the fifth records the special illuminations of Divine Truth vouchsafed to an eminent contemplative.

Abbot Butler's book takes a very honourable place among modern studies of mystical theology. For it is distinguished by a combination of wide and detailed scholarship and powerful common sense, with a warm appreciation and a deep penetration of mystical doctrine. Possibly the title may mislead those who do not know the

book. It is no mere study of a by-path in historical theology. The teaching of Augustine, Gregory, and Bernard is studied as representative of the nature and claim of mystical experience, and of a form and doctrine of contemplative prayer which the Abbot rightly believes to be most valuable as example and instruction for our spiritual life. From the former standpoint have been written the Epilogue, now placed at the end of Part I, which discusses the validity of the mystics' claim to immediate contact with God, and the Appendices on Nature Mysticism and the Mystical Experiences of Non-Catholics.

Dealing with the latter, the practical aspect, Abbot Butler emphasises certain characteristics of the mystical doctrine of his chosen witnesses, specially instructive to-day: the absence of preternatural phenomena—*e.g.*, ecstasy and visions, a freedom from fear of diabolic counterfeits of prayer,* emphasis on the positive fulness of the Divine Object of contemplation, the absence of any elaborate theological or philosophical explanation. We would have hoped that the recent growth of interest in mystical studies had gone far to destroy the popular identification of mysticism with psycho-physical phenomena and private revelations. But the welcome accorded to lives of certain modern "mystics"—very largely a series of such phenomena—shows that the Abbot's emphatic exclusion of these things from the sphere of mysticism—he insists that they should be called "psychic," not "mystic"—is still very necessary. But is ecstasy rightly classed with visions and locutions? Is it not the natural effect of a certain degree of mystical prayer (*not* the highest) upon a constitution not yet inured to the psycho-physical tension involved? If this be the case it would be permissible for a contemplative in a high degree of prayer to desire and pray for, not, indeed, the

* Although St Bernard, in Sermon 33 on the Canticle, does not, as the Abbot's critic suggests (see note to p. 187), display any apprehension that Satan may counterfeit the mystical experience itself, a possibility, indeed, which St John of the Cross explicitly denies, he seems to suggest that the devil may interpose false inspirations—*surely during prayer*, suggesting some apparently good course of action—*e.g.*, excessive fasting. A slight qualification should have been made to the statement that "if St Bernard speaks of prayer . . . the devil does not come in." It would have left the Abbot's substantial contention intact.

failure of consciousness normally concomitant on spiritual espousals—for that is an infirmity, and, as such, evil rather than good—but the degree of prayer likely to produce that result as its, in itself undesirable, epiphenomenon. On the other hand, to desire or pray for a special revelation of any kind is always wrong.

In his masterly study of St. Augustine, Abbot Butler calls attention to the intellectual character of his contemplation. It is as the unchangeable Reality—the home and ground of absolute values (Plato's *Ideas*) that he loved to seek and find his God. The Abbot, indeed, feels obliged to prove at length in a separate section that the Saint's prayer was true mysticism, not mere Platonism. That St. Augustine enjoyed genuine mystical experience of God is proven to the hilt. But we are more doubtful of the antithesis. As Professors Burnet and Taylor have shown, at the core of Platonism lay the religious mysticism of Socrates, and the religious mysticism of Plotinus was the soul of its Neoplatonic development. Is not the supreme value of Platonism—especially as baptized by St. Augustine—precisely the fusion of the intellectual search for truth with the religious contemplation of Truth Itself? We may, indeed, suspect that Plato or his master in the first intoxication of their intellectual-mystical experience indulged the belief that in this life there was possible such a clear vision of truth as would supply a scientific explanation of the world by final causes. Since, unfortunately, Plato never committed to writing his teaching on the Good, we cannot be certain of this. But it is suggested by several passages in the *Dialogues*, and traces of such a hope may, we suspect, be found in the passage quoted on p. 69, in which St. Augustine expects from contemplation at its highest a demonstrative vision of the truths of faith, as also in his belief that certain contemplatives—among them, apparently, himself—have enjoyed a passing glimpse of the Beatific Vision. Here, however, the language used by the Old Latin Bible about Moses' vision of God counted for much. On p. 79 Abbot Butler represents the Hebrew as "practically the same" with the Old Latin. On p. lxxix of the Afterthoughts, he says:

"There is no equivalent in the Hebrew" for the crucial words in the Old Latin which misled the Saint. This slight confusion of wording—it is no more—does not weaken the Abbot's cogent argument in the Afterthoughts that no mortal man, not even Moses or St. Paul, has ever seen the unveiled Essence of God. If this book helps to eliminate that belief from mystical theology, it will be no slight service. But the statement on p. 221 that "St. John (of the Cross) does not follow the idea of SS. Augustine and Thomas that the Divine Essence can be seen in this life" is surely an oversight. It is contradicted by the explicit statement in *The Ascent of Mount Carmel*, II, 24 (Edición Crítica, II, 22) quoted by the Abbot on p. 88. From the passages cited by Abbot Butler it would seem that St. Augustine did not distinguish clearly between: (1) The obscure mystical contact with God; (2) Intellectual visions of revealed truth; (3) Glimpses of the Beatific Vision. They are confused under the common category of non-imaginative contemplation. St. Gregory also appears to admit only the alternative of images infused by God and an unveiled Vision of His Essence. But unlike St. Augustine he seems to regard all contemplation of God in this life as mediated through images (128). Are these images derived from bodily things? If so, he is in formal opposition to the unanimous teaching of later mystics, and, incidentally, inconsistent with his own teaching in other passages quoted by Abbot Butler. If they are infused intellectual species, his language is vague and misleading. The further development in which he explains that we contemplate the Father "by His Image, the Son" (128-9) is difficult to understand. Does he mean the Godhead or the Humanity of the Son? If the latter, he confines contemplation to corporeal images; if the former, as the conclusion of the passage suggests, the question arises how it is possible to contemplate the Godhead of the Second Person without contemplating the Father and the Holy Ghost. The Abbot might very well have discussed the interpretation of these two difficult texts. Similarly, St. Bernard, it would seem, allows only the alternative, union of substance between the mystic and

God (hypostatic union or pantheistic absorption) or union of wills. Yet his experience implies a contact with the substance of God which is much more than agreement of will. Such obscurity and confusion are only to be expected when mystical theology was still in its infancy. The more undeveloped and, therefore, less differentiated teaching of the earlier mystics must be supplemented by the more developed, and therefore more fully differentiated teaching of the latter. By this we do not mean the elaborate theological and philosophical theorisings of which Abbot Butler in his *Afterthoughts* is so prudently suspicious, but the more detailed and accurate and, therefore, more nicely demarcated descriptions of the later mystics.

In view of this undifferentiation it is surely hazardous to assume, as Abbot Butler appears to do (219), that St. Bernard reached the supreme degree of Spiritual Marriage. He produces no text sufficiently explicit to show the exact stage of mystical union attained by the Saint. On p. 310 Abbot Butler seems to identify the passive union with the Spiritual Marriage. It would, we think, be better to follow St. Teresa and St. John of the Cross in their restriction of Spiritual Marriage to the supreme degree of the mystical ladder—St. Teresa's Seventh Mansion. Spiritual Espousals or Ecstasy, Full Union, even the Prayer of Quiet, are usually reckoned as passive unions. We cannot go back on these later articulations of an experience once formulated less distinctly. If the teaching of SS. Augustine, Gregory, and Bernard is *for practical purposes as a guide in the spiritual way*, preferable to the elaborate descriptions of the supreme heights left us by Ruysbroeck and St. John of the Cross, it is insufficient for an adequate theoretical treatment of mystical theology. Hence, indeed, the *Afterthoughts*.

The dictum on p. 189 that the "type of mysticism abounding in revelations and visions, set in with St. Gertrude, the two Mechtilds in the century after St. Bernard" requires modification. When writing this sentence the author overlooked St. Bernard's friend, the prophetess St. Hildegarde, also St. Elizabeth of Schonau, who flourished towards the end of St. Bernard's life. As

regards the question raised on p. 154 as to the history of the idea of "deification" in later Christianity, we would invite attention to a passage in Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy* (Book III, 10). "Uti justitiae adeptione justī, sapientiae sapientes fiunt, ita divinitatem adeptos, deos fieri simili ratione necesse est. Omnis igitur beatus, deus; sed natura quidem unus, participatione vero nihil prohibet esse quam plurimos."

The second part of the book, in which the teaching of Augustine, Gregory, and Bernard on the active and contemplative lives is worked out at length, fills a serious lacuna. The catena of teaching about the Contemplative Life from Plato to St. John of the Cross is particularly valuable, and we feel almost ungrateful for the rich provision of evidence here collected in expressing the wish that the teaching of Plotinus—if not also of Proclus—on the Contemplative Life had been added to the catena. Plotinus links the teaching of Plato with the teaching of Augustine, as Proclus in turn mediates the teaching of Plato and Plotinus to the pseudo-Dionysius.

We doubt whether the case for the validity of the mystics' claim to experimental contact with God—which, as the Abbot so emphatically insists, is the crucial question of mystical theology—could be pleaded more persuasively than it is in the Epilogue. But we are unable to agree that conversions such as are recorded by Starbuck and James are in "most cases" "purely subjective." No doubt their form is, normally at any rate, due to the operation of the subconscious self, but, if sincere and lasting, they are surely an objective work of God upon the soul. Certainly, as stated on p. 201, M. Delacroix holds that mystical experience can be explained as effects of the subliminal self. Yet his account of the rich and profound creative life—wider and deeper than that of the normal self—which reveals itself in the experience of the great mystics (see esp. pp. 360 and 387 of his *Études de Mysticisme*) forces on the unprejudiced reader the conviction that this vast and powerful superpersonal Reality cannot be merely the subconscious aspect of a human soul. In spite of himself, M. Delacroix is a powerful and con-

vincing witness in favour of the mystics' claim to be in communion with a transcendent Reality.

But we are reviewing a second edition, and that edition is distinguished by two new features, the addition to the appendix which discusses the character and value of non-Catholic mystical experience and the Afterthoughts. To refuse, with so many Catholics, to admit the supernatural character of experiences which seem impossible to distinguish from those of Catholic mystics, weakens considerably, if, indeed, it does not altogether nullify, the impressive evidence borne by the mystics to the Being and Character of God. Nor does any article of Faith require that denial. We therefore welcome the definite admission, by so weighty an authority as Père Maréchal, an admission endorsed by Abbot Butler, that the mystical experience of a holy Mohammedan such as Hallaj—and Abbot Butler implies that the same may be said of Plotinus—was the work of supernatural grace.

The Afterthoughts call for further comment. They discuss problems raised by the mystics studied in the book, and canvassed for many years past by mystical theologians. Three are of special importance: (1) Is mystical experience a direct contact with God? (2) Is contemplation in all its forms and degrees infused by God, or is there a contemplation which can be acquired by our efforts with the ordinary assistance of grace? (3) Is mystical prayer a necessary concomitant of sanctity? That is to say, must souls as they attain the perfection of charity necessary for the Beatific Vision pass through the degrees of the mystical way or their equivalent after death?

1. As against Saudreau, Joret, and Garrigou-Lagrange, Abbot Butler insists that the claim of the mystics to direct contact with God must be accepted as literally true. We heartily welcome his firm attitude on this vital question. He adopts Père Noel's view that, even naturally, the soul possesses an obscure knowledge of God. Excellently as Père Noel has argued his thesis, we prefer its restatement by Père Picard in two articles published in the *Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique* for January and April, 1923, entitled "La Saisie Immédiate de Dieu dans les États

Mystiques." In the first of these, Père Picard argues that the soul possesses an obscure, almost subconscious, apprehension of God, but that He is not, as Père Noel maintained, apprehended mediately through the soul, but immediately in Himself. And he shows that this was St. Thomas' earlier, if not his later, teaching. In his second article, Père Picard maintains that the effect of sanctifying grace, the virtue of faith and the gift of wisdom, is to make this "obscure intuition" less obscure—what he terms "clair-confuse," evident, but vague. We should like to suggest that the Presence perceived is itself different, since it is now the Presence of God united to the soul by grace as well as natural presence. In passive contemplation which, for Père Picard as for Père Poulain, begins with the Prayer of Quiet, God hitherto apprehended, *as if* a passive object, is felt as actively at work in the soul.

The second controversial point discussed in the Afterthoughts is the question of the existence of an acquired as opposed to an infused contemplation. Abbot Butler originally accepted the distinction of acquired and infused contemplation. His present position (Afterthoughts, lxxxiv) is that infused contemplation immediately follows the abandonment of meditation and is identical with the Prayer of Loving Attention or Simplicity, but contains "an element of effort on the part of the will." We believe that in this contention he is right, rather than Père Poulain, who rigidly distinguishes the Prayer of Simplicity from mystical or infused prayer. But, on the other hand, we think that even in this mixed contemplation there is an obscure apprehension of God's presence and action. This the Abbot will not admit. He confines the experimental perception of God to the higher degrees of contemplation, apparently Full Union upwards (lxxix and lxvi). Here he follows Père Gardeil. But St. Teresa does not suggest any "difference of kind" between the Prayer of Quiet and Full Union. Neither the break of continuity, postulated by the Abbot after the Prayer of Quiet, nor the break of continuity postulated by Père Poulain before it, seems to correspond with the evidence. Nor does the

Noel-Picard theory of the perception of God, which the Abbot substantially accepts, suggest such a gap. Everything—not least the obscurity and controversy in which the borderland states of mystical prayer are involved—points to the continuity of a vital process in which the presence and action of God emerge from subconscious obscurity into clear apprehension. The mixed contemplation which characterizes the Prayer of Simplicity, now accepted by the Abbot as largely an infused contemplation and so termed by St. John of the Cross, is, we think, continuous with the Prayer of Quiet, and in turn heightens into Full Union.

On pages lxxxiv-lxxxv Abbot Butler writes: "The term 'mystical experience' could be usefully restricted to that experimental perception of God . . . that is the real claim of the mystics in their higher states of contemplation and union," and again, "to this perception and to nothing short of it should be given the name 'mystical experience'" (lxxix). Yet he gives the title "mystical states" (lxxix) and "mystical prayer" (xliii and lxxxiv) to all contemplation without discourse of the faculties, phantasms or images, inclusive, therefore, of the Prayer of Simplicity. If the Abbot allowed that, as we hold, in all these forms of contemplation there is an apprehension of God they would fully deserve the title. Since he does not grant this, it seems misleading to call such prayer "mystical." Moreover, the distinction between "mystical experience," to be reserved for the higher and experimental forms of prayer, and "mystical states" or "mystical prayer" extended to non-experimental forms is over-subtle. In fact, the Abbot is unable to maintain it consistently, for on p. lxiii he writes: "There are many *experiences* certainly *mystical* without" a "direct sense of God." If the Abbot has yielded to the teaching of the mystics so far as to term the states of prayer which range from the Prayer of Simplicity to the Prayer of Quiet mystical, passive, and infused, why should he deny that they contain a direct, though more or less obscure, intuition of God? Indeed, it is difficult to conceive a contemplation infused by God which should be altogether without any perception, however obscure, of the Infuser. If Abbot Butler

had extended the apprehension of God to all degrees of infused prayer, he would, we think, have avoided this confusion of language. And he has himself laid down a theological and philosophic principle which justifies, if it does not demand, the extension. For if natural consciousness, as Pères Noel and Picard affirm—we believe rightly—involves an indistinct apprehension of God, and the ordinary prayer of a soul in grace involves an apprehension of God as specially present in the soul of the just, contemplation of any degree must, a fortiori, apprehend His presence more distinctly than natural consciousness or non-contemplative grace.*

The third controversial issue discussed in the Afterthoughts is the place of mystical contemplation in the Christian life. The Abbot concludes that though the lower degrees of contemplation "are within the reach of men of good will laying themselves out to lead a spiritual life," and no one "is debarred," a priori, "from even the highest grades of contemplation," the way of mystical prayer is not, as certain theologians maintain, the normal way of sanctification for all. We are faced here by an apparent antinomy. On the one hand, if mystical experience is as Père Bainvel defines it, "the life of grace become conscious, known experimentally," it must be an integral part of the life of grace. On the other hand, experience proves that the Abbot is right when he maintains that many souls attain a higher degree of perfection—i.e., of loving conformity with God's will—without mystical prayer of any kind than many other souls who enjoy that prayer. Indeed, his contention is powerfully enforced by the Abbé Gobert, who, in an extremely important and valuable article in the *Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique* for January of this year, affirms as the conclusion of his own experience as a director of souls, compared with the experience of other directors, that the presence or absence of mystical prayer is largely determined by differences of temperament, and cannot be co-ordinated

* Here we also part company with Père Picard, who seems to deny any sense of God as active in forms of contemplation below the prayer of quiet. Infused prayer, we hold, involves some apprehension both of the Infuser and the infusion.

with progress in holiness. The antinomy may, we believe, be resolved by distinguishing between the substance of the mystical union—the union of God with the soul and His action within it—a union and action which increase with the growth of sanctifying grace and charity (are, indeed, a function of that growth) and the experimental perception of that union and action which constitutes mystical prayer as a conscious phenomenon. No soul can enter heaven until the former, the substance of the mystical union, has reached, here or hereafter, a degree which in this life corresponds with the supreme degree of mystical prayer. But the experimental perception of that union may, from causes wholly independent of the will—e.g., environment or psycho-physical temperament—be very faint or altogether wanting. For example, a soul may possess a degree of union equal to that possessed by St. Teresa during the Prayer of Quiet and fail to perceive it, her prayer being ordinary vocal prayer or meditation; or again, may possess in substance the transforming union of St. Teresa's Seventh Mansion while perceiving that union so obscurely that her prayer is experimentally the Prayer of Quiet or even of Simplicity. Place a light of equal power in a lantern of glass, a lantern of horn, and a dark lantern. It will shine brightly in the first, dimly in the second, and in the third will be invisible. We would suggest this view as an eirenicon to the combatants, the more especially as those writers who most strongly insist on the necessity of the mystical way to holiness—Saudreau, Garrigou-Lagrange, and Arinterro—do not admit an experimental perception of God, and in their view of the mystical life emphasise that unitive aspect which is, we believe, common to all holy souls, mystical and non-mystical alike.

Careful study of Abbot Butler's book should enable the reader to value, use, and, where necessary, supplement Canon Saudreau's *Life of Union with God*. The author was one of the first to revolt against the error that contemplative prayer is the exceptional privilege of a few, and to recall Catholics to the traditional belief that even in its higher, more clearly mystical degrees, contemplation is a normal means of sanctification open to pious

souls in any vocation. The primary object of the present work is to prove this doctrine by a catena of passages from masters of Catholic spirituality, from Clement of Alexandria to the sixteenth century. That proof is, largely as the result of the Canon's work, far less necessary to-day than it was when the book first appeared in 1901. But the catena remains of permanent value as a concise presentation of Catholic teaching on the life of prayer. The omission of Blessed Ruysbroeck from the authors quoted is regrettable. The compiler's motive was, he tells us, his inability to read the original. In view of the exceptional value of Ruysbroeck's writing—he and St. John of the Cross are undoubtedly the two supreme mystical theologians of the Church—we think the author might well have trusted the French translation to which he refers. It is true this did not exist in 1901, but he could have made use of it for his third edition. We also miss the authentic work of Tauler. This cannot be supplied by the admittedly spurious *Institutions* which should have been placed in a section by themselves after Tauler's authentic writings. It is also a pity that the *spuria* and *dubia* of St. Gregory are still quoted among his undoubtedly genuine works. As a whole, however, the selections are very representative.

As we have already pointed out, Canon Saudreau does not admit that normal mystical experience is a direct apprehension of God. He prefers to define mystical prayer more vaguely as an infusion of special light and love attaching the soul to God more intimately and wholeheartedly than is otherwise possible. Such a definition of mystical experience is indeed Hamlet with the Prince of Denmark omitted. The present work, both as a catena and an exposition, suffers from a corresponding incompleteness. For the texts which affirm most clearly a direct experience of God are omitted from the catena. Here and there, however, passages occur which state or imply it. On p. 201 we find Gerson's definition of mystical theology as an experimental knowledge of God. On p. 165 St. Bonaventure is quoted: "In the second mode the soul fastens its gaze on the Good in Himself;"

also St. Bernard (120), the contemplative "burns for that God whom he divines, *feels* rather than sees that God who passes before him with the rapidity of a spark which flashes and goes out, whom the soul hardly *touches*, even ever so lightly." There is further the very explicit and important passage from the *Institutions* (pseudo-Tauler) in which the author writes: "Man in this stage receives God in an essential way, not by means of images . . . not by certain mental processes, *but by himself*. Man finds himself . . . as though enveloped in a cloud, but God enlightens him Himself by His Essence" (pp. 182-3). Canon Saudreau, feeling the force of this passage, appends a note in which he attempts to qualify his author's statement by appeal to the fact, universally admitted, that mystical union is not "a vision of the Divine Essence." As, however, the text quoted does not affirm a clear vision of God, but only an obscure contact "in a cloud," the objection is beside the point. Moreover, Canon Saudreau, in his embarrassment, uses contradictory language. "God," he writes, is in the mystical union "*perceived* without form," and a few lines later he calls this a "*vague conception* of God." A conception is not a perception. Whether mystical experience be the latter or merely the former is precisely the question at issue. Canon Saudreau is practically forced by his text to admit for a moment, though only to contradict it, the thesis which he denies, namely, the *perception* of God in mystical union. If M. Ribet is plainly wrong in regarding contemplation as "miraculous," he is fully justified in affirming that in mystical union the soul "*feels* and enjoys the union which takes place between itself and God by the gift of his grace" (313). Canon Saudreau's comment that this definition explains his error is gratuitous.

Among the authors quoted in Canon Saudreau's catena we would invite especial attention to St. Diadochus. The extracts given, fortunately at great length (40-44), prove that his *Treatise on Perfection* is of the very greatest value and importance as a source of mystical theology. It should be translated into English.*

* This would not be lengthy or costly work, as the treatise consists of one hundred *very short* chapters.

In this remarkable treatise St. Diadochus speaks far more explicitly on many problems discussed by mystical theologians to-day than the majority of early writers. He is also another and a very clear witness against Canon Saudreau's denial of a direct experience of God in mystical prayer. For he teaches in the plainest terms Père Poulain's doctrine of a spiritual sense in which the soul feels without seeing God.

He relates mystical prayer to the gifts of the Holy Spirit, though for him it is the work of the gift of knowledge, not as for later theologians, the gift of wisdom. His language also implies that mystical prayer is a consciousness of sanctifying grace or rather of God as present through sanctifying grace.

"From the moment," he writes, "of our baptism, grace is secretly present in the highest part of the soul [the fund or apex of later mystics] but its presence escapes our senses. When we have begun to love God with all our hearts, then, in an inexplicable manner, is communicated to our souls some share of his favours," and again, "Among those who are baptized, the presence of grace is at first hidden, waiting for the soul to make choice (of good). When one turns with one's whole heart to God, then God, in making Himself known in a spiritual, inexplicable manner, shows that He is present in the centre of the soul. . . . If we begin to make progress . . . the fire of grace will penetrate our hearts at their surface." Compare Père Bainvel's definition of the mystical life as "the life of grace becomes conscious, known experimentally."

Of great interest are the quotations from Albertus Magnus.¹ Notice especially his clear differentiation between the Prayer of Quiet and Ecstasy in which he anticipates almost verbally the descriptions of St. Teresa (p. 151). On the other hand, his account of contemplation, as quoted by Canon Saudreau, seems inadequate to the plain descriptions of other mystics, for his language appears

* The treatise *De Adhaerendo Deo*, which Canon Saudreau regards as doubtfully authentic, and as possibly the work of the fourteenth century, has been proved by Professor Grabmann to be the work of a fifteenth-century Benedictine mystic, John of Kastl. (See *Zeitschrift für Ascese u. Mystik*, April, 1927, p. 198.)

in places to reduce it to a divinely assisted consideration of the attributes of God (151, ll. 1-6 and 14-15, and 152, ii. 1-5). The extracts from the spurious *Institutions* of Tauler are of particular interest to the student of St. John of the Cross. For the language of pseudo-Tauler on naked faith and its detachment from images and meditation so strikingly resembles the teaching of the *Ascent of Mount Carmel* that it must be a source from which St. John derived in part the formulation of his doctrine. The extracts from Gerson are also of peculiar interest and value, the more so because he is not easily accessible. Admirers of Abbot Butler's work on *Western Mysticism* will be especially delighted with the passages in which Gerson reiterates and confirms the balanced teaching of St. Gregory on the contemplative vocation (205).

It was, we think, a pity to include passages from St. John of the Cross on the "Night of the Spirit." The second Night belongs to the higher degrees of mystic union which lie beyond the scope of this book. In his remarks on "Quietism," Canon Saudreau exposes the root of the Quietist error when he defines it as a wish "to make contemplatives of all the faithful indiscriminately"—i.e., to persuade them to abandon meditation at once and attempt a contemplative form of prayer whatever their temperament or spiritual condition (303-4). In a footnote on page 271 we are told that "we cannot think without explaining our thoughts to ourselves by words. The operation of the understanding does not act without the co-operation of the imagination which formulates the words." This, we believe, has been disproved by the experiments conducted and described by Prof. Spearman, from which it appears that imageless thought—ratiocination unaccompanied by any word or other image formulated in the imagination—does actually occur among the normal operations of the human mind. In a note to p. 221, ecstasy is treated as lying like visions outside the normal path from the Prayer of Quiet to the Transforming Union. This contradicts the explicit account of St. Teresa, for whom Ecstasy is a definite stage of mystical union—the Fourth Water of the *Life* and the Sixth Mansion of the *Interior Castle*. It is

not, therefore, an accidental form of the Full Union (Third Water, Fifth Mansion) as is affirmed on pp. 222-3. The little work entitled *Mystical Theology* long ascribed to St. Bonaventure, which Canon Saudreau is inclined to attribute to Br. Henry of Baume, is the work of a thirteenth-century Carthusian, Hugh of Balma (see *R.A.M.*, *Avril*, 1927, 156-61). It is a pity that in the footnote to p. 147 Canon Saudreau ascribes the opposition of certain theologians to mystical prayer to "a secret self-love." While we are convinced that their prejudice is erroneous, mischievous, and unfounded, there is no reason to doubt their entire good faith and excellent intentions. It is a mistake to regard, without definite proof, intellectual error as the result of moral shortcoming.

Although Canon Lejeune's book is far too slight to be that definitive and exhaustive study of the Contemplative Life desiderated by Abbot Butler, it can be heartily recommended to students of the Abbot's book. The meaning and value of the Contemplative Life is explained in accordance with the traditional teaching of the fathers, though no explicit appeal is made to their authority. We should like to call special attention to the following passage (p. 81): "A confessor who perceives glaring faults in a penitent favoured with mystical prayer should not be surprised or scandalized, still less conclude that his penitent is completely deceived in his state. For God often bestows the gift of contemplation upon a very imperfect soul in recompense of some painful trial to which he subjects her or leaves in a person of good will some very obvious failings to keep him constantly humble." As regards the three points of controversy we have discussed above, Canon Lejeune follows Père Poulain in admitting a direct contact with God in mystical contemplation, also, and here we think he is mistaken in making a sharp distinction between infused and acquired contemplation, excluding from the latter all direct contact with God. In respect of the third point, the universal call to mystical prayer, our author quotes with approval Père Surin's judgment that "every soul can attain mystical prayer," and "it is her own fault if she fails to do so."

We have already argued that this position is only tenable of the substance of mystical prayer—the will union—not of its realization in consciousness, which largely depends on factors independent of the will. Moreover, such a universal call to conscious mystical prayer is not easy to reconcile with the limitation of the contemplative vocation to souls of a certain temper which our author rightly lays down. The book is damaged by the assertion as an axiomatic truth, “that the most prosperous nation is the nation in which the most prayer is made” (14). The defeat of the Spanish Armada is sufficient to disprove this preposterous “axiom.” We are also surprised that Canon Lejeune seems to identify the contemplative vocation with the vocation of a victim of reparation. No doubt the latter implies the former—but not *vice versa*. The victim vocation is an extraordinary, the contemplative, as the Canon himself proves, an ordinary vocation.

Fr. de Besse's over-ambitious title is regrettable. If he had entitled his brochure a guide to the *Ascent of Mount Carmel* and the *Dark Night of the Soul*, he could justify the claim. St. John's teaching on detachment, active and passive, on the nature of mystical prayer and on the means and manner of entrance into it, the theme, in short, of these two treatises, is drawn out by a series of well-selected quotations and lucid explanation. The student of St. John of the Cross could desire no better introduction. But St. John's description of the supreme state of prayer, the Transforming Union which follows the “Second Night” and constitutes so large a portion of the *Spiritual Canticle* and the bulk of the *Living Flame of Love*, is barely touched. Fr. de Besse's remarks on these two books are almost entirely confined to those portions in which the teaching of the *Ascent* and *Dark Night* is recapitulated and confirmed. Within these limits we can have little but praise for a most successful example of exposition, condensed, but never obscure. What is Fr. de Besse's contribution in this book to our three points of controversy? He leaves no doubt that St. John of the Cross taught a direct contact with God in mystical prayer. But whereas Canon Lejeune exaggerated the distinction between imposed and acquired

contemplation, the Prayer of Quiet and the Prayer of Simple Regard, Fr. de Besse identifies them—surely the opposite excess. The fact of judgments so diametrically opposed by competent students of mystical theology is perhaps the weightiest argument in favour of our contention that the two degrees of prayer differ not in kind, but in degree, not in the respective presence or absence of direct contact with God, nor even, as Picard maintains, of His felt action, but in the proportion borne by that contact and experienced Action to the normal activity of the soul. As regards the third point, the universal call, here, also, we feel that Fr. de Besse is excessive. For he appears to teach not merely that mystical contemplation is for all—and that only cowardice prevents the majority of souls from attaining it—but that St. John's path of utter renunciation as traced in the *Ascent of Mount Carmel* and the *Dark Night* should be followed by every Christian. St. John himself says: "My principal object is not to address myself to all, but only to certain persons of our Holy Order of Mount Carmel . . . friars as well as nuns, who, by the grace of God, are on the pathway of this mount." If the saint unfortunately forgets this wise limitation and bids his readers later in the book not to rejoice in their marriage (would Fr. de Besse preach this at a wedding?), it remains true that the sublime path of complete sacrifice is for the few called *in this life* to reach the summit of mystical marriage. To propose it to all is likely to drive many souls in despair from God to the world. If St. John of the Cross is the supreme master of mystical theology, he is not, therefore, a practical guide for the ordinary Christian. Though the Church has made him a doctor, she has not recommended his works as she has recommended the works of St. Teresa for the spiritual food of all her children indiscriminately. If we are wise, we shall take the hint.

In reviewing a new edition of Dame Julian's *Revelations*, we welcome the reappearance of a book which ranks among the gems of religious literature. The editor has done his work well, giving us a carefully collated text based on the best available MS. of the longer version of the *Revelations*

(Sloane, 2499). We regret that it was impossible to print with it the shorter text contained in the Amherst MS. of 1413, and published by the Rev. Dundas Harford. As its editor and Miss Evelyn Underhill maintain—and Dom Huddleston is inclined to accept the contention—the shorter version represents the original edition of Dame Julian's *Revelations*, and the additional matter peculiar to the longer version is the result of her later meditations. If this be the case, it is desirable that both versions should be printed together and the reader thus enabled to distinguish the two strata of which the final work is composed. Dom Huddleston, indeed, has added in the notes a few passages in which the shorter version contains additional matter wanting in the longer recension. But the omissions are at least as interesting and far more extensive.

We cannot agree with the interpretation of the words: "I saw God in a Point" as meaning: "I saw 'all His divers perfections summed up in a single centre.'" The context shows that it is not the Unity of the Divine Attributes which is here intended; but the immanence of God as the ground of everything created: "He is in the mid-point of all things." Dom Huddleston adopts the accepted view that the scene of the *Revelations* was the anchorage at St. Julian's Church. In her essay on Dame Julian in the *Essentials of Mysticism*, Miss Evelyn Underhill points out that the presence by the sick bed of her mother and many "others" (Amherst MS.) is an objection to that view. We think she is right—but cannot accept her further conjecture that when the revelations were made Dame Julian was a nun at Carrow Abbey—the house to which the anchorage belonged. The chaplain of the convent would scarcely have been described as "my curate," nor, surely, would Julian's mother rather than the Abbess or Infirmarian have come forward to close her eyes in death. Would she even have been present within the enclosure? We believe that Julian was still at her home when the revelations took place, and that it was as a consequence of this divine favour that she became an anchoress. Unhappily, we shall never know where that home was. Her allusion to the "sea-ground" with its

"hills and dales green, seeming as it were moss-be-grown" suggests a dweller by the sea. The description recalls the green ribbon weed which covers, with a carpet soft as moss, the rocks left bare at ebb tide.

Somewhere within sight of that symbol of Infinite Majesty we may imagine this Norfolk girl receiving the series of intuitions of Divine Truth, which place her among the great Christian seers. Miss Evelyn Underhill rightly calls attention to the double character of the revelations—visions of God Incarnate, *for the most part* visions of the Crucified, formed in the subconscious and purely intellectual apprehensions of the Godhead. The bipolarity of Christian mysticism, turning as it does around the double focus of the Infinite Godhead and the Sacred Humanity, dominates the *Revelations*. And that double focus is for Dame Julian the double focus of a vision which sees Divine Truth concomitantly in its temporal manifestation and its timeless transcendence. It is implicit in the refusal to look away from the crucifix, the God-Man suffering in time, to heaven, the eternal Godhead. For the latter is already revealed in the former. The rood in Julian's parish church and the boundless sea by which, we may believe, she grew to womanhood, are symbols of this twofold vision of truth, the lower and relative truth of time and the higher and absolute truth of eternity, which is the essence of her revelation. And this two-levelled understanding of truth is the key to her daring paradoxes, even, perhaps, a seeming unorthodoxy. In time, the predestined soul may sin, even mortally; in God's eternal now, in which its final salvation is equally present with its passing state of sin, it is fixed in His love, is, what it finally will be.

In time, the judgment, the "doom," of the Church on sinners and her work for their restoration are true; in eternity is the ultimate and absolute truth of God's unbroken union with the souls eternally His. And even Adam's fall—the most terrible sin ever committed—is eternally absorbed in his salvation in Christ. Here there intervenes another fundamental principle apprehended by Julian with a force wellnigh unparalleled since St. Paul—

the unity of the saved as the one and the indivisible body of Christ. "In this oneness standeth the life of all mankind that shall be saved." Because Adam and all other sinners ultimately saved are finally "in Christ," God loves them as one with His own Son. This is the thought elaborated in the sublime parable-vision of the Lord and the Servant. To time belong the passing pains of the Crucified and His members—the anguishing thirst, the sharp scourges—to eternity their significance and their fruit, the victory of the immutable Love which is God. To time belong the many "means" of prayer to which Julian—no Quietist—assigns their due place, to eternity the Goodness which is at once the cause ("the ground") and the answer of all prayer. To eternity belongs the Divine Act which is ground, substance, and value of all positive acts of creatures (there is no Doer but he)—but as temporal acts they fall short—it may be even sinfully—of the Act in which they are founded. The eternal Love of God, apprehended by the intuition of the seer, is represented in time by the free shedding of the precious Blood, seen in a series of picture-visions, and the abiding immanence of creation—in itself as little as a hazel-nut—in the infinite fulness of Deity is revealed in history by the enclosure of the redeemed in the Sacred Heart of the God-Man. The Incarnation of God in Christ and, by extension, in the members of His Church-body—with His and their Passion and Resurrection—is the temporal manifestation in creatures of the Eternal Love by which they shall be brought up into their abiding Ground and Source—for man is the sum of all created being below himself. This truth is, of course, the substance of the Christian religion and, a fortiori, of Christian mysticism. But few have apprehended it so powerfully as Dame Julian. To ponder her *Revelations* is to penetrate the heart of Christianity. To be sure, she is not always able to render in unerring language so lofty a vision. Her feet slip on the heights. Probably, as Miss Underhill suggests, under the influence, direct or indirect, of Eckhart, she confuses, or appears to confuse, the uncreated ground of the soul, its eternal essence as an idea in the Divine mind,

with the actual ground, the "substance" of the created soul, and therefore ascribes to the latter an indefectibility, a godly will that may never assent to sin—perhaps even a pre-existence of its earthly embodiment. (See chapter lviii, "He made us all at once.") The mistake would be fostered by the intuition of which we have already spoken, that the soul is always to God what it will be for eternity. The logic of her error, since she cannot hold the universal salvation of all mankind, involves an implicit distinction of substantial nature between the predestined and reprobate, which she never affirms but could not consistently deny. But an occasional error in the expression of her vision must not blind us to its splendour, its infinite height, its vast breadth, its inexhaustible depths. Moreover, Julian possessed the rare gift of clothing her sublime conceptions in beautiful and simple symbols and in parables of inexhaustible significance. Such are the parable of the Hazel-nut and the great parable of the Lord and the Servant which embraces the entire economy of redemption. Miss Underhill happily compares Dame Julian with Angela of Foligno. If Angela displays greater heights of personal union with God, Julian has the more universal vision. And she excels Angela in speculative power. Yet both, to a degree altogether exceptional, exemplify the bifocal, double-levelled character of Christian mysticism. And whatever their debt to the mystical theologies of the past both are everywhere fresh, spontaneous, and original. To judge by the scanty manuscripts, Dame Julian's *Revelations* had no message for the majority of her contemporaries. Possibly, the problems which vexed her soul—sin, suffering, and damnation—were little felt by a less critical and stronger nerved age. Her book seems to have been laid up for a distant generation, vexed by the problems which she found so hard. May the present edition make more widely known the answers which she saw in God.

BOOKS REVIEWED

G. T. Rivoira: *Roman Architecture and its Principles of Construction under the Empire, with an Appendix on the Evolution of the Dome up to the Seventeenth Century*. Translated from the Italian by G. McN. Rushforth. Clarendon Press. 1925.

THIS illuminating monograph, which ranges over the major problems of Roman architecture from the early Imperial times to the seventeenth century, was brought out posthumously by the care of Madame Rivoira, whose devotion to her husband's work accounts in no small measure for its success. Commendatore Nogara, the illustrious Director of the Pontifical Galleries, collaborated in the pious task, while in its English edition the book owes much to the literary gifts of its translator, Mr. G. McN. Rushforth, who also contributes to the English edition a short but interesting topographical sketch. Few recent works on Roman architecture have been so fully noticed, but, as generally happens when a book treats of both the classical and Christian epochs of art, reviewers have been more concerned with the earlier than the later phases, and the author's concluding chapters and Appendix on the origin of the early Christian basilica and on the development of the dome have scarcely received the attention they deserve. Yet the period that opens with Constantine, being one of the most significant for the history of the Church, is equally so for that of art. Let us hear Rivoira himself:

"... isolated, so to speak, with regard to the Empire, the Church of Rome, raised by the bounty of Constantine from her original humble state to one of splendour, succeeded step by step in making herself the spiritual heir of the old Imperial power, the laws and hierarchy of which she adopted, and copied its regulations and forms. Later, when the temporal was added to the spiritual sovereignty, she set up the civilizing and dominating force of the Middle Ages, the Papacy. The seat of empire was no longer in Rome, but above the she-wolf's cave the eagle's nest still kept its place. Without the act of Constantine the Eternal City would

not now, clothed with the mantle of some three thousand years of greatness, be moving in company with the new Italy, towards a new and glorious destiny. Nor would the triumphs of Italian architecture in the fifth and sixth centuries have taken shape, with all their wealth of lessons for both West and East."

Rarely has the relation of the early Christian Church to the Empire, and the good resulting throughout the centuries from Constantine's removal of the Imperial Government to Byzantium, been put in so true and vivid a light.

Of the two Basilicas of Rome, St. Peter's and St. John Lateran that arose by the care of Constantine, the Lateran—originally the *Basilica Salvatoris*—is the older, and to its plan Rivoira accordingly gives precedence over that of the other Constantinian foundations. The Lateran has lightly projecting arms, which brings Rivoira to compare it to the plan of cruciform Etruscan tombs, of the type best known from the tombs of Cervetri and Vetulonia. The comparison is suggestive, but the Christian basilica is not primarily cruciform, and the actual derivation was more probably from Roman buildings of the type of the recently discovered *hypogeum* near the Porta Maggiore, which, were it not for the pagan character of its stuccoes, could with its nave, apse, aisles and small atrium easily be mistaken for a Christian basilica.

But it is the fresh light he brings to bear on the structure and history of the dome that gives so great a value to this part of Rivoira's latest and last book. In an admirable passage he shows that the substitution of radial for horizontal courses, as at S. Maria Maggiore at Nocera dei Pagani, a fourth to fifth-century Campanian church, leads in time to the elongated dome; and of this type of dome Rivoira, an ardent student and admirer of Etruscan architecture, finds "the germ . . . whether transplanted or not from other shores and other regions" in the hood-shaped roof of Etruscan chamber-tombs. Incidentally he establishes the purely Roman origin of the fan-shaped or squinch-arch, that awkward device inserted between the drum of the primitive dome and the supporting square structure (*e.g.*, in the Baptistery of S. Giovanni of Naples),

and shows its derivation from the hood-shaped tops of Roman angle-niches.

The Appendix on the domes of the later Renaissance, coming from one who had unrivalled knowledge of the whole development of ancient and modern architecture, is of special interest. Rivoira's discussion of the double dome of S. Peter's—the first of its kind in Rome—is followed by another on the dome of Santa Maria di Loreto, near Trajan's Forum. In connection with this Rivoira has discovered new facts, enabling him to confirm the ascription of its outer dome and of its curious lantern to Giacomo del Duca, who thus completed the younger Sangallo's "original octagonal dome." A tiresome archæological controversy as to the exact share of each architect in the construction of this dome, one of the landmarks of Rome, has thus been brought to a close. Oval domes, exemplified by those of the Santuario of Vicoforte and of S. Giacomo degli Incurabili in Rome, he audaciously traces back to ancient Roman examples, such as the oval chamber in the Baths of Caracalla, or the oval chamber-tombs illustrated by Montano in his *Scielta di Varii Tempietti*.

In these days, when we are told that the architecture of the Baroque period is at a discount, it is refreshing to find a writer on architecture, trained as Rivoira was, in the severest school of classical archæology, breaking a lance in defence of the Baroque and the great churches of the Catholic revival. Incidentally he pays a tribute to the majestic beauty of St. Paul's, London, which, though dedicated from the first to Anglican usage, clearly shows the inspiration of its Catholic models.

Rivoira's lifelong effort was to establish the originality of Roman building-forms and the debt owed to them by primitive Christian architecture throughout Western Europe. He was a vigorous and successful opponent of the *los vom Rom* school of archæology led by Joseph Strzygowski, and no less than the illustrious Austrian scholar he possessed, as his two best-known works abundantly testify (*Lombardic Architecture*, English translation 1910; *Moslem Architecture*, English translation 1918), an incomparable knowledge of Syrian, of Arab, and of

Mussulman art. The greatest of his works is undoubtedly *Architettura Lombarda*, in which he first laid down principles that are vital for the whole history of architecture. He had travelled far and wide, not only in the East and in North Africa, but also in Spain, France, and England. England, his wife's country, was ever to him a second home: he had a special love for its cathedrals, and he often brought new light to bear on obscure points in the history of its early architecture.

Rivoira came of a fine old Piedmontese stock, and was related to the Della Chiesa family to which Benedict XV belonged. He studied architecture and engineering at the University of Turin, and entered Rome on General Cadorna's staff, September 20, 1870, after which he made his home in the Eternal City and became one of its most ardent devotees. Rome to him was inextricably bound up with the fortunes of Italy. Always a Catholic at heart, even in difficult days, he felt the spell of Rome as centre of the Church's life, and, as the quotation given above shows, looked upon the Papacy as the fulfilment of the Empire. He would have rejoiced to see the recent unveiling of the Cross within the Colosseum, and young Italy drawing the omen of its own victory from the motto of the Constantinian labarum: *In hoc signo vinces*. . . . But he died at the comparatively early age of seventy, on March 3, 1919, too soon to realize fully the marvellous rebirth of his country, its new unity, and the healing of its ancient feuds. He had lived through the harassing years of war and did not survive the bitter experiences of the *dopo guerra*; there is no doubt that patriotic anxieties told upon him and hastened the end. But though he was denied the supreme consolation of witnessing the glorious events of October, 1922, he seemed to know intuitively of the great days in store for Italy, and never for one moment lost faith in her destinies. He belonged actually to an older generation, but he retained to the last the intrepid energy, the high courage and ardent enthusiasm characteristic of the men who have shaped the *Quinta Italia*, or, as Rivoira himself would have preferred to call her, the *nuova Italia Romana*. E. S.

Civilization or Civilizations: An Essay in the Spenglerian Philosophy of History. By E. H. Goddard and P. A. Gibbons. With an Introduction by F. C. S. Schiller. Constable and Co. 7s. 6d. net.

HERR SPENGLER'S book, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (*The Decline of the West*), appeared towards the end of the war, and its vogue, largely among many Germans who understood little more of it than its title, was enormously helped by the pessimism and despair of defeat. Just as Herr Houston Stewart Chamberlain's *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, a book whose glib analogies invite at least a superficial comparison with Herr Spengler's, came at a moment when Germany was in an imperialist mood, and helped to strengthen that mood, so Herr Spengler's elaborate prophecy of the end of our civilization came at a moment when Germany was profoundly pessimistic, and helped to deepen that pessimism. The difference is that the vogue is lasting. This is not only due to the much more serious character of Herr Spengler's reasoning, but also, we think, to a persistence of the same original pessimism as started this heavy work—over a thousand pages, in two ponderous volumes, written in a dull prose—on its triumphant progress to its present circulation, over a hundred thousand copies in Germany alone. Whether this astonishing figure will be reached in England remains to be seen; the first volume has recently been translated, and the reaction of English opinion will be interesting to watch. For the second volume, which has closer relation to current conditions, we may well have to wait some time. Meanwhile, Messrs. Goddard and Gibbons have guessed, rightly, we should judge, that there must be many readers who, having heard of Herr Spengler's ideas from accounts in newspapers and reviews, but being unable to read the original or even attack the English translation, will welcome a fairly extended summary of the so-called "Spenglerian philosophy."

The term "philosophy" is a loose one; Herr Spengler himself calls his work a "morphology of history," and would probably be the first to admit that what systematic

philosophy there is in his book derives from his original master Heraclitus and from Hegel. No, what Herr Spengler has done is to construct a scheme of world-history, fit each of the eight preceding cycles of civilization into it, and from this attempt to forecast the probable development of our own, the ninth, or Western, cycle, between the present time and its end, in about a century. The obvious flaws and overlappings in his elaborate series of analogies he explains by a theory of "pseudo-morphosis," as, for example, the imposition of Western ideals on Russia; and it is one of the merits of Messrs. Goddard and Gibbons's exposition that this very important reservation to Herr Spengler's apparently fatalistic argument is explained more carefully and clearly than in the original. What is not done—though the obvious necessity for it is hinted in Professor Schiller's cautious Preface—is to emphasize the empirical and, one might almost say, the didactic nature of Herr Spengler's arguments. From the boastful Preface of the original, that the *Untergang des Abendlandes* constituted the first attempt to "determine the future course of history" to Herr Spengler's conclusions in his second volume, and still more in certain other of his writings, there is a wide gap, with which there is no space to deal here. We will only remark that the title of "prophet" has two meanings, and that Herr Spengler has assumed both mantles.

For the rest, let us briefly state the essence of the Spenglerian theory as described by these two writers. It is that each cycle of civilization, the Babylonian, the Egyptian, the Classical, the Arabian, and the rest, in every category of human self-expression, in religion, art, mathematics, science, philosophy, music, architecture, the science of government, shows a rise to an apex, after which it declines. Thus classical civilization rose to the fourth stage of religious and philosophical development with Aristotle and Plato; Western civilization to exactly the same stage with Kant; Babylon rose to the so-called "Empire" stage of political development with Hammurabi; the classical civilization with Augustus; Indian with Asoka. We may apparently expect our own "Empire" stage in about a hundred years. The plausibility of it is obvious, and

incidentally it may be remarked that in plausible classification and the exploitation of analogy the Germans—for example, Freud and Houston Stewart Chamberlain—have more than once shown themselves past masters. Plausibility, of course, is not necessarily falsity, but the way in which superficial analogy plays like a will-o'-the-wisp is illustrated again and again in this volume. Thus it is necessary, for chronological reasons, to find a Western equivalent to the Vedas, the "Age of Unconscious Belief." Herr Spengler takes Scholasticism, and consequently has to postpone, for our civilization, "the age of conscious thought about the universe" until the time of Luther and Cromwell. This, it is true, is an extreme example; and by his postulate of "pseudo-morphosis" Herr Spengler guards himself against ridicule. But it is not an unfair sample of the superficialities and intellectual absurdities into which the so-called "law" may lead us. Other instances may be culled in plenty, and the task should be well worth attempting, for there is a distinct danger that the popularization of Herr Spengler's theories, shorn of all the reservations with which he has surrounded them, may assist in spreading that spirit of distrust in European ideals, that weak surrender to a Nirvana outlook on life which, if our culture do not overcome it, will yet prove our undoing. We hope, therefore, that this preliminary study will prove the beginning of a systematic examination of Herr Spengler's ideas, many of which may be either refuted or, on his own showing, given a meaning quite opposite to that which they have received in Germany until now.

A. R.

The Inquisition. By A. L. Maycock. Constable and Co.

THIS is intended by its author to be a book that will help the reader to understand the Inquisition; it is not meant to attack or defend it, but only to explain it. This is, we believe, the correct method for the historian; his task is never to pass judgement, but only to record. He assembles material for judgement; he is the patient recorder; but the reader must be the judge. With such a

laudable purpose before him, Mr. Maycock deserves credit, deserves to have his book put by the side of those of Lea and Turberville as in its way a fellow with theirs in spirit and intention, and indeed in result. Of course, Mr. Maycock has not the learning of Lea nor even of Turberville. He is not an historian except by desire, nor a popular writer except in effect. It is the book of an honest, well read, and hard-working man who has applied commonsense to the materials furnished by others. We do not find in what he has to say any new information or original research. We find, however, on the whole a fair presentation of the facts accumulated by others. Such a book has been needed, but it may fail of success, just because it is so much rather the quiet and unromantic description of the rise, progress, and methods of the Inquisition from its gradual origins to the great schism than a lurid denunciation of it or a partisan defence.

We are given at the beginning a chapter which describes the spirit of the Middle Ages, admirable if it be remembered as a description rather of the spirit than the accomplishment of that time, but no less worth describing on that account; for men and nations and times are to be judged not so much by the success that attended their efforts as by the efforts themselves: "God doth not ask a perfect work, but infinite desire."

Then follows a chapter which recounts the rise of that heresy, spreading into Europe from the East and up from the South, which, under various forms, rested on the main tenet that matter was evil and spirit good. Almost idealistic as it sounds, in its effects it became materialistic, for if all matter was evil, then none of it was justifiable, concubinage no worse than marriage, theft no worse than legal possession, murder no worse than taking food. Indeed, if we are to believe the unanimous testimony of their adversaries (and H. C. Lea considers that we have no reason at all to doubt it), the only perfect act for the Cathari was suicide (called the *endura*), for all life was immersed in matter, and only death made a man free from sin.

So dominant was this heresy of exaggerated asceticism that even Wycliffe was not wholly free from the taint of it;

his denial of the right of property except to the man in a state of grace was a logical deduction from the main doctrine of these sects, and though later, perhaps under pressure from his ally, the wealthy John of Gaunt, whom it seemed difficult to suppose to be in a state of grace, he modified his teaching by the subtilty that "having is of many kinds," and the good had all things, whereas the wicked only possessed them (poor comfort to the starving good); he yet, like all the later reformers, was a Puritan at heart—the English equivalent of the Albigensian of France and Italy.

Most valuable for those who would wish to re-create the Inquisition are the chapters that deal with it in action and give in detail the main penalties it used in its work. Recognizing how gruesome and unpleasant was its trade, Mr. Maycock yet gives us, no doubt, the best that can be said for it; but it is a poor best to our way of judging, both in the methods it used and the spirit it expressed. We can acknowledge, as in some measure reasonable, the principle on which it was founded (in the words of S. Thomas: "The Church does not persecute men in order to induce them thro' violence to believe, but to prevent them corrupting others"), and in definite circumstances all civil governments have had to employ it, without even claiming infallibly to judge of the doctrine they persecuted whether or not it were true: yet for all that we cannot help seeing the harm it has done the Catholic Church, its ineffectiveness towards the purpose for which it was imposed, and even more the unseemliness of such business being conducted by ministers of Christ in Christ's own name. No doubt as generations pass there is a development of moral sensitiveness to Christ's teaching, just as there is a development in our understanding of His doctrine, so that we see more clearly than they did how hostile the method of the Inquisition was to the Spirit of Christ; and yet while we judge harshly past ages for their obtuseness to what seems to us so clearly foreign to the spirit of Our Lord, we must be prepared to be judged ourselves by later ages for not equally having seen that we too are very far from ideal Christianity. But even with this to temper the edge

of our criticism, we cannot but be critical of what this book describes. Indeed, it is to Mr. Maycock's credit as a historian that without the use of many adverse adjectives he disgusts us with it. His seeming pitiless description of this engine of repression is really the best way of insensibly putting us against it.

We would point out to Mr. Maycock, however, two small errors we have noticed. First, that Cantu in his *Storia Universale* (vol. vi, p. 87 n., Turin, 1887) has shown from a Cambridge manuscript that the name Waldenses existed before the birth of Valdez, who cannot therefore be the founder of the sect (p. 32); second, that in spite of p. 265 there is a fragment of a Catharist ritual preserved for us which has been printed at Lyons.

But the book, with occasional lapses, is a valuable contribution to the growing literature on the Inquisition.

B. J.

Glastonbury and England. By Christopher Hollis. Sheed and Ward. 2s. 6d.

THERE is much ground for thinking that one of the chief objects that the devil had in view in engineering the Reformation was to isolate England not only, as Mr. Belloc so emphatically claims, from the culture and tradition of the Europe about her, but also, and equally completely, from her own too-Christian past. To rob her of so great a Catholic tradition, to degrade her to the position of a nation without roots, and the stability and continuity that the possession of roots implies, would indeed be a work worthy of his own peculiar genius.

How completely he succeeded may be gauged from the fact that whilst the name of Glastonbury still has the power to evoke some vague thrill in almost every breast, yet those who could give anything like a definite reason for that thrill are few and far between. The visitors who flock in multitudes to see the sparse ruins, all that remains of the abbey that was once the glory of England, show by their ingenuous remarks that they have no faintest idea of the significance of what they have come to see.

So it is that we welcome with a very real joy *Glastonbury and England*, by Christopher Hollis. The book has a great work to do and is well fitted to do it. The jacket takes us at once to the heart of the matter. It shows a picture of that mysterious Tor that even the devil has failed to destroy. Crowned by the martyrdom of the last Abbot of Glastonbury and his two companions in the sixteenth century, its history stretches far back into a dim and legendary past. Surmounted still by the tower of a church once dedicated to St. Michael the Archangel, it still lives, still exerts its potent and mysterious power. The ruins are dead, slain by a thousand dishonourable deeds. All present-day attempts to restore to them some semblance of decency, to bury the sacrilege and horrors of the past beneath green lawns, seem merely to accentuate their utter desolation. The great nave of the once world-famous pilgrimage church, prepared, as it were, for pleasant tennis parties and other summer games! Could degradation go further? May one not say in a very true sense that the hatred and violence of the past were preferable? At least in those days its supernatural function was recognized, though combated, whilst to-day all speaks of that decent toleration that brings death to the soul.

"Here was England born and made and murdered." So read the words printed under the picture of the Tor. Glastonbury is, indeed, unique. Known to the heathen as Avalon, the island of the blest, Bede tells us how Pope Eleutherius sent missionaries at the request of the British King Lucius. Later, so far as *written* testimony goes, we read how St. Joseph of Arimathea came to Glastonbury and built "a little lonely church" that was dedicated to Our Lady by Our Lord Himself. So it was that owing to this tradition the Abbot of Glastonbury was the first Abbot in England, and England claimed her Church as of Apostolic foundation. To quote Mr. Hollis, who is speaking of another claim which, whilst ignoring St. Joseph, speaks of a Church consecrated by Our Lord to the honour of His Mother, "the claims at least prove that, when all England was the country of Our Lady, Glastonbury was the England of England, the most ancient home there of

the Christian faith, its constant preserver." We cannot now follow this history so gloriously begun, so unique in its claims, so potent in the destinies of England. Of Patrick, Dunstan, and Arthur, of the struggle of the English community with their Norman conquerors, of Glastonbury's great place in the Middle Ages, of her splendour under Abbot Bere, of the tragic death of her last Abbot, and of the ruin and ignominy meted out to the holy place, we must refer the reader to the book itself. Catholics to-day are instructed, as perhaps never before, in the truths of the Catholic Faith; is it not good that they should know, too, something of the fruit of those truths in the history of the country and race? Glastonbury, so uniquely glorious in her claims and history, so holy in her Saints, so tragic in her end, has been strangely neglected. We can only hope that the present work so vivid and vigorous may do much to spread a knowledge of her history and kindle a desire to do something to make reparation for the past. The Catholic Church that created the Glastonbury that was a glory in Christendom, though slain, still lives. A pathetically tiny church, probably very much the size of the original Glastonbury Church that was the nucleus of all its subsequent glory, stands to-day within a stone's throw of the ruins. It is both a witness and an opportunity.

F. B.

Le Livre de Job. Par le P. Paul Dhorme, des Frères Prêcheurs.
Paris: Gabalda. Pp. clxxviii, 614. Price 100 francs.

WHY do the wicked prosper? And still more (as concerning them more narrowly), why do the righteous fail? A taxi-driver (a true story, I believe) is in such a hurry to restore some Treasury notes left in his car that by mistake he drips petrol all the way; he gets no thanks for the notes, and is dismissed for careless waste instead. Ask him to believe that honesty is the best policy! But we, the children of the New Testament, are ready enough with our answer: the next world will set all right! But what if we cut out the next world from the solution? In that case we have the Book of Job, forty-two chapters

of it, and nearly eight hundred pages of commentary from Père Dhorme.

"La thèse de la sanction du bien et du mal, dès cette vie, thèse qui s'appuie sur la justice de Dieu rendant à chacun selon ses œuvres, est au fond de la morale juive" (p. cxiv). The learned editor thus faces the moral issue. In the three rounds of the debate Job's "friends" labour and labour and labour the point; but Job in the bitterness of his soul knows that the cheap solution does not apply, that the appalling extremity of his woe is not the chastisement of an equal offence. Like some Prometheus Bound he speaks, refusing to admit the justness of his torment upon such premises, yet not defiant, but immeasurably perplexed.

Moi, je sais que mon défenseur est vivant
Et que, le dernier, sur terre il se lèvera
Et derrière ma peau je me tiendrai debout
Et de ma chair je verrai Eloah (*i.e.*, God),
Lui que, moi, je verrai, moi,
Et que mes yeux regarderont, et non un autre :
Mes reins languissent dans mon sein! (xix 25-27).

Thus Job's supreme hope is confined to this world, in a passage whose difficulty makes it a good specimen of Père Dhorme's careful scholarship. At the end God will arise and Job shall see him; in xlii 5 he acknowledges the fulfilment of his hope, and his confusion at his own short and crabbed vision :

Par oui-dire j'avais entendu parler de toi,
Mais à présent mon œil t'a vu,
C'est pourquoi je m'abîme et me repens,
Sur la poussière et la cendre!

The previous passage cannot be translated with perfect certainty; and for the third line quoted I should be more inclined to render, "after they have struck off my skin, this!"—that is to say, "after my skin is wasted away, this shall come to pass"; a translation which has the advantage of keeping the Massoretic (*i.e.*, the Jewish traditional) text, for which in so perplexing a passage the presumption stands. But "*de ma chair*" seems clearly right: "la

préposition *min* indique clairement le point de vue, l'endroit d'où l'on regarde ou par où l'on regarde," says Père Dhorme, quoting Psalm xxxiii (Vulg., xxxii) 14; Cant. ii 9. He might perhaps have quoted the striking remark of St. John Chrysostom, that Job "knew nothing of the resurrection" (Migne, P.G. 52, 565). Not but that he believes in survival after death, but he finds little comfort in the thought:

Retire-toi de moi pour que je sois un peu gai,
 Avant que j'aie, pour n'en plus revenir,
 A la terre de ténèbres et d'ombre,
 Terre de noirceur et de désordres,
 Où la clarté est comme l'obscurité (x 20-22).

Truly he needs much enlightening; but most of all regarding those two brief scenes with which the book opens, at the court of God. Perhaps a little more space might have been devoted to the doctrine of a future life in the book, which sometimes perplexes readers.

All the while the reader, who has been supplied at the outset of the book with the key to the problem, awaits almost impatiently that all should be explained. And how little *is* explained! The wonders of creation are dwelt upon, but not the mystery that bewilders Job. Jehovah dwells upon the hippopotamus and the crocodile, whose very name almost brings a smile to our lips, but Père Dhorme (p. lxxiv) rightly insists upon the crowning poesy of these passages. The necessity of this divine intervention is absolutely required by the prologue (p. lxxvi), it is no afterthought; the puzzle, if puzzle there be, is to see why Job does not hear such words as are spoken to Tobias according to the Vulgate text (Tob. xii 13): "Because thou wast acceptable to God, it was necessary that temptation should try thee." It is the facts themselves which show that the probation was transitory, and that the whole debate was vain, not excluding (as he himself confesses) the part of Job, because this vital fact was not understood (pp. lxxi-lxxii). Even the sons and daughters are restored, and none are fairer than Jemimah and Keziah and Keren-happuch. Thus the bonds of this-

world sanction have not been burst; we almost wish, like a former Master of Balliol (E. Caird) in his "lay sermons," that the restitution had not been made, but perhaps a greater lesson is to be found in the withholding of the fuller light.

The main thesis is well expounded by Père Dhorme, and a full commentary offered which is strongest in philology. Some critical questions remain open to further discussion—for example, the date of the book. No doubt the learned editor would admit that the argument for placing Job between Zachary and Malachy (p. cxxxv) is a slender one; all the more so, if we consider, as we have here been doing, how undeveloped is the main ethic of the book, and how it would lag behind in the prophetic movement of the epoch. The appeal to Aramaic influence (p. cxlii) is important, but the story of Aramaic is itself a matter of some perplexity. "Ce qui semble clair," we read, "c'est que l'époque visée par l'auteur sacré est celle des Patriarches" (p. xviii); surely this must go for something, even if it be not easy to say precisely for how much.

Our editor has no taste for the intervention of Elihu, the cocksure young man who bursts in with his superior ideas, rates Job once more, and (as unfortunately will happen with such irrepressible cleverness) hits upon a considerable measure of the truth. Job and his friends endure him in silence, and even Jehovah ignores him. Must he be adjudged a later intruder, pushed in by an editor like unto himself? To me he seems the single utterly human touch in the book; and I would liken his discourses in some far-off way to the *ὑπόρχημα* of Greek tragedy, the bright dance-song preceding the crash. Dramatically he serves a vivid purpose; is the evidence sufficient to expel him? It appears to be rather too subjective for that.

And the *genre littéraire*! There, indeed, we have the problem. The three paragraphs explicitly devoted to this topic (pp. lxxxviii-lxxxix) can hardly be said to do much more than summarize the obvious. Perhaps we have here the most serious flaw in the book. One cannot but feel that in a monumental work of this kind the theological issue of inspiration and inerrancy should be fairly and

squarely faced, which in this case means the discussion of the historical character of Job: whether, in fact, we are held to suppose that this great succession of speeches represents a debate actually held and duly reported, at least in truthful summary. Our biblical experts need above all things to be experts upon the divine character of the sacred books, and in the case of such a book as Job the whole question calls for detailed examination.

Such an examination is what we most miss in this edition; but this must not blind us to the many good things there, and to the vast and erudite labour which has gone to the making of it—a labour indeed to which no review can possibly do justice. It is an advantage to the whole Church, and a welcome sign of the times, that it should be possible to produce so learned a work upon so large a scale. To it, as well as to the mighty series whereof it forms part, we wish all success, “unto the edification of the Church.”

C. L.

John Wesley. By William Holden Hutton, D.D., Dean of Winchester. Great English Churchmen Series. Macmillan and Co. 6s.

IN brief compass Dean Hutton has contrived to portray a vivid picture of his hero. It is sad, if instructive, reading. For it is the story of a *saint manqué*, because he was not a Catholic, and only the discipline of the complete Catholic system of faith and practice could have overcome the headstrong self-will which stood between Wesley and sanctity. Heroic energy, heroic self-devotion, heroic love of Jesus and souls—all these constituents of holiness were abundantly his; humility, obedience, self-effacement were lacking. Even the reasonable demands of episcopal authority were flouted (see the dialogue between Wesley and Bishop Butler, 105-7), and finally, in defiance of principles once accepted wholeheartedly, Wesley persuaded himself that he was empowered to ordain even to the episcopate. He therefore added schism to schism, and as a result of his insubordination the vast body of Christians which looks to him as its founder has been cut

off from those elements of Catholic teaching and practice even then operative or later to be revived in the Church of England, and possessed by a narrow Protestantism, well-nigh impenetrable to Catholic influences. The insistence on experienced conversion as essential to Christian holiness which has wrought such havoc among souls and proved so prolific of self-deception, the absurd, yet horribly cruel, system of education established in his Kingswood school, and the unfortunate mistake of a marriage in which Wesley did violence to his essentially celibate temperament and vocation—a marriage humiliating to himself, hampering to his work, and a source of misery to both parties—bear further witness to the dire effects, especially disastrous in proportion to the very greatness of his character, of Wesley's lack, however inculpable, of the Catholic Faith. A Catholic, Wesley might have taken his place with St. Ignatius; a Protestant, Wesley could only give life to a movement which, if powerful, was narrow and one-sided, and form a body which, while valiantly, and for a century and a half effectively, upholding in English-speaking countries the Banner of Christ against infidelity and sin, has always bitterly opposed the Church of Christ, and is to-day rapidly deteriorating into a nerveless ethical society without faith in the Son of God. On pp. 76-7 may be found a most important letter in which Wesley, with almost prophetic insight, foretold that only a vital as opposed to a conventional Christianity would be able to resist infidelity, then represented by the Deists. That vital religion which for many generations the Wesleyan body maintained powerfully, though in an ill-balanced and defective form, is now leaving its veins. Wesley's prophecy is becoming the condemnation of modern Wesleyanism.

We would invite attention to Wesley's remarkably candid strictures on the character of John Knox (98), and its effect on the Presbyterian ethos. "I know," he writes, "it is commonly said, 'The work to be done needed such a spirit.' Not so; the work of God does not, cannot, need the work of the devil to forward it." If only the writer had extended this principle to the entire body of Reformers and pursued its implications to the full!

We have noticed two obviously misprinted dates: 1785 for 1735 (42), 1730 for 1738 (50), and, surely, 1774 (73) can hardly be correct. The objection to the term "private" (p. 160) as used of college "collections" is unfounded. The term is obviously used to denote not secret, but peculiar to the college as opposed to the public examinations conducted by the University.

On p. 36 we read that James Hervey was perhaps the originator of the expression "imputed righteousness." Surely it belongs to the official terminology of Protestantism and is as old as Martin Luther—in a sense even older, since the Ockhamite theologians maintained in a milder form an imputed justice. Alike by the scale of his work and his undoubted, if defective, holiness, Wesley deserves that some Catholic should devote to his life some portion of the time and scholarship Catholics have spent on Luther. Meanwhile the present volume may serve as a useful introduction, well written, well arranged, and well balanced, to the biography of a great man and a fervent, if indiscreet, lover of God.

Facing Life. Meditations for Young Men. By Raoul Plus, S.J.
Translation approved by the author. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 2s. 6d.

THESE well translated meditations are eminently useful and practical and entirely devoid of the sentimentality which too often mars French spiritual books. The Christian life, indeed, is throughout represented as a battle demanding from its soldiers the utmost bravery and skill. In other words, this is a thoroughly Ignatian book. We would especially call attention to the meditations on "Conviction" (No. 40), "Experience" (41), "Thought for Others" (79), "Joy and Sorrow" (52). We are sorry, though the author could hardly avoid it, that in an otherwise beautiful and helpful passage from Lacordaire, the young man's destined bride is termed "a frail sweet creature." The meditation on "Heredity" (p. 96) accepts the disputed theory of the inheritance of acquired characters and pushes it to lengths which no scientist would approve. To say that the human race

existed on earth "*probably* much more" than 4,000 years before Christ is a ludicrous understatement (188). Nor can we subscribe to the statement (69), "Take away confession, chastity and hell, and the Church would have no more enemies." On all three points the Orthodox Eastern Church is entirely at one with the Catholic Church, yet the Greeks have been and are her bitter enemies. And why speak of "consoling God"? (54). A God whom His creatures could console were no God. It was, of course, only in His Manhood that Christ could be consoled.

Christ is King. By C. C. Martindale, S.J. A course of Sermons preached at Westminster Cathedral. Steed and Ward. 2s. 6d.

THESE arresting sermons serve admirably their purpose, to draw out the meaning of the new feast of Christ's Kingship. They begin where all effective preaching or instruction should begin, with the nature and attributes of God, whose significance for human life is elicited most forcibly. The subordinate plot of the sermons, to borrow a phrase from dramatic criticism, is the panegyric of two Jesuit Saints, Aloysius and Stanislaus Kostka. In the first of the several passages devoted to their praise, the preacher depicts most convincingly the actual option before them. If they had not chosen to answer God's call and become saints, they would have been, not sinners of the present day, but typical cinquecento sinners. Choosing to be saints, they equally became—though this is rather implied than explicitly stated by the preacher—not modern saints, even superficially intelligible to ourselves, but cinquecento saints, as alien therefore and inimitable in the manner, as abidingly imitable in the substance of their sanctity.

On p. 19 we read: "The modern conscience has no claim to be more right than were the consciences of . . . two thousand years ago." Of course, the moral teaching of Jesus retains its absolute validity. But the statement surely requires qualification. Lapse of time brings with it a racial education by experience, and this has its ethical aspect. The human conscience of two centuries ago, on

the Continent at least, saw nothing morally reprehensible in judicial torture. We do. Surely Fr. Martindale would allow that we are right on the point, our ancestors wrong. Nor do we like the definition of sin (p. 31), though, to be sure, it is not given as theologically accurate. "By sin I here mean deliberately doing less well than you know you could do and should do." A definition of sin which includes imperfection and would logically make the heroic vow to do always the more perfect a matter of obligation is misleading and calculated to trouble a scrupulous conscience. But we would not be misunderstood. Perusal of these fine sermons, equally inspiring and instructive, left with us, and will, we are sure, leave with other readers, a hearty admiration and a regret that we did not hear them, invested with the force and persuasiveness of the living voice.

The Mind of the Saints. By C. V. Trent. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 5s.

THIS book is a fresh and suggestive study of Catholic sanctity under the headings "Motive," "Asceticism," "Detachment," "Mysticism," "Martyrdom," and "Mission." The treatment of detachment is excellent. This extremely difficult question is handled with accurate thought and delicate discrimination. The solution amounts to Baron Von Hügel's formula, "a maximum of attachment permeated and purified by a maximum of detachment." Here, and in the further development of an appendix, the excessive self-torture practised by Fr. Doyle and most unfortunately published to the world is subjected to a reverent and cautious yet plain-spoken criticism which we cannot too highly commend. But the Stylite life was not a "perversion" in its period and place. Only some such extreme form of asceticism would have possessed the appeal actually exercised by the Stylites. And it is a pity that St. John of the Cross' doctrine of detachment should be called "strange" and a fantastic hypothesis, even indeed treated as a pre-Christian survival from Jewish Carmelites! The theory of detachment elaborated in the Ascent of

Mount Carmel is excessive only in its extension to all classes and conditions of Christians, nor is this extension consistently made. As applicable to the few souls called to ascend, even in this life, the sublime peaks of ecstasy, spiritual espousals and spiritual marriage, it is the ineluctable truth. St. John's doctrine of detachment is the logical consequence of his mystical theology, and unfortunately mystical theology is the weak spot in Mr. Trent's equipment. His chapter on Mysticism is the most unsatisfactory in the book. It is largely concerned with monasticism and the contemplative life. About mystical experience there is little. And that is, perhaps, no loss. For we are told that in the mystics "grace took the form of a *clear* perception of God" (54). Mr. Trent should have said an obscure touch. The mystics are defined as "those who made prayer their chief occupation." So do many souls who have never enjoyed mystical experience. Are "something adapted to the natural character" and "a special gift of God" alternatives? We have always thought it was characteristic of grace to be adapted to the nature of its recipient. And is there any race of Catholics without its mystics? We doubt it. The reader is, moreover, advised to ignore the post-Reformation mystics of the Continent—*e.g.*, St. Theresa and St. John of the Cross. "The best way for us perhaps is to short-circuit the later mystics, and pick up the threads of English Catholic piety where they were broken (at the Reformation)." Strange advice. There is no doubt a peculiar charm, for Englishmen at any rate, in the writings of our native mystics; but we cannot afford to neglect the masters of mystical theology because they were not British. Moreover, the English mystical tradition was not broken. It continued into the seventeenth century with the Benedictines, Gertrude Moore and Augustine Baker. And Fr. Baker, whose *Sancta Sophia* is a guide to mystical theology of singular beauty and usefulness, did *not* "short-circuit" the counter-Reformation mystics of the Continent. Without their writings, in which he was steeped, the treatises of *Sancta Sophia* could not have been written. Finally, Jesuit Mysticism is identified with the Spiritual Exercises

(65)—a method of meditation. This slipshod and uninformed treatment of mysticism detracts greatly from the value of these studies.

Letters of Louise Imogen Guiney. Edited by Grace Guiney. With a Preface by Agnes Repplier. Two vols. Harper Bros. 21s.

EVERY now and again in life or literature we are privileged to encounter figures of a goodness so pure, radiant, spontaneous, easy, and natural that we are tempted to indulge the fancy that apparently a race exists not involved in Adam's fall, who in spirit have never left Eden and live scattered among their less fortunate brethren for witness of that lost paradise. Such was Miss Guiney, and such does she appear in these letters which reflect a peculiarly charming and lovable personality. In a superficial sense they are a record of failure, for Miss Guiney's line of research—the minor literature of that seventeenth century which she loved, as it deserves to be loved—was so unpopular that her books found few readers, and in England, at any rate, her work was not wanted by the public. Moreover, her *magnum opus*, the definitive edition of Vaughan, never saw completion. But a soul of such pure flame could not really fail, and even from the external standpoint the future is before her. Her hero Vaughan waited some two and a half centuries before he emerged from deepest obscurity to his present fame. Without predicting a similar apotheosis for Miss Guiney, we may trust that her flute will always bear its part, if a minor one, in the orchestra of English poetry. We cannot but feel that her memory would have been better served by one volume of letters sold at a much lower price. Time and money are scarce—and lovers of literature are often pressed for both. No slight portion of the letters consists of uninteresting details about unimportant people—*e.g.*, Mrs. Moulton and Col. Higginson . . . “are to start June 1 on the *Pavonia*”—and, an even larger portion, of allusions often partially or wholly unintelligible. To take an example: Why did Grace Denslow, whoever she may be, break friendship with Miss Guiney? If we are not to

know, why mention the fact at all? The letters might most profitably have been thinned out and pruned on these lines. We cannot think that a certain letter, evidently the intimate outpouring of a depressed mood and largely concerned with the state of Miss Guiney's finances, should have been given to the public. Nor should it be assumed that the reader is acquainted with the story of Didymus and Theodore (vol. i, p. 218). A chronological table of the chief dates in Miss Guiney's life and the dates of her publications would have been of great assistance to the reader. Except for her unfortunate criticism of Pope Benedict's Christian efforts for peace, Miss Guiney's sympathies and tastes cannot fail to attract. The letters addressed to her Anglo-Catholic friend, Fr. Van Allen, are models of what Christian controversy should be, and we recommend them to the notice of Catholics engaged in controversy with Anglicans. We hope that this collection, in spite of its excessive length and cost, will reveal to many readers a personality of singular charm.

Everyday Life in Anglo-Saxon, Viking, and Norman Times.
Written and illustrated by Marjorie and C. H. B. Quennell.
B. T. Batsford. 5s.

A WELCOME addition to the series, indispensable to all who teach or learn English history, in which the authors make the dry bones of history live by skilfully reclothing them with the everyday life of our ancestors. In the present volume Saxon, Dane, and Norman appear as living and very human figures—no paste-board images set up by the schoolmaster to annoy school-children. Unfortunately the arrangement of the book is rather haphazard—a strange fault in writers who insist so strongly on the importance of a good plan. If the authors were not separated by close on a thousand years from the Vikings, we doubt whether they would have painted so flattering a portrait. For all their courage and energy these heroes were bloodthirsty savages. If the treatment of ecclesiastical affairs requires considerable supplementation it contains little, if anything, positively untrue.

DECISIONS OF ROMAN CONGREGATIONS

THE April number of the *Acta Apostolicæ Sedis* contains an Apostolic Letter conferring the title of Minor Basilica on the Rosary Church at Lourdes. The Consistorial Congregation announces the appointment of the Rev. Matthew Cullen to fill the vacant see of Kildare and Leighlin; and the newly formed Vicariate of the Suez Canal Zone is entrusted to Father Columban Dreyer, formerly Vicar Apostolic of Rabat. The Congregation of Rites promulgates certain additions to the Martyrology consequent upon the recent canonizations.

In May an Apostolic Constitution erects the new diocese of Amarillo, in Texas, formed from portions of the dioceses of San Antonio, Dallas, and El Paso, the former of which is raised to metropolitan rank, as is that of Santa Caterina or Florianopolis in Brazil. To the new Brazilian archdiocese are subordinated the two newly constituted sees of Lages and Joinville. The Constitutions of the Order of St. John of God, revised in accordance with the new code, are approved; the Abbey Church of Maria Laach, in the diocese of Trèves, is made a Minor Basilica.

The Holy Office promulgates an "Instruction" to Ordinaries dealing with "sensual and sensuo-mystical literature." Attention is drawn therein to the recent increase of publications, mostly novels, plays, and journalistic publications, with tendencies to sensuality and a sort of lascivious mysticism, and often containing detailed descriptions of vice and immorality. Such publications are to be considered as forbidden in the same way as if they were expressly named in the *Index*, and Bishops are to warn the faithful of the prohibition to read such publications, and if they deem it necessary, to denounce any particular publication to the Holy See.

An important instruction of the Congregation of Rites deals with the masses which are to be celebrated during the Forty Hours' Exposition.

The June *Acta* contains a decree rendering the Ligurian diocese of Luni-Sarzana henceforth subject to the metropolitan authority of Genoa; it had previously been directly subject to the Holy See.

A summary is given of the findings of the Rota in the nullity suit of Cavaliere Marconi.

